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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, Michael J. Hines,
and respectfully submit this Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support ofDefendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The undisputed facts set forth herein are established by the deposition testimony of
plaintiff Jacklin Land Company's ("Jacklin") corporate representatives, consisting of Jacklin's
Property Manager (Pat Leffel), Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) corporate designee (Tom Stoeser), and
Jacklin's CFO (Tom Stoeser). Cited deposition pages are attached as Exhibits to the Affidavit
afMichael J. Hines (Exhibit A-Leffel's deposition; Exhibit B-Rule 30(b)(6) deposition; and
Exhibit C-Stoeser deposition).

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
A.

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF PAT LEFFEL, JACKLIN'S PROPERTY
MANAGER.

1.

Pat Leffel was Jacklin's Property Manager :from 1993 through September 2008.

Hines Aff, Exhibit A, p.ll. Mr. Leffel handled all lease negotiations with prospective tenants.
Id. at pp. 12-13. He would make recommendations to Jacklin whether the prospective tenant
was a suitable tenant. Id. at p. 14. On behalf of Jacklin, he was the person in charge of, and the
first person to contact, to tenants complying with property restrictions and the applicable
CC&Rs. Id. atpp.14-15.
2.

Mr. Leffel was very familiar with the recorded CC&Rs applicable to Riverbend

Commerce Park, and testified that he had a full understanding of the applicable CC&Rs. Id. at
p.15.

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
MATERIAL FACTS: 2

521

3.

Mr. Leffel testified that if a prospective tenant was proposing an incompatible

use for the property located in Riverbend Commerce Park, he would have discontinued lease
negotiations on behalf ofJacklin. Id. at p. 19.
4.

In the April 2008 time period, Pat Leffel met with defendant Blue Dog RV,

Inc. 's ("Blue Dog") Sales Manager, Dave Russell, at Blue Dog's RV shopping center located at
Treaty Rock, Post Falls, Idaho. Id. at pp. 28-29. At the time that Mr. Leffel talked with Dave
Russell, Mr. Leffel knew that Blue Dog was an RV shopping center and had visited their site
operation. Id. at p. 29.
5.

After Mr. Leffel's visit to Blue Dog Treaty Rock site, Dave Russell called Pat

Leffel to look at property located in the Riverbend Commerce Park as a potential site to
relocate its RV shopping center. Id. at 35.
6.

Following Mr. Russell's inquiry, Mr. Leffel showed Blue Dog six lots owned by

Jacklin at Riverbend Commerce Park located just across the street from the KLP property
ultimately leased to Blue Dog. Id. at p. 37. Mr. Leffel showed these lots for the specific intent
of Blue Dog relocating their RV shopping center to those lots. Id. at p. 38.
7.

When Mr. Russell inquired to Mr. Leffel about the availability ofthe lots due

north across the street (hereafter, the "KLP property" which is owned by the defendants KLP
Owners), Mr. Leffel gave Mr. Russell the owners' contact information to make inquiries
regarding another potential leasing site. Id. at pp. 39-40.
8.

Over the course of four months, from April to July 2008, Mr. Leffel negotiated

with Mr. Russell concerning leasing space to Blue Dog to relocate their RV shopping center to
Jacklin's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 75.

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
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9.

Ultimately, the lease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog focused on

leasing Lots 1 - 4 of Jacklin's property, which were vacant, undeveloped lots directly across the
street from the KLP property (which also consisted of four undeveloped lots) Id. at p. 41.

10.

Jacklin extended lease terms to Blue Dog for the lease of Jacklin's property.

Blue Dog felt that the lease rate was too high. Id. at p. 44.
11.

On July 7,2008, Mr. Russell informed Mr. Leffel that Blue Dog had decided to

lease space from KLP, the property straight across the street from the property Jacklin offered
to lease to Blue Dog. Id. at p. 47.

12.

Prior to July 7,2008, during all of lease negotiations between Blue Dog and

Jacklin to relocate Blue Dog RV's shopping center to Jacklin's property, Jacklin never
informed Blue Dog that an RV shopping center was an incompatible use or otherwise restricted
in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 48. Up until Jacklin learned that Blue Dog had
leased space from KLP on July 7,2008, Jacklin never informed Blue Dog that their RV
shopping center would be violative of any CC&R or any other restriction. Id. at p. 49.

Q.

And during that same time period, the April through July 7th , up
until when they informed you they had leased other property, you
had never informed them that that RV shopping center that they
proposed relocating to Lots 1,2,3 and 4 colored in orange was an
incompatible use to any of Riverbend Commerce Park's CC&Rs;
correct?

A.

We really didn't get into the CC&Rs. I didn'tAgain, it's a -- No.

Q.

You never communicated that.
No.

A.
Q.

And, in fact, you never communicated that the proposed use as an
RV shopping center would have been violative of any restriction
applicable to Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 colored in orange, correct?

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
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A.

Correct.

Q.

And Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Phase 1 colored in orange are subject to
the CC&Rs that we've talked about that have been marked as
Exhibit 1,2 and 3, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And at the time, this April through July i h time period when
you're dealing with Dave Russell of Blue Dog, you were aware
that these CC&Rs applied to the property you were talking about
leasing, potentially leasing, to Blue Dog; correct?

A.

Correct.

Id. at pp. 49-50.
13.

Jacklin never informed Blue Dog until it leased space from KLP that Blue Dog

could not operate an RV shopping center in Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at pp. 53-54.
14.

Jacklin remained interested in leasing space to Blue Dog to operate its RV

shopping center until Blue Dog terminated the lease negotiations after it indicated it had leased
space from KLP. Id. at p. 54.
15.

During the entire time that Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease its

property, Pat Leffel believed that Blue Dog's proposed RV shopping center was a compatible
use with the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 55. Mr. Leffel believed that Blue Dog's
proposed RV shopping center was consistent with the purpose ofthe Riverbend Commerce
Park as described in the CC&Rs preamble; to wit: "The development is also intended to be a
vivacious business park where manufacturing, warehousing and assorted commercial endeavors
can enthusiastically pursue profit in an economical and beautiful environment." Id. at p. 59.

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
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16.

Jacklin never expressed any concerns about Blue Dog's RV shopping center

being an incompatible use until Jacklin realized Blue Dog had leased space from a competitor.
Id. at pp. 77-79.
17.

Once Blue Dog relocated its RV operation to the KLP property, Jacklin told

KLP and Blue Dog that Blue Dog had to immediately vacate the property. Id. at p. 63. Other
than telling Blue Dog to vacate the property, Jacklin never worked with Blue Dog to address
any site concerns. Id. at p. 64.
Q.

Let's make sure we get a clean record on that. Other than telling
them to vacate the property, did you ever work with them on a site
plan to address your concerns?

A.

No.

Q.

So the only option you gave them was to leave as opposed to
addressing the esthetic concerns that you might have, correct?

A.

Through correspondence.

Q.

Correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Is it fair to say that you made no effort whatsoever to work with
Blue Dog on a site plan?
MR. MAGNUSON: Again, I presume you're asking him
individually.

MR. HINES: Correct.
THE WITNESS: No.

Q.

(BY MR. HINES)

A.

Correct statement.

Correct statement?

Id. at pp. 94-65.
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18.

Jacklin never gave Blue Dog the opportunity to make any site improvements.

Id. at p. 63. Jacklin never infonned Blue Dog that it could stay on the property if they did site
improvements. Id. at p. 63. Jacklin made no effort whatsoever to work with Blue Dog on a site
plan. Id. at p. 65. There was nothing that Blue Dog could have done to address Jacklin's
concerns about the RV operation other than to vacate the property. Id. at pp. 65-66.
19.

Jacklin's specific concerns about Blue Dog's operation consists of three items:

(1) parking RV trailers on dirt; (2) the appearance of some canvas signage; and (3) moving RV
units up and down Riverside Avenue, the same street that separates the KLP property from
Jacklin's property. Id. at p. 66. Jacklin admits that it never worked with Blue Dog to address
any of the three concerns. Id. at p. 67. When Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease
its property, it never raised the issue ofRV traffic on Riverside Avenue, which is the same
arterial accessing either the KLP property or the Jacklin property. Id. at p. 67.
20.

Similarly, Mr. Leffel never told Blue Dog that it would have to asphalt Jacklin's

property if it leased that space. Id. at pp. 93-94.
21.

Jacklin's preference was to execute a lease with Blue Dog as opposed to Blue

Dog reaching a deal involving the KLP property. Id. at p. 76. To fulfill its desire to lease space
to Blue Dog, Pat Leffel took the initiative to keep the lease negotiations with Blue Dog going
forward. Id. at p. 76. Jacklin never had any concerns about the RV center being a prohibited
use under the CC&Rs until after Blue Dog signed a lease with KLP and Jacklin's attorneys got
involved. Id. at p. 95
22.

After Blue Dog infonned Mr. Leffel that Blue Dog had leased space from KLP,

all of the emails from Mr. Leffel to defendants advising them of Blue Dog's incompatible use

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
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were ghost written by Jacklin's attorney. Id. at pp. 102-103. Mr. Leffel never told the KLP
recipients of his emails that his emails were being ghost written by an attorney. Id. at pp. 121122.
23.

When Mr. Leffel sent these emails to Blue Dog and KLP, he was not aware of

any specific violation ofthe CC&Rs as a result of Blue Dog RV shopping operation. Id. at pp.
112-113. At the time ofthose email communications.Mr. Leffel was not aware of how Blue
Dog's operation as a RV shopping center any way interfered with other property owners use of
their property. Id. at p. 114.
24.

With respect to the 1990 Development Agreement, prior to the Blue Dog

relocating its R V operation neither KLP nor any of the prior owners were ever in violation of
that agreement, notwithstanding that no first class shopping center was ever built on Lots 1 - 6
of that property. Id. atpp. 114-115,119-120.
25.

As to the CC&R articles that applied to the KLP property, Mr. Leffel testified

that there is no material difference between those CC&R articles and those which applied to
Jacklin's property right across the street which it offered to lease to Blue Dog. Id. at pp. 110111.
26.

Mr. Leffel further testified that, with respect to complying with the CC&Rs

Articles, Blue Dog's current use of the KLP property does not differ from the use proposed by
Blue Dog for Jacklin's property. Id. at pp. 112, 168.
Q.

So why would their use ofthe property on the Cordes property be
any different than their use of the property on the Jacklin property
as it relates to compliance with Articles II, III, IV, V and VI of the
CC&Rs?

A.

I don't believe they are. But I'm not an attorney.

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
MATERIAL FACTS: 8

527

Id. at p. 112.
27.

After Jacklin informed KLP that Blue Dog's operation was in violation ofthe

controlling CC&Rs, Jacklin provided KLP with the 2006 CC&R Declaration which by all
accounts is inapplicable to the KLP property. Id. at pp. 123-124.
28.

The same four lots which Jacklin offered to lease to Blue Dog have been used

by Jacklin as a temporary parking area in conjunction with heavy equipment auctions that were
occurring on the adjoining property. Id. at p. 136. Jacklin charged and received parking fees
for this temporary use. Id. at p. 137. Notwithstanding this temporary use, Jacklin did not make
any site improvements to the undeveloped lots. Id. at p. 136. Jacklin never analyzed whether
its temporary use violated the applicable CC&Rs. Id. at p. 137. Jacklin never advised other
property owners in Riverbend Commerce Park of Jacklin's temporary use or obtained their
permission. Id. at pp. 142-143 . Jacklin recently curtailed this temporary use of their property
due to concerns of environmental contamination caused by this temporary use. Id. at p. 137.
29.

Jacklin's use of its Lots 1-4 as a parking lot facilitated the auction of heavy

equipment occurring on the property immediately to the West of both the Jacklin and KLP
properties. Id. at pp. 139-140. The heavy equipment was parked on that adjacent property and
clearly visible from both Jacklin's and KLP's properties. Id. at pp. 139-140. RV auctions were
also held on the adjacent property, where a high volume ofRV rigs would be parked for the
sale. Jacklin also stores tractors on its adjoining property, which it concedes could be a
violation of the CC&Rs. Id. at pp. 148-149.
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B.

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF JACKLIN'S RULE 30(b)(6)
CORPORATE DESIGNEE

30.

Tom Stoeser was Jacklin's Property Manager from 1988 until 1993 when Pat

Leffel was hired. Hines Aff., Exhibit B, p. 11.
31.

Ifa tenant at Riverbend Commerce Park was in violation of the applicable

CC&Rs, Jacklin's policy would be to notify the offending tenant as soon as possible. Id. at p.
13.
32.

Prior to Blue Dog's tenancy, Jacklin never believed that KLP's or its

predecessors' use ofthe KLP property was in violation of any CC&Rs.
33.

The 1990 Agreement (attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Richard A.

Cordes, and hereafter referred to as the "Development Agreement") is the Agreement at issue
in this lawsuit. Id. at pp. 17-18, 21.
34.

The Development Agreement was drafted by Jacklin, and not QCA, the other

signatory to the Agreement. Id. at p. 20.
35.

The fact that KLP Lots 1 - 4 remained undeveloped was not a violation of the

Development Agreement. Id. at pp. 25-26. The fact that Lots 1 - 4 do not have a first class
shopping center on them is not a violation of the Development Agreement. Id. at pp. 26-27.
36.

Only when the KLP property is developed does KLP have to construct a first

class shopping center on the developed property. Id. at p. 27.
37.

After Blue Dog took over the tenancy ofKLP's property, that property was not

developed in any fashion. Id. at p. 28. No building was constructed on that property. Id.
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38.

Under the Development Agreement, there is no time frame to construct a first

class shopping center. Id. at p. 27, 33. Jacklin had the opportunity to insert a time requirement
if it had wanted. Id. at p. 34.
39.

The Development Agreement does not use the verbiage that Lots 1 - 17 have to

be used as a first class shopping center. Id. at p. 31. The Agreement further does not state that
all of the Lots 1 -17 have to be used as a first class shopping center. Id. at p. 32. The
Agreement does not prohibit multiple operations on Lots 1 - 17. Id. at pp. 34-35. The
Agreement does not expressly prohibit the use of the property in another form. Id. The
Development Agreement further does not prevent KLP from selling Lots 1 - 4 of the original
purchased Lots 1 - 17. Id. at p. 24. There could be a completely separate development on Lots
1 - 4. Id. at pp. 24-25.

40.

The Development Agreement does not specifically prohibit the use of an RV

center. Id. at p. 33.
41.

The only provision of Articles 2 - 6 of the 1989 CC&Rs which Jacklin could

point to as purportedly prohibiting the temporary use of Lots 1 - 17 is Article 3.11. Id. at pp.
35-36,38,41. Jacklin admits that Article 3.11 only applies to a parking lot. Id. at p. 39.
42.
IS.

The Development Agreement does not define what a first class shopping center

Id. at p. 42. Jacklin cannot express what constitutes a first-class shopping center. Id. at p.

43. Jacklin does not know the distinction between a first class, second-class, and third-class
shopping center. Id. The CC&Rs do not define what a first class shopping center is. The
Development Agreement does not even define what a "shopping center" is. Id. at p. 44.
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43.

When asked whether a first class shopping center is inherently ambiguous,

Jacklin answered: "I don't know." Id. at p. 45. Jacklin does not know if an RV sales operation
could constitute a first class shopping center because Jacklin never defined the term. Id. at p.
47.
44.

Jacklin conceded that a RV sales operation could constitute a first class

shopping center. Id. at p. 48.
45.

The recorded 1989 CC&Rs for Riverbend Commerce Park do not apply to Lots

1 - 17 (the KLP property). Only Articles 2 - 6 of the 1989 CC&Rs apply contractually to that
property. Id. at pp. 49-50. When asked whether the 1989 CC&Rs were already terminated
prior to the incorporation of Articles 2 - 6 of those CC&Rs into the Development Agreement,
Jacklin answered: "I don't know." Id. at p. 51.
46.

The Jacklin's property that it offered to lease to Blue Dog is subject to the 2006

Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs. Id. at p. 56. Articles 2 - 6 of the 2006 CC&Rs are similar
to Articles 2 through 6 found in the 1989 CC&Rs which purportedly apply to the KLP
property. Id. at p. 56. The only material difference is Article 3.11 addressing the parking
restriction. Id. at p. 57.
47.

Jacklin is not aware of any changes in Articles 2 - 6 in the 2006 CC&Rs, as

compared to Articles 2 - 6 in the 1989 CC&Rs, that would make an RV operation more
permissible under the 2006 CC&Rs than the 1989 CC&Rs. Id. at p. 59.
48.

Other than giving KLP a copy of the wrong CC&Rs, Jacklin did nothing to work

with KLP to submit a site plan concerning the Blue Dog operation. Id. at p. 66. The only thing
that Jacklin did to work with KLP on site issues concerning the Blue Dog operation was
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testified to in Mr. Leffel's deposition. Id. at p. 67. There is no written communication
indicting that Jacklin was willing to work with KLP on site issues. Id. at p. 74.
49.

Jacklin never identified for defendants a specific CC&R article or restriction

that Blue Dog is purportedly in violation of. Id. at pp. 78-79.
50.

Jacklin confinned, as expressed in a letter from its attorney to KLP, that

notwithstanding any efforts made by KLP to obtain Jacklin's consent and approval for Blue
Dog's operations, Jacklin would have denied it. Id. at pp. 82-84. No matter how Blue Dog
developed the RV operation on KLP's property, it would have been unacceptable in the eyes of
Jacklin. Id. at p. 88.
51.

Blue Dog offered to make $50,000 worth of site improvements, which Jacklin

rejected. Id. at pp. 85-86. Even with such site improvements, Jacklin would not have approved
Blue Dog's use of the property. Id.
52.

Jacklin believed that Blue Dog's operation was compliant with the Riverbend

CC&Rs when Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property. Id. at pp. 8687. It was Blue Dog who cut off the lease negotiations with Jacklin, not vice versa. Id. at p.
92.
53.

Jacklin cannot identify any monetary damages or injury as a result of Blue

Dog's operation. Id. at p. 89. Blue Dog's operation has not caused any irreparable hann, and
Jacklin is not aware of any facts to indicate Jacklin has been irreparably harmed. Id. Jacklin
cannot identify a single lost tenant or purchaser of property in Riverbend Commerce Park as a
result of Blue Dog's RVoperation. Id. at p. 121.
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54.

Jacklin admits that it has used its undeveloped lots, located directly across from

the KLP property, for a temporary commercial use. Id. at p. 94. Jacklin has used its vacant lots
as a parking lot for which it received compensation. Id. Notwithstanding putting its
undeveloped property into commercial use, Jacklin did not prepare a site plan, or perform any
landscaping or parking upgrades. Id.
55.

Jacklin admits that RV auctions occur on the property immediately to the West

of Jacklin's and KLP's undeveloped properties. Id. at p. 100. Numerous RV units are parked
on site during the auctions. Id. at p. 100.
56.

When Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property, Jacklin

did not believe that the Blue Dog operation was contrary to a premier commerce park such as
Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at p. 120.
57.

Even though Jacklin believed that an RV center could constitute a first class

shopping center, Jacklin never told KLP that belief. Id. at p. 124.
58.

Jacklin never offered to sit down with KLP and work through site issues

concerning the Blue Dog operation. Id. at p. 126. Jacklin never communicated to KLP the
type of site improvements that would need to take place for the Blue Dog operation. Id.
C.

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF TOM STOESER, JACKLIN'S CFO.

59.

Tom Stoeser, Jacklin's CFO, never expressed any concerns to Pat Leffel,

Jacklin's Property Manager, that Blue Dog's proposed RV operation on Jacklin's property in
Riverbend Commerce Park would be an incompatible use. Hines Aff., Exhibit C, p. J2.
60.

The owners of Blue Dog agreed to personally guarantee the proposed lease

between Blue Dog and Jacklin for the lease of Jacklin's property. Id. at p. 14.
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61.

After Blue Dog infonned Jacklin that Blue Dog had leased property from KLP,

Jacklin did not work with Blue Dog to address any site concerns prior to ordering Blue Dog off
the property. Id. at p. 19,28. Jacklin never extended any offer to work with Blue Dog on site
issues. Id.
62.

Mr. Stoeser never asked Blue Dog for a site plan, let alone requested one, prior

to demanding that Blue Dog vacate the KLP property. Id. at p. 27.
63.

Mr. Stoeser testified that any efforts made by KLP to obtain site approval from

Jacklin for Blue Dog's operation would have been futile because Jacklin would have rejected it.
Id. at pp. 32-34.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a case about sour grapes.
Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company ("Jacklin") negotiated with defendant Blue Dog RV,
Inc. ("Blue Dog") for four months to relocate Blue Dog's RV shopping center to undeveloped
land owned by Jacklin in Riverbend Commerce Park located in Post Falls, Idaho. At all times
during these discussions, Jacklin represented that Blue Dog's RV sales operation was a
compatible use in the business park and a permitted use under the applicable CC&Rs. Jacklin
was excited about the prospect of Blue Dog relocating to Riverbend Commerce Park, and
raised no concerns whatsoever about Blue Dog's operation. During the course of the
negotiations, Jacklin even referred Blue Dog to property right across the street from Jacklin's
proposed lease site as additional property which Blue Dog could acquire for its RV operation or
for a temporary staging site for its RV units. This adjacent property (hereafter, the "KLP
property") is owned by the defendants KLP ownership group.
Jacklin's attitude toward Blue Dog's RV operation only changed when Blue Dog
advised Jacklin that it had received better lease terms from KLP and that it was no longer
interested in leasing Jacklin's property. Having lost out in the lease negotiations, Jacklin turned
a new face toward Blue Dog's RV operation, claiming for the first time that it was an
incompatible use and ordering Blue Dog to immediately vacate KLP's property. Further,
Jacklin categorically refused to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns
which Jacklin had regarding Blue Dog's operation.
Jacklin subsequently commenced suit against defendants seeking to permanently enjoin
Blue Dog's operation on KLP's property. The purported basis is a 1990 Development
Agreement signed by Jacklin and KLP's predecessor. Plaintiff has now filed a motion for
summary judgment asking the Court to enjoin Blue Dog's operation, and defendants have filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal ofplaintiff's complaint.
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The Court should grant defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment and deny
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment for the following reasons. First, under contract
construction standards governing the interpretation and enforceability of restrictive covenants,
including the requirement that all ambiguities are to be interpreted in favor of the free use of
land, the 1990 Development Agreement does not expressly or by implication prohibit Blue
Dog's RV operation. Second, Jacklin admits that it has suffered no irreparable injury as
required to obtain injunctive relief. Third, Jacklin's refusal to work with Blue Dog and KLP to
address Blue Dog's RV operation and any site concerns constitutes a breach ofthe1990
Development Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which bars
Jacklin from asserting claims against defendants under the Agreement. Lastly, defendants'
affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel, ground in Jacklin's inequitable reversal of its
position as to whether Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permitted operation in Riverbend
Commerce Park, bars plaintiffs request for injunctive relief.

II. FACTS
A.

MATERIAL BACKGROUND FACTS.
1.

KLP's and Jacklin's Properties at Issue.

The KLP property and the Jacklin property at issue are directly across from each other
in the Riverbend Commerce Park and are separated by the same arterial, Riverside Avenue.
KLP owns Lots 1 through 17, Phase I, Block 1, in Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit ofRick
Cordes,

~

4. KLP Lots 1-4 are undeveloped. Lots 5 through 6 are paved parking lots. Lots 7-

17 consist of the constructed Outlet Mall. Id. The Jacklin property at issue consists of Lots 14, Phase I, Block 2 in Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit ofMichael J Hines, Exhibit A
(Leffel Depo.), p. 37. These four lots are nearly identical in location and condition to the KLP

property. Cordes AjJ.,

~

6. Both consist of undeveloped lots, accessed by the same arterial.

Both are grass covered and neither is paved nor graveled. Id.
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For four months, from April to July 2008, Jacklin extensively negotiated with Blue
Dog for Blue Dog to relocate its RV shopping center to Jacklin's four undeveloped lots, Lots 14. Hines Aff, Exh. A, pp. 75-76. Ultimately, Blue Dog chose to lease property from KLP for its

RV shopping center operation. Affidavit ofDave Russell,

~

15. The leased KLP property

consists ofthe four undeveloped Lots 1 through 4 (where Blue Dog parks non-motorized RV
units), the two paved Lots 5 through 6 (where Blue Dog parks its motorized RV units), and Lot
7 upon which sits the Western edge of the constructed Outlet Mall which Blue Dog uses as its
sales office. Cordes Aff.,

2.

~

5.

The 1990 Development Agreement and Applicable CC&Rs.

The defendant owners of the KLP property purchased Lots 1 through 17 in 2005 from
Prime Retail, Inc., a successor in ownership to Quality Centers Associates ("QCA"). Id. at ~ 7.
QCA purchased that property from Jacklin in approximately 1990. Id. As consideration of
QCA's purchase of Lots 1 through 17 from Jacklin, the parties executed a development
agreement which was recorded on November 7, 1990 (hereafter, the "Development
Agreement"). Id., Exhibit B.
In the Development Agreement, QCA agreed to "construct and maintain upon said
Purchased Property [Lots 1-17], a first class shopping center. ... " Id. at ~ 8. QCA complied
with the 1990 Development Agreement by constructing the Outlet Mall in approximately 1991.
Id. Significantly, the Outlet Mall only physically sits on and comprises Lots 7-17, with Lots 56 comprising a paved parking lot. Id. Lots 1-4 have always remained undeveloped lots. Id.
Lots 5-6 never had a building constructed upon it. Id. Thus, no building was ever constructed
and maintained on Lots 1-7. Id.
In consideration of QCA purchasing Lots 1-17 from Jacklin, the 1990 Development
Agreement also removed the previously recorded Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs as
encumbrances upon Lots 1-17. Id. at

,r 9.

The CC&Rs applied to property within the
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Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Thus, no recorded CC&Rs instrument applies to KLP's Lots
1-17. Id. In the Development Agreement, QCA did agree contractually to continue to comply
with Articles 2 though 6 of the previously existing CC&Rs, but the 1990 Development
Agreement expressly removed the Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs as recorded
encumbrances against Lots 1-17. Id.
When KLP acquired Lots 1-17 in 2005, Lots 1-4 remained undeveloped and no first
class shopping center had been constructed on those lots. Id. at ~ 10. At no time did Jacklin
ever advise KLP or its predecessors that either were in violation ofthe 1990 Development
Agreement because no first class shopping center was constructed on Lots 1-4. Id. This is
because the Development Agreement only required a first class shopping center to be
constructed and maintained upon the Purchased Property as a whole, which was satisfied by
constructing the Outlet Mall on Lots 7-17 in approximately 1991. Id. The Development
Agreement did not require that a first class shopping center be physically constructed upon and
maintained on all 17 lots. Id. Jacklin permitted and expressly approved the use of the property
in this fashion for nearly 18 years. Id.; Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 119-120. Prior to leasing Lots 1
through 7 to Blue Dog in July 2008, at no time did Jacklin ever advise KLP that it was in
violation of any agreement or use restriction by not having constructed a first class shopping
center on Lots 1 through 4. Cordes Aff.,

3.

~

11; Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 114-115.

Jacklin's Four Months of Negotiations with Blue Dog to Relocate Its RV
Shopping Center to Jacklin's Property.

From April through July 2008, Jacklin and Blue Dog extensively negotiated Blue Dog's
potential lease of Jacklin's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Russell Aff. at

~

9.

Jacklin's Property Manager, Pat Leffel, first met Blue Dog's Sales Manager, Dave Russell,
when Mr. Leffel visited Blue Dog's prior location at Treaty Rock Plaza in Post Falls, Idaho.
Id. at 4. Mr. Leffel, who is in charge of all lease negotiations and enforcement of CC&Rs for
Jacklin at Riverbend Commerce Park, was fully aware of Blue Dog's RV shopping center
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operation. Id.; Hines Af[., Exh. A., p. 29. A short time later, Blue Dog contacted Mr. Leffel and
inquired about available space in the Riverbend Commerce Park where Blue Dog could
relocate its RV shopping center. Russell Ajf.,

~

5. Mr. Leffel responded very enthusiastically,

and ultimately identified Lots 1 through 4 owned by Jacklin as a suitable lease site. Id. at ~ ~ 6,
10. Discussions also occurred involving Blue Dog's lease ofa building owned by Jacklin just
South of Lots 1-4 to house Blue Dog's service operation. Id. at 8. Jacklin's Property Manager
was fully aware of Blue Dog's intended use for its property, and at no time did Jacklin ever
raise any concerns about an RV shopping center constituting an incompatible use or otherwise
violating any CC&Rs or restrictions in place at Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at ~~ 8,9. To
the contrary, during the four months of negotiations, Jacklin indicated that it was very excited
about the prospect ofleasing space to Blue Dog for its RV shopping center in Riverbend
Commerce Park. Id. at ~~ 6, 9.
Negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog progressed to the point where Jacklin's
Property Manager stated that he would draft up lease terms and determine the rental rate for
Blue Dog to lease Jacklin's property for its RV shopping center operation. Id. at ~ 11. Jacklin
also asked at this time for Blue Dog's financial information which Blue Dog provided. Id.
Jacklin further requested the owners of Blue Dog to personally guarantee the lease. Hines Ajf.,
Exhibit C (Stoeser Depo.), p. 14. Ultimately, Jacklin extended a lease rental rate offer to Blue

Dog of approximately $25,000 per month for a ten year term. Russell Ajf.,

~

11.

After receiving Jacklin's proposed financial terms for the lease, Blue Dog inquired
about the four lots directly across the street to the North from Jacklin's proprty (the KLP
property). Id. at '112. Those lots, while very similar to Jacklin's four undeveloped lots, were
slightly closer to Interstate 90 and therefore more visible to vehicle traffic. Id. Mr. Russell
told Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog would like to pursue acquiring rights to that
property as well. In response, Jacklin's Property Manager told Blue Dog that the property was
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not owned by Jacklin but that he would be happy to put Blue Dog in contact with the owners
(KLP). Id.; Hines Ajf., Exh. A, p. 39. Jacklin gave Blue Dog Rick Cordes' contact infonnation
as a representative ofKLP, one of the owners ofthe KLP property. Id. Jacklin's Property
Manager further offered to contact Mr. Cordes on Blue Dog's behalf. Russell Ajf.,

~

12. At

this time, there was no doubt that Jacklin was aware that Blue Dog's potential interest in the
KLP property, as well as in Jacklin's property, was for the relocation of Blue Dog's RV
operation. Id.; Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 48.
Mr. Cordes responded to Blue Dog that KLP might in fact be interested in leasing some
of the KLP property to Blue Dog. Cordes Ajf.,

~

13. KLP had chosen not to further develop

Lots 1-4 based on the uncertainty of where and when the new Beck Road interchange would
be built connecting into Interstate 90. Id. Once that interchange was built, which would give
direct access to the Western portion of the Riverbend Commerce Part and KLP's property, it
would affect the type of tenants attracted to the KLP property, and hence, the type of
development that would occur. Id. Accordingly, KLP was interested in Blue Dog's overture
and its proposed temporary use of Lots 1-4. Id.

4.

Blue Dog's Decision to Lease Property from KLP.

Blue Dog then proceeded to have lease negotiations with both KLP and Jacklin. Russell
Ajf.,

~

13. Blue Dog specifically indicated to KLP that Blue Dog was also still negotiating with

Jacklin to use Jacklin's property directly across the street for its RV shopping center operation.
Cordes Ajf.,

~

14. During this time period, Blue Dog also raised the issue to Jacklin of Blue

Dog needing a temporary site to move its RV units ifit ultimately leased property in the
commerce park. Russell Ajf.,

~

14. In response, Jacklin's Property Manager again referred

Blue Dog to the KLP property as a potential temporary site for the RV units. To facilitate this,
Jacklin even offered to assist Blue Dog in obtaining City approval for the temporary use of
parking RV units on the KLP property. Id.
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Ultimately, Blue Dog found KLP's lease terms to be better than Jacklin's and decided
to lease with KLP. Russell Aff,

~

15. On July 1,2008, KLP signed a lease with Blue Dog for

Lots 1-7 to relocate and operate their RV shopping center. Cordes Aff, ~ 15. Because it was
Jacklin's own Property Manager who referred Blue Dog to KLP, KLP never dreamed that
Jacklin would subsequently take the position that an RV operation was an impermissible use in
the Riverbend Commerce Park or specifically on KLP's property. Id. Indeed, Jacklin was the
developer ofthe Riverbend Commerce Park who drafted the controlling CC&Rs, so if anyone
should have been aware of a restriction, it should have been Jacklin. Id. KLP had absolutely
no reason to question the appropriateness of Blue Dog's RV operation on its property based on
the fact that Blue Dog was referred and recommended to KLP by Jacklin's Property Manager-the very source from whom KLP would have otherwise sought approval. Id. Moreover, KLP
was aware that Jacklin was pursuing the same use on their own property, further reinforcing for
KLP the legitimacy and approval of an RV sales operation. Id.

5.

Blue Dog's Relocation of its RV Shopping Center to the KLP Property.

During approximately the first week of July 2008, Blue Dog relocated its RV shopping
center to the KLP property. Blue Dog's relocated operation is precisely the type ofRV
shopping center that Blue Dog had communicated to Jacklin's Property Manager during the
four months that Jacklin and Blue Dog negotiated a potential lease. Russell Aff,

~

21. It is the

same type ofRV operation that Jacklin's Property Manager saw when he visited Blue Dog's
operation at Treaty Rock. Id.
Upon relocating Blue Dog's shopping center to the KLP property, defendants did not
develop the property or erect any structures. Id. at ~ 22. Essentially, non-motorized RV units
are parked on the four vacant lots. Motorized RV units are parked on the two paved lots. Blue
Dog then also uses a previously constructed office building connected to the Outlet Malls to
perfonn office work. Cordes Aff,

~

5.
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6.

Jacklin's Uncompromising Demand to Blue Dog to Vacate the KLP Site
and Refusal to Work with KLP and Blue Dog to Address Any Site
Concerns.

Upon agreeing to lease terms with KLP, Blue Dog informed Jacklin's Property
Manager that it was no longer interested in leasing Jacklin's Lots 1-4. Russell Aff,

~

16.

Jacklin's Property Manager Leffel seemed surprised and disappointed that Jacklin had not
reached an agreement with Blue Dog. Id. Jacklin's Property Manager testified that Jacklin's
desire was for Blue Dog to strike a deal with Jacklin, not with KLP. Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 76.
However, Blue Dog was still discussing at that point the possibility of also leasing the building
site from Jacklin for Blue Dog's service center. Russell Aff,

~

16. At this time, when Blue

Dog advised Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog had reached an agreement with KLP to
lease and relocate its RV shopping center to KLP' s property, but before the relocation had
occurred, Jacklin did not give any indication whatsoever that an RV shopping center was an
incompatible use or restricted in any way in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. To the
contrary, Jacklin has now admitted that during the entire period of negotiations with Blue Dog,
it believed Blue Dog's RV operation was a compatible use in the Riverbend Commerce Park
and fully compliant with any pertinent CC&Rs. Hines Aff, Exhibit B (Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6)

Depo.), pp. 120, 85-86. Jacklin's opinion only changed when it lost out on the lease
negotiations with Blue Dog.
Given the multiple assurances by Jacklin's Property Manager that Blue Dog's RV sales
operation was a compatible and permitted use in the Riverbend Commerce Park, Blue Dog
relocated to KLP's property the first part of July 2008. Russell Aff,

~

18. In a 180 degree

reversal, Jacklin's Property Manager then informed Blue Dog for the first time that its RV sales
operation was not a permitted use in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Blue Dog was
astounded at this news,given that during the four months of negotiations with Jacklin, which
included discussions relating to locating both on Jacklin's and KLP's properties, at no time did
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Jacklin raise any concerns or restrictions regarding operating an R V shopping center in
Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Moreover, it was Jacklin who referred Blue Dog to KLP
regarding their property as a potential site for Blue Dog's RV operation. Id. Why would
Jacklin refer Blue Dog to the owner of a potential lease site ifin fact that lease site could not
house an RV shopping operation? Id. Had Jacklin advised Blue Dog that a RV Shopping
Center was an incompatible use or otherwise restricted, Blue Dog would have discontinued
lease negotiations and pursued other sites outside of Riverbend Commerce Park. Id.
When Blue Dog raised these issues with Jacklin's Property Manager, he was very
apologetic. Id. at, 19. Jacklin's Property Manager told Blue Dog that the "powers to be" at
Jacklin had changed their mind and at this point would not allow Blue Dog to operate an RV
center on someone else's property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. Based on the
Property Manager's words and conduct, Blue Dog believed that Jacklin now opposed Blue
Dog's RV operation simply because Jacklin lost out on the leasing opportunity to a competing
owner. Id.
Not only had Jacklin mislead Blue Dog into believing that its RV shopping center was a
perfectly suitable operation for the Riverbend Commerce Park, but it absolutely refused to
work with Blue Dog or KLP to address any site concerns. Id. at, 23; Cordes Aff., '19. KLP
and Blue Dog offered to spend at least $50,000 in substantial site improvements on the four
undeveloped lots, including landscaping and surface work. Cordes Aff., , 19. Blue Dog went
so far as to contact multiple contractors to get bids. Russell Aff., '23. However, Jacklin
responded that it would not matter; Jacklin would still demand that Blue Dog vacate the
premises regardless of what site improvements Blue Dog and/or KLP undertook. Cordes Aff.,
, 19; Russell Aff., '23. Jacklin's corporate representative testified that no matter how Blue
Dog operated its shopping center on KLP's property, no matter what site improvements were
made, in Jacklin's eyes Blue Dog's RV sales operation on KLP's property would be
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unacceptable. Hines A[f., Exh. B, p. 88; Exh. A, pp. 65-66. It is further undisputed that Jacklin
categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns that Jacklin
had or to work on an acceptable site plan. Russell Aff.,

~

20; Cordes Aff.,

~

19; Hines Aff., Exh.

A, pp. 63-65; Exh. B, pp. 65, 67, 126.
Refusing all of Blue Dog's and KLP's efforts to address site concerns, Jacklin gave
defendants the uncompromising ultimatum of immediately vacating Blue Dog's operation from
the KLP property or face litigation. Cordes Aff., ~ 18; Russell Aff., ~ 20. 1 Believing that Blue
Dog's RV shopping center is absolutely compatible with the other business operations in
Riverbend Commerce Park, and that it is a professionally owned and operated first class
shopping center specializing in high-end RV units, defendants choose to stand their ground
and not bear the expense of relocating. Cordes,

~20.

Jacklin then filed suit on August 22,2008, seeking a permanent injunction, a declaration
of rights, and the imposition of punitive damages. See Complaint.

B.

UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH ENTITLE DEFENDANTS TO JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
In addition to the undisputed facts referenced above, defendants incorporate herein the

undisputed facts set forth in Defendants' Statements of Undisputed Material Facts in Support
ofDefendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

1As a further sign of deceptive practices by Jacklin, when its Property Manager was exchanging
emails with Rick Cordes ofKLP advising KLP to remove Blue Dog from the property, all of
the emails were ghostwritten by KLP's attorney at the Witherspoon Kelley firm, which Jacklin
did not disclose. Hines Aff., Exh. A, pp. 102-103, 110, 121-122, 125, 130. Had this been
disclosed, Mr. Cordes would have involved KLP's own attorney in responding. Cordes Aff., ~
22.
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III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.
A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when all of the facts contained

in all the applicable pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits have been construed
most favorably to the nonmoving party, and it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bailey v. Ness,
109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985); LR.C.P. 56(c). The evidence must be construed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897,
899,876 P.2d 595 (1994). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851 (1991). Ifthe evidence is conflicting on
material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is
not appropriate. Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120,645 P.2d 350 (1982). A material fact is
one upon which the outcome ofthe case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849,
908 P.2d 143 (1995).

B.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF
LAW BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT
BLUE DOG'S RV SHOPPING CENTER OPERATION.
1.

Legal Standard Governing the Interpretation and Enforcement of
Restrictive Covenants.

In order for a restrictive covenant to be enforced, it must be expressly and
unambiguously set forth. Gabriel v. Cazier, 130 Idaho 171, 173,938 P.2d 1209 (1997)
(because restrictive covenants are in derogation ofthe common law right to use land for all
lawful purposes, restrictions are not to be construed to extend by implication but rather must be
clearly expressed in the covenant). All doubts and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
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the free use ofland. Id.; Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 830-31, 70 P.3d
664 (2003).
In construing a covenant that imposes restrictions on the use of land, the governing
rules are generally the same as those which apply to any contract or covenant. Sun Valley
Center for the Arts and Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Company, 107 Idaho 411, 413, 690 P.2d
346 (1984); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 147,350 P.2d 348 (1960). The interpretation and
legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions oflaw to be resolved by the court rather
than the jury. Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693,697,692 P.2d 337 (1984). When the
language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions
oflaw. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743 (2003).
If, after applying ordinary processes of contract interpretation, there remains doubt as to
the actual, mutual intent ofthe parties, then the contract ambiguity should be resolved against
the party who used the ambiguity in drafting the contract. See Farnsworth v. Dairymen's
Creamery Ass'n., 125 Idaho 866,870, 876 P.2d 148 (1994) (summary judgment warranted
based on rule of contract interpretation that ambiguity should be resolved against party who
drafted ambiguous contract); Hillside Service Co. v. Alcorn, 105 Idaho 792, 795, 673 P.2d 392
(1983) (provisions of a contract must be construed in favor of the non-drafting party).
The rules of contract construction require the Court first to determine whether there is
an ambiguity. Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829. The court must view the
agreement as a whole and analyze the plain language of the covenant. Id.

A restrictive

covenant is ambiguous ifit is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Gabriel,
130 Idaho at 173. Determining whether there is an ambiguity is a question oflaw. Pinehaven
Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829.
In Pinehaven Planning Board, the trial court granted a planning board summary

judgment (i) declaring that the landowners' short-term rental of their cabin violated a restrictive
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covenant, and (ii) pennanently enjoining them from renting the cabin for short-tenn use.
Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 827. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
restrictive covenants were unambiguous and clearly allowed the landowners to rent their
property for short tenns. Id. at 829. Notably, the court also stated that even ifthe restrictive
covenants were ambiguous, the landowners would still prevail because given two reasonable
interpretations of the restrictive covenant, the ambiguity must be resolved as a matter oflaw in
favor of the free use ofland. Id. at 830.
Similarly, in Sun Valley Center, the grantees of real property brought an action to
detennine, among other things, whether the grantor's successor could enforce a restrictive
covenant that provided for the review and approval of proposed plans by a design committee.
Sun Valley Center, 107 Idaho at 412. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
grantor's successor on all issues and upheld the restriction on the property. Id. at 413. The
Idaho Supreme Court reversed. Applying the rules of contract construction to the restrictive
covenant, the Supreme Court held that the intent of the parties with respect to the covenants
establishing and directing the design committee were unclear and ambiguous and presented an
issue of fact such that summary judgment in favor of upholding the property restriction could
not be decided on summary judgment. Id. at 413,414. See also Smith, 82 Idaho at 147-48 (the
Supreme Court held that, in an action for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant, where the
words and expressions used therein were unclear and ambiguous, it was reversible error for the
trial court to grant judgment upholding the restriction).
Here, the 1990 Development Agreement does not expressly or by implication prohibit
Blue Dog's RV shopping center on the KLP property. Combining (a) the express terms of the
Development Agreement with (b) the cannon of constructions that (i) all doubts regarding the
scope of restrictive covenants are to be interpreted in favor of the free use ofland and (ii) all
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ambiguities are to be interpreted against the drafter (Jacklinf of the restriction, defendants are
entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs complaint as a matter oflaw.
2.

Express Scope of the Development Agreement.

The Development Agreement provides in pertinent part:
In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block one, Riverbend Commerce
Park, Phase I, City of Post Falls, County of Kootenai, Idaho ("Purchased
Property"), by Purchaser and the removal of record on even date herewith of that
certain Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (as amended) as it
affects the Purchased Property, and other good and valuable consideration,
Purchaser agrees: (i) to construct and maintain upon said Purchased
Property, a first class shopping center which shall be in compliance with all
state and local building codes and ordinances; (ii) to work together with
Seller to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with
other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park, and (iii) despites its removal of
record as to the purchased property, Purchaser agrees to comply and conform
to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in those Declarations of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions recorded November 28, 1988 ... [and as
subsequently amended] ... which are incorporated herein by this reference in its
use and maintenance ofthe Purchased Property excepting those which are
inapplicable to a retail shopping center (as shall be mutually agreed upon) or
which violate applicable local building codes and ordinances.

Cordes Ajf., Exhibit B (emphasis added).
Jacklin's entire Complaint turns on the flawed assertion that the Development
Agreement expressly prohibits Blue Dog's RVoperation. Blue Dog's RV operation is barred
only if the express terms of the Development Agreement prohibit this type of operation. See
Gabriel, 130 Idaho at 173; Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829. As demonstrated
below, as a matter oflaw, neither clause (i)'s reference to a first class shopping center, nor
clause (iii)'s incorporation of Articles 2-6 of the previously terminated CC&Rs serves to
prohibit Blue'Dog's RV shopping center on KLP's property. The plain terms ofthe Agreement

2 On cross-examination, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) representative admitted that Jacklin drafted the
Development Agreement, not KLP's predecessor. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, p. 20.
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itself, as well as Jacklin's historical treatment of the property, provide no legal basis to bar Blue
Dog's RV operation.
3.

Clause (i)'s Reference "to construct and maintain a first class shopping
center" Does Not Prohibit Blue Dog's RV Shopping Center Operation.

As a matter of law, the Development Agreement's reference "to construct and maintain
a first class shopping center" does not expressly, nor even by implication, prohibit Blue Dog's
RV shopping center on KLP's property for the following independent reasons.
(a)

It Is Not a Use Restriction. Jacklin grossly misstates the nature and

scope of clause (i). This clause is not a use restriction. Rather, it simply provides that the
Purchaser is to construct and maintain a first class shopping center upon the property. It
doesn't address, let alone, prohibit any uses on the property, let alone barring a RV sales
operation. Jacklin concedes that the Agreement does not expressly prohibit the use of the
property as an RV sales operation. Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 33. As the drafter of the
Development, if Jacklin had wanted to specifically prohibit such a use, it certainly had the
opportunity to do so. And any such omission is interpreted against Jacklin. Farnsworth, 125
Idaho at 870.
The existence ofJacklin's omission explains Jacklin's strategy of referring to "use
language" that does not exist. The need for Jacklin to contort the language of clause (i) into an
actual use restriction is best evidenced by Jacklin's repeated mischaracterization of the
language both to KLP and in its motion papers. In Pat Leffel's emails to KLP demanding the
immediate vacation of Blue Dog's operation (emails clandestinely ghost written by Jacklin's
attorney), Jacklin writes: "QCA agreed [referring to the Development Agreement] to use the
lots solely to "construct a first class shopping center" and for no other purpose." Cordes Aff.,

Exhibit C, p. 1. However, the Development Agreement does not state how the Lots are to be
used or that certain purposes are prohibited. Pat Leffel, then, states in his filed Affidavit:
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Bye-mail dated July 14, 2008, I responded to Mr. Cordes by advising him of the
QCA Agreement of November 1990. I also advised him that QCA agreed "to
use the lots solely to 'construct a first class shopping center' and for no other
purpose."

Affidavit ofPat Leffel Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment,

~15.

By putting in

quotes and thereby ascribing to the Development Agreement an express use restriction which
does not exist, Jacklin's Property Manager flags the fatal weakness of Jacklin's position.
Notwithstanding J acklin's concerted effort to misrepresent the language of clause (i), the
unavoidable legal conclusion, as directed by standard contract construction, is that the
Development Agreement does not expressly prohibit a RV sales operation.
(b)

The Obligation to Construct and Maintain a First Class Shopping

Center Has Been Satisfied. The Development Agreement required KLP's predecessor to
"construct and maintain upon said Purchased Property [Lots 1-17], a first class shopping
center ... " This was satisfied in 1991 upon the construction of the Outlet Mall, which has been
maintained since. No further development on the Purchased Property was required nor has it
occurred. Indeed, Lots 1-4 have remained vacant (until Blue Dog's relocation) and
undeveloped for the last 18 years. Notably, the fact that Lots 1-4 remained undeveloped was
never viewed by Jacklin as a breach of the Development Agreement. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, pp.
25-27. Notwithstanding that no first class shopping center was ever constructed on Lots 1-6,
Jacklin concedes that there was no breach of the Development Agreement. Id. Thus, Jacklin's
own actions confirm that the Development Agreement never required a first class shopping
center to be constructed upon each separate lot of the Purchased Property. So long as a first
class shopping center was built upon the Purchased Property as a whole, the purchaser satisfied
the Development Agreement. At a minimum, whether the Agreement required a first class
shopping center to be physically constructed on each ofthe 17 Lots is an ambiguity that must
be interpreted against Jacklin as the drafter of the Agreement as well as the party who is
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attempting to restrict the free use ofland. See Farnsworth, 125 Idaho at 870; Pinehaven, 138
Idaho at 830.

(c)

Blue Dog's Operation is a First Class Shopping Center. The

Development Agreement does not define what constitutes a "first class shopping center," which
Jacklin concedes. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, 42. Jacklin, who drafted the Agreement, admits that it
does not know the distinction between a first, second or third class shopping center. Id., at 43.
The Agreement does not even define what a "shopping center" is. Id. at 44. When asked at the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition whether an RV sales operation could constitute a first class shopping
center, Jacklin testified: "I don't know because we [Jacklin] didn't define the term." Id. at 47.
Further, when asked whether the term "first class shopping center" is inherently ambiguous,
Jacklin's corporate officer answered simply: "I don't know." Id. at 45. Ultimately, Jacklin
conceded that a RV shopping center could be a first class shopping center. Id. at 48.
Blue Dog's RV sales operation is a first class shopping center. See Cordes Ajf.,

~20.

It

is a retail location selling high end RV units, many priced in the hundred(s) of thousands of
dollars. It is the same type of shopping center operation that Mr. Leffel saw when he visited
Blue Dog's operation at Treaty Rock. Russell Ajf.,

~9.

Blue Dog's shopping center on the

KLP property does not violate any definition of "first class shopping center" provided in the
Development Agreement or otherwise by Jacklin. Further, there is no requirement that there be
only one first class shopping center on Lots 1-17. Jacklin concedes that the Development
Agreement does not prohibit multiple operations on Lots 1-17. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, pp. 34-35.

(d)

Blue Dog's Operation is a Permitted Temporary Use. The

Development Agreement contains no time deadline for the construction of first class shopping
centers on Lots 1-17, as Jacklin admits. Hines Ajf., Exh. B, pp. 27, 33. Moreover, it does not
prohibit any temporary use of the property prior to the construction of the first class shopping
centers. Cordes Ajf., Exh. B. KLP has made clear that Blue Dog's shopping center, which has
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a base teml ofthree years, is a temporary use until the Beck Road Interchange is constructed.
Cordes Aff.,

~

20.

(e)

Jacklin Admits that a First Class Shopping Center Only Has to be

Constructed When Property Is Developed. The final admission by Jacklin is perhaps the
most fatal. Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that the fact that Lots 1-4 were
undeveloped did not constitute a violation ofthe Development Agreement. Hines Aff., Exh., B,
p. 26. According to Jacklin, a first class shopping center only had to be constructed after the

Lots were developed: "Jacklin's understanding is when those lots are developed-there was no
time frame to construct it, but they had to construct a first class shopping mall." Id. at 27.
Jacklin then concedes that after Blue Dog took over the tenancy of the KLP property, they did
not develop the property. Id. at 28. Thus, by Jacklin's own testimony, even assuming that
Blue Dog's operation is not a first class shopping center (which defendants dispute), there was
no contractual obligation to construct a first class shopping center until the property is
developed. Critically, it is undisputed that there has been!!Q development of the property in
connection with the Blue Dog tenancy.
4.

Clause om's Incorporation of Articles 2-6 of the Terminated CC&Rs Does
Not Prohibit Blue Dog's RV Shopping Center Operation.

In consideration of the Purchaser agreeing to buy Lots 1-17, Jacklin agreed to temlinate
the recorded 1988 CC&Rs, including all amendments, governing Riverbend Commerce Park as
applicable to Lots 1-17. 3 The Development Agreement then incorporated Articles 2-6 of the
temlinated CC&Rs. See Hines Aff., Exhibit F, 1989 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and

3 There were subsequent Amended Declarations of CC&Rs that applied to Riverbend
Commerce Park,the last recorded in 2006. See Hines Aff., Exhibit D, 2006 Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions ofRiverbend Commerce Park. Notwithstanding
Jacklin's Property Manager representing to Blue Dog that the 2006 CC&Rs applied to the KLP
property (Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 123), the express temlS of the 2006 CC&Rs make clear that it
does not apply to the KLP property: "Neither this Declaration nor prior Declarations shall
apply to Lots 1-17 of Block One of Riverbend Commerce Park .... Lots 1-17 of Block
One ... are specifically excluded." Hines Aff., Exh. D, p. 1.
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Restrictions ofRiverbend Commerce Park, pp. 1-11. However, even to the extent that the

incorporation ofterminated Articles of a Declaration of CC&Rs is legally valid, nothing in
Articles 2-6 prohibits Blue Dog's RV shopping center.
(a)

Articles 2-6 Have No Legal Effect Because They Were Previously

Terminated. On October 16, 1990, Jacklin executed the "Amendment of Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Riverbend Commerce Park." Hines Ajf., Exhibit E.
In it, Jacklin expressly terminated all prior and subsequent CC&Rs as applicable to Lots 1-17

(the KLP property): "All restrictions ofthe 1990 and prior CCRs as apply to Lots 1-17 of
Block one of Riverbend Commerce Park are terminated. The same lots are specifically and
intentionally excluded from the superseding 1990 CCRs." Id. (emphasis added).
Significantly, at the time that the parties executed the Development Agreement (on
November 7, 1990) the CC&Rs, including Articles 2-6, had already been terminated and were
null and void. Thus, the Development Agreement incorporated null and void CC&R Articles
2-6. Terminated CC&R Articles, whether contractually incorporated or through the recording
statute, cannot impose legal obligations on any successor owner of Lots 1-17, including KLP.
Articles 2-6, therefore, have no legal applicability to KLP's use of Lots 1-17.
(b)

Articles 2-6 Do Not Prohibit an RV Sales Operation. Even assuming

that Articles 2-6 legally apply to KLP's Lots 1-17, they do not prohibit Blue Dog's shopping
center. Article 6 sets forth "Uses and Operation." Hines Ajf., Exh. F, p. 10. It states that:
"Light industrial and commercial uses are intended for the development." Id. Blue Dog's RV
operation certainly fits this description. Article 6.3 further expressly lists the "Specific Uses
Prohibited." Id. Notably missing from this list is the prohibition of an RV sales operation. Id.
Articles 2-5 similarly do not expressly prohibit a RV shopping center operation. Hines Ajf.,
Exh. F, pp. 1-10.
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(c)

Articles 2-6 Do Not Prohibit a Temporary Use of the Property.

Nowhere in Articles 2-6 is a temporary use of the KLP property prohibited. Id. Jacklin argues
that Article 3.11 sets forth this prohibition. Hines Aff., Exh., B, pp. 35-36. Article 3.11 actually
provides: "Parking: Temporary Lots. Parking lots for temporary parking (parking used prior
to or during construction of improvements) need not meet all requirements specified above but
must be reasonably dust, weed, and refuse free and be maintained as temporary lots no longer
than one (l) year from date of occupancy." Hines AjJ., Exh. F, p. 4. This Article only
addresses a temporary parking lot utilized during construction. It does not address a temporary
use of the property different than a first class shopping center. Moreover, Blue Dog is not
using Lots 1-6 as a temporary parking lot. Further, even under this strained interpretation, Blue
Dog would have one year to comply, which has not expired.
(d)

Articles 2-5 Are Only Triggered When the Property Has Been

Developed, Which Has Not Occurred. The landscaping (Article 2), parking (Article 3),
signage (Article 4), design and construction limitations (Article 5) all contemplate development
of the property before the specific obligations are triggered. Hines AjJ., Exh. F, pp. 1-10. As
Jacklin admits, no development of Lots 1-4 have occurred, and therefore, these specific
requirements have not been triggered and are premature. Hines AjJ., Exh. B, p. 28.
(e)

Blue Dog's Efforts to Make Site Improvements Were Rendered

Futile by Jacklin's Refusal to Cooperate. Blue Dog offered to spend in excess of $50,000 to
make site improvements. However, Jacklin categorically rejected this and all efforts to work
with Blue Dog and KLP on site issues. Jacklin admits that no matter how defendants
developed Blue Dog's RV shopping center, it would have still been unacceptable to Jacklin.
Id. at p. 88. Jacklin's CFO further concedes it would have been "futile" for Blue Dog to make
any site improvements because Jacklin's approval would have still been withheld. Hines Aff.,
Exh. C, pp. 33-34. Idaho recognizes futility as a defense to performance. See Sullivan v.
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Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184, 192 n.3 (1993) ("One party by a breach cannot make it
impossible, difficult, unfair, or futile for the other party to perform and then invoke the other's
alleged non-performance as a defense"); see also Chapman v. Olbrich, 217 S.W.3d 482, 491
(2007) (in action seeking specific performance of a contract, tender of performance of
contractual obligations is excused when tender would be futile or when defendants have
repudiated the contract); 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance § 84 (2008). Thus, by rendering
all efforts by Blue Dog to make site improvements and to conform with Articles 2-6 futile,
Jacklin is now barred from complaining about defendants' alleged non-performance.
(1)

An Alleged Violation of Articles 2-6 Does Not Grant Jacklin the

Right to Evict Blue Dog from the Property. Even if Blue Dog's operation violated any
provision of Articles 2-6, nothing in those Articles authorizes eviction as a remedy. The 1989
and 2006 CC&Rs that apply to Riverbend Commerce Park as a whole (other than Lots 1-17)
both contain comprehensive enforcement procedures in Article 8. Hines AjJ., Exh. D, pp. 16-

18; Exh. F, pp. 14-16. However, the Development Agreement does not incorporate or
otherwise set forth any enforcement procedures. Thus, the Development Agreement does
authorize the remedy now sought by Jacklin.
(g)

The Same Substantive CC&R Articles Would Have Applied to Blue

Dog's Operation on Jacklin's Property. Jacklin's after-the-fact assertion that Blue Dog's RV
operation violates Articles 2-6 flies in the face of Jacklin's four month solicitation ofthe same
Blue Dog RV operation for its property. Jacklin testified that Blue Dog's operation was a
permissible use for its property and complied with the applicable CC&Rs. Hines Aff., Exh. B,

pp. 86-87. Jacklin would not have negotiated with Blue Dog ifit believed it was a nonconforming use. Hines Aff., Exh. B, pp. 48-49. Jacklin further testified that there were no
material, substantive differences in Articles 2-6 ofthe 2006 CC&Rs that applies to the Jacklin
property, and Articles 2-6 of the 1988 CC&Rs that purportedly applies to the KLP property.
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Hines AjJ., Exh. A, pp. 52-53; Exh. B, pp. 56, 59. Thus, Jacklin's own actions and
representations demonstrate that Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permissible use under
Articles 2-6.

C.

JACKLIN'S CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF INDEPENDENTLY FAIL
FOR FAILURE TO PROVE IRREPERABLE INJURY.
Injunctive relief is only authorized when the claimant demonstrates "(1) that it has

suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Norton, 503 F.3d 836,843 (9 th Cir. 2007) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S.388, 391 (2006»; Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984).
Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief are legally defective because plaintiff does not
satisfy the irreparable harm element. Harris, 106 Idaho at 518 (second element requires
moving party to show "great or irreparable injury"). Not only does plaintiff fail to plead
irreparable harm in the Complaint (see Complaint), but Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent
testified unequivocally that Jacklin has not been harmed or injured by Blue Dog's RV
operation on KLP's property.
Q. (By Mr. Hines). Are you able to quantify for me any monetary damage or injury as
a result of Blue Dog's RV operation?
A. (Jacklin's 30(b)(6) Representative). No.
Q. Are you aware of any facts to indicate that Jacklin has been irreparably harmed as a
result of Blue Dog's operation?
A. As stated before, the current tenant. There's been inquiries as to what's going on
because everybody else has had to comply with the CC&Rs, and they're wondering
what's going on with Blue Dog.
Q. But how has that caused any irreparable harm to Jacklin?
A. It hasn't yet.
Q. SO sitting here today you're not aware of any facts to suggest that Blue Dog's
operation has caused any irreparable harm, correct?
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A. Not as of yet.
Q. Correct?
A. Correct.
Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 89. Jacklin's corporate representative further testified:

Q. With respect to alleged damages caused by the RV Center operation, that operation
has been going from July 2008 until today, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Can you identify a single perspective tenant who Jacklin has lost as a result of the
operation?
A. No.
Q. Can you identify a single land sale that was foregone because of the operation?
A. No.
Hines Aff., Exh. B, p. 121.

Jacklin's admission that it has suffered no harm, let alone irreparable harm, requires
dismissal of plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. See Udell v. Idaho State Bd of Land
Comm., 119 Idaho 1018, 1019,812 P.2d 325 (1991) (court upheld determination that plaintiffs
had not established right to injunctive relief where they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury
which could not be compensated by monetary damages); see also Smith v. Ravalli County Bd.
of Health, 209 Mont. 292, 296, 679 P.2d 1249 (1984) (property owners were not entitled to
preliminary injunction where they presented no evidence that their property would be damaged
if septic system became operable).

D.

JACKLIN'S BREACH OF THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BY
REFUSING TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH WITH KLP TO APPROVE A SITE
PLAN PREVENTS ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT AGAINST KLP.
Ifa breach of contract is material, the other party's performance is excused. J.P.

Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46 (1996)
(in action for payments due under a personal services contract, court found that plaintiffs
breach was material so defendant's duty to pay plaintiff under the contract was excused). "A
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substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches the fundamental purpose of the
contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract." Id.
"It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the

failure of performance, either of an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own
liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure." Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126,
133,391 P.2d 344 (1964) citing 5 Williston on Contracts, § 677 (3d ed. 1961). "One who
unjustly prevents the performance or the happening of a condition of his own promissory duty
thereby eliminates it as such a condition. He will not be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong, and to escape from liability for not rendering his promised performance by preventing
the happening of the condition on which it was promised." Id. citing 3A Corbin on Contracts,

§ 767 (1960).
Here, clause (ii) of the Development Agreement contractually obligated Jacklin "to
work together" with KLP "to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the
shopping center." Cordes Ajf., Exh. C. This express contractual covenant reinforces what the
law already imposes. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in every
contract. Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595 (2002) (a duty
of reasonable performance exists in every contract). This legal covenant requires the parties to
perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement. Id.; George v. Univ. of
Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 37, 822 P.2d 549 (1991) (the implied covenant places a good faith
obligation on each party to take reasonable measures to ensure that the other party obtains the
benefits of the agreement). A violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates,
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Steiner, 138 Idaho at 242. A
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing relieves the non-breaching party
of any further legal duty to perform under the contract. See Stravens Planning Associates, Inc.,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .... : 25

560

129 Idaho 545 (because plaintiffs breach of implied duty went to the heart and purpose of the
contract and was thus material, defendants duty to pay under the contract was excused).
It is undisputed that Jacklin categorically refused to work with KLP or Blue Dog to
address any site concerns involving Blue Dog's shopping center operation. Jacklin's Property
Manager testified that Jacklin never gave defendants any opportunity to make site
improvements or address site concerns. Hines Aff, Exh. A, p. 63. Other than ordering Blue
Dog to immediately vacate the property, Jacklin never worked with defendants on a site plan or
to address site concerns. Id. at p. 64. There was nothing Blue Dog could do to placate Jacklin
short of vacating the property. Id. at pp. 64-65. Jacklin's CFO testified that after Blue Dog
informed Jacklin that it had leased premises from KLP, Jacklin did not work with Blue Dog in
any manner to address site concerns, but rather simply ordered Blue Dog to vacate. Hines Aff,
Exh. C, p. 19. Jacklin never extended any offer to work with Blue Dog. Id.

Similarly, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent testified that Jacklin: (i) never offered to sit
down with KLP and work through site issues (Hines Aff, Exh. B, p. 126); (ii) never
communicated the type of site improvements that would have to occur to satisfy Jacklin's
concerns (id.); and (iii) summarily rejected Blue Dog's offer to make over $50,000 of site
improvements @. at pp. 85-86). In the eyes of Jacklin, no matter how defendants developed
Blue Dog's RV shopping center, it would have still been unacceptable to Jacklin. Id. at p. 88.
Jacklin even withheld from defendants its belief that a RV sales operation could be a first class
shopping center. Id. at p. 124.
Jacklin's complete refusal to work with defendants to address site concerns constitutes a
breach of the Development Agreement as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. As such, Jacklin's own breach bars it from advancing claims of breach of the
Development Agreement against defendants. See Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho at 133;
McOmber v. Nuckols, 82 Idaho 280, 284,353 P.2d 398 (1960) (where plaintiff first refused to
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allow defendant to perform under the contract, plaintiff could not recover damages for
defendant's failure to perform).

E.

DEFENDANTS' WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL DEFENSES PRECLUDE
ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
The affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel are recognized defenses to the

enforcement of a restrictive covenant. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 43 ("The broad rules of
waiver and estoppel generally are applicable to the enforcement of covenants. Thus, a person
by his or her conduct may be estopped from asserting a right to enforce a covenant."); Atwood
v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006) (the doctrine of quasi-estoppel
"prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent
with a position previously taken"); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140,
144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003).
Waiver requires a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right that is relied
upon by an adverse party and which alters their position. A & B Irrigation Dist. v. AberdeenAmerican Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005). Quasiestoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original
position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to
the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he
or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. Atwood, 143 Idaho at 114.
Jacklin repeatedly assured Blue Dog that its RV sales operation would be a compatible
use in Riverbend Commerce Park. Jacklin referred Blue Dog to the KLP property both as a
potential lease site and as a temporary staging site for RV units. Jacklin then reversed its
approval of Blue Dog's RV shopping center only after it lost out in the lease negotiations to
KLP. Jacklin's conduct squarely fits the affirmative defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel.
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First, Jacklin took a different position than its original position. Jacklin originally
represented to Blue Dog that its RV sales operation was a compatible use in Riverbend
Commerce Park, then reversed itself and said that it was an incompatible use after Blue Dog
notified Jacklin that it had leased space from KLP.
Second, Blue Dog suffered significant disadvantage in Jacklin's change of position.
The uncontroverted evidence is if Jacklin had told Blue Dog either that its RV sales operation
was an incompatible use in Riverbend Commerce Park or that an RV sales operation was
prohibited on KLP's property, Blue Dog "would have discontinued lease negotiations and
pursued other sites outside of Riverbend Commerce Park." Russell Aff.,

~

18.

Third, it would be unconscionable to permit Jacklin to change its position from one it
already acquiesced in. The defendants directly relied on Jacklin's representations that an RV
sales operation was a permissible use in Riverbend Commerce Park and that KLP was a
suitable site for that operation based on Jacklin's referral of Blue Dog to KLP. Blue Dog and
KLP relied upon Jacklin's conduct by agreeing to a three year lease. Blue Dog has spent
considerable time and money in relocating to Riverbend Commerce Park. For Jacklin to now
reverse itself and demand that Blue Dog vacate the KLP site is unconscionable. To the extent
that Jacklin ever possessed the right to bar an RV operation from Riverbend Commerce Park,
Jacklin has waived that right because of its inequitable conduct toward Blue Dog and KLP
which defendants have relied upon to their detriment.

F.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS FOR TWO
INDEPENDENT REASONS.
Initially, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment fails for the same legal reasons

argued above in support of defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. An injunction is
not warranted and will not issue unless the party against whom relief is sought is violating, or
threatens to violate, some right of the party seeking the remedy. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 503
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F.3d at 843; Brunzell v. Stevenson, 30 Idaho 202, 164 P. 89 (1917). As set forth in Legal
Argument Sections B through E above, Jacklin cannot identify any legal rights that defendants

have violated. The express terms of the Development Agreement do not prevent a RV sales
operation, and the cannons of construction require that any ambiguity be interpreted against
finding such a land use restriction. Thus, for the multiple reasons set forth above and
incorporated herein, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied. See Brunzell,
30 Idaho at 202 (injunction overturned on appeal when the trial court determined that no legal
rights had been violated).
Alternatively, defendants' affirmative defenses of breach of contract, waiver and
estoppel create issues of material fact which preclude plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
As argued above, defendants believe that uncontroverted facts support these affirmative
defenses which warrant dismissal ofplaintiffs complaint as a matter of law. However, even if
the Court disagrees, at a minimum, defendants have raised questions of fact in connection with
these defenses which prevent summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The existence of waiver and estoppel is a factual determination. Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, 650 P.2d 657,660 (1982); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v.
Meridian Athletic Association, Inc., 105 Idaho 509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983) (in breach of
contract action regarding right of first refusal, genuine issues of material fact existed whether
there was implied or express waiver of that right, precluding summary judgment); United States
v. James Stewart Co., 336 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1964) (the existence of estoppel is a question
of fact). Genuine issues of material fact regarding waiver and estoppel preclude summary
judgment. Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992);
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006) also see Regents of University of
California v. Principal Financial Group, 412 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1046 (N.D.Ca1.2006) (questions
regarding estoppel were intensely factual and inappropriate for resolution on a motion for
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summary judgment); Cedars Sinai Medical Center v. Mid-West Nat. Life Ins. Co., 118
F.Supp.2d 1002, 1012-13 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (denying summary judgment because of fact issues
related to inducement and reliance).
In this case, ifthe Court chooses not to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for the legal
reasons set forth above, it should nevertheless deny plaintiffs motion because genuine issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and consistent with Idaho's strong presumption
upholding the free use of land, defendants respectfully request the Court (i) to grant defendants'
cross-motion for summary dismissing plaintiff s Complaint in full with prejudice, and (ii) to
deny plaintiff s motion for summary judgment.
DATED this \1~ day of February, 2009.
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

BY~

MICHAEJHINES""'"
ISB #6876
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT
ISB #6911
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of February, 2009, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served upon the following, as indicated below and addressed as
follows:

JOHN F. MAGNUSON
1250 Northwood Center Ct.
P.O. Box 2350
Couer d' Alene, ID 83814

[ ]
IX]
[ ]
[]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Fax: (208) 667-0500
Via Email

~#~
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST runICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. CV-08-6752
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho
corporation; THE PATTERSON
FAMILY 2000 TRUST CREATED
UITIA DATED FEBRUARY 25,2000;
GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE;
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED UITIA DATED JANUARY
13,2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH,
TRUSTEE; KL PROPERTIES, INC., a
California corporation; RICHARD A.
CORDES and SUZANNE M. CORDES,
husband and wife; DAVID BARNES and
MICHELLE BARNES, husband and wife;
GARY L. PATTERSON and
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERLY
L. DION, husband and wife; and
ANDREW J. BRANAGH and ANNE C.
BRANAGH, husband and wife,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT -- PAGE I

567

"

COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company, by and through its attorney of record, John
F. Magnuson, and respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment (filed December 11, 2008). This Motion is supported by the pleadings and
submissions on file herein, together with the accompanying Affidavit of J ohn F. Magnuson pursuant
to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c). To the extent necessary, the Court should consider this Reply
Memorandum, and the supporting affidavit submissions filed by Jacklin, to constitute an opposition
to Defendants' untimely "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.,,1

I. INTRODUCTION.
The Defendants' opposing Memorandum (filed February 17,2009) reads like a John Grisham
novel. The Defendants apparently see phantoms and conspiracies behind every door. Yet like a
Grisham novel, the Defendants' Memorandum is, in large part, nothing more than a work of fiction
advanced by Defendants in an effort to extricate themselves from clearly enunciated rules and
obligations to which they have succeeded.
There is an oft-cited maxim in the First Judicial District that suggests that if the pleadings
and submissions related to a motion for summary judgment are several inches thick, as here, then
there must be a material issue of fact somewhere in the stack. This appears to be the Defendants'
hope. Plaintiff suggests that when the undisputed material facts are viewed with clarity, and in the
light of day, that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested and that the Defendants' efforts to

Plaintiff has separately moved the Court for entry of an order striking Defendants'
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment" from the calendar of March 3,2009. As set forth in the
Affidavit of counsel filed in support of said Motion to Strike, Defendants have had months of notice
of the impending summary judgment date, which was rescheduled at their request to provide for
discovery, and yet they still insist on filing an untimely motion for summary judgment on the eve of
the hearing date. The motion does not comply with the timelines under IRCP 56( c) and should be
stricken for the reasons advanced.
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"dodge" and "duck" should end.
The facts at bar, together with the controlling documents and controlling law, are relatively
straightforward. The Defendants have been asked to cease their unpermitted use of the subject
property since the inception of the lease between Blue Dog and KLP. The Defendants have refused.
In support ofthis refusal, the Defendants continue to attempt to characterize the facts as ifthe parties

were characters in a cheap dime novel. Their efforts have proven successful to date. Blue Dog has
remained as a tenant on the subject property for seven months, through the "Winter of Our
Discontent," while throwing sand in the gears of justice.
This is not, as Defendants posit, "a case about sour grapes." True, the case has something
to do with wine (or shall we say "whine"?). In reality, the case bears the hallmark of a problem too
often seen in contemporary American society: an individual or entity who seeks to place the blame
for his actions on others, decrying any sense of self-accountability or responsibility. This case is
really about a party who knowingly breaks clear rules, consensual rules that bind the Defendants for
the benefit of Jacklin, only to deny accountability when challenged.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND TERMS.
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 11, 2008), Jacklin

submitted its "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts." Those facts are incorporated herein as
though set forth in full. Where noted, they will be referred to by the acronym "SOF." Also, attached
hereto as Exhibit A, for the Court's convenience, is a copy of Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Tom
Stoeser (also filed December 11, 2008).
"Riverbend Commerce Park" is a multi-phased commerce park developed by Jacklin. See
SOF at '1. The First Phase of Riverbend Commerce Park ("RCP") was platted in 1988. Id. at '2.
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RCP's First Phase created various lots, including Lots 1-17 of Block 1. Id. at '3. This
property is now owned by the Defendant Owners (KLP). A portion ofthe property is leased to Blue
Dog. Depicted on Exhibit A in yellow is that area including Lots 1-17 of Block 1 of Phase 1 ofRCP.
The Blue Dog leasehold is located on the western edge of the KLP property.
When originally platted and developed, the First Phase was subj ect to a certain "Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions ofRiverbend Commerce Park." Id. at,7 (Instrument No.
1135200). These Covenants original encumbered the property that is now owned by KLP and 1eased
by Blue Dog. The Covenants were thereafter amended in 1989 through Kootenai County Instrument
No. 1155779. Id. at ,6. Like the original Covenants, the amended Covenants once encumbered the
property now owned by KLP and leased by Blue Dog.
In 1990, Jacklin entered into negotiations with an entity known as "Quality Centers
Associates" ("QCA"), which had expressed an interest in purchasing that portion ofPhase 1 ofRCP
that includes the property now owned byKLP (as well as the portion leased to Blue Dog). Id. at,7.
QCA, which intended to use the property now owned by KLP for commercial purposes, expressed
its desire that the then-controlling Covenants be removed as a matter of title from the subject
property. Id. at,l O.
Jacklin agreed to QCA's request on certain terms and conditions.

Those terms and

conditions were ultimately memorialized by an Agreement recorded as Kootenai County Instrument
No. 1200512. Id. at '12. See also Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G. That
agreement is referred to herein as the "QCNJacklin Agreement.,,2

2
Defendants' opposing submissions on summary judgment repeatedly refer to the
QCNJacklin Agreement as "the Development Agreement." Interestingly, the word "development"
does not appear anywhere in the agreement. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G. Such loose
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The QCNJacklin closing, with respect to the property now owned by KLP, took place in
November of 1990. Id. at

'13. The QCNJacklin Agreement was recorded as Kootenai County

Instrument No. 1200512. Id. The QCNJacklin Agreement provided, as to the KLP property at issue,
as follows:
•

QCA, individually and on behalf of its successors and assigns in and to any
portion of the subject property, agreed "to construct and maintain ... a first
class shopping center.... "

•

QCA agreed to "work together with [Jacklin Land Company] to achieve a
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it
shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within
Riverbend Commerce Park. ..."

•

QCA agreed to otherwise comply and conform to Articles IT, ill, IV, V, and
VI ofthe Declarations as amended as ofthat date (Instrument No. 1155779).

See SOF at

,13. See also Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G.

As noted, the QCAlJ acklin Agreement is unique to the KLPIBlue Dog property. It limits the
use thereof to the construction and maintenance of a first class shopping center. It requires the owner
of the property (since it is binding upon KLP as QCA's successor-in-interest) to "work together with
[Jacklin Land Company] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping
center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend
Commerce Park. ... " Id.
Finally, it incorporates, as a matter of contract, Articles II-VI of the Covenants in effect as
of the closing date (Instrument No. 1155779). In short, although the KLP/QCA property was
excluded from the Covenants generally applicable to the Riverbend Commerce Park, it was

characterization is endemic ofthe Defendants' position in response to Jacklin's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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nonetheless made subject to Articles II-VI of the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants as they
existed on the date of closing. It was further made subject to the unique contractual undertakings
that encumbered and pertained to that parcel (related to a "mutually acceptable design and
appearance" and a "first class shopping center"). The remainder of Phase 1, including Lots 1-4 as
depicted in orange on Exhibit A above the "Phase 1" line, remained subject to the RCP Covenants
and any subsequent amendments thereto.
Jacklin then proceeded to develop Phases 2 and 3 of RCP. The remaining lots created in
Phases 2 and 3 of RCP, with one exception, remain subject to the RCP Covenants and any
subsequent amendments thereto. 3
Depicted on Exhibit A are six lots colored orange. These orange lots are owned by Jacklin.
Discussions were had, as described in the Affidavit of Pat Leffel (filed December 11, 2008) and the
Leffel deposition transcript (attached as Exhibit A to the Hines Affidavit), between Jacklin and Blue
Dog as to Blue Dog's possible lease terms for use of all or a portion of the orange property (and
potentially the adjoining pink property) for an RV sales facility. This Jacklin property, located in
both Phases 1 and 2 (as depicted on Exhibit A), is subject to the general RCP Covenants (and any
subsequent amendments thereto) and not the QCAJJacklin Agreement. As set forth below, the
Defendants have a convenient way of ignoring this distinction when it suits their needs.
To summarize, there are then three agreements that pertain to the disputes at issue:

The one exception involves another purchase by QCA. QCA purchased a portion of
Phase 2, after it had made its purchase of the subject property (the KLPlBlue Dog property). See
SOF at ~24. As with its first purchase, QCA wanted the property to be removed from the scope of
the RCP Covenants. As with the first transaction with QCA, Jacklin agreed so long as QCA would
use the property "as a first class shopping center" and in compliance with Articles II-VI of the
Covenants incorporated in the Agreement. See SOF at ~24. See also Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. I.
3
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(1)

The November 1990 QCAlJ acklin Agreement pertains to the KLP!Blue Dog
property only.

(2)

The RCP Covenants in effect in November of 1990 (Kootenai County
Instrument No. 1155779), at Articles II-VI, contractually bind the KLP!Blue
Dog property. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C.

(3)

The current variant ofthe RCP Covenants (Hines Affidavit at Ex. D) governs
the use ofthe Jacklin property (which Jacklin once considered leasing to Blue
Dog) (colored in orange on Exhibit A).

Against this background, one needs to view the Defendants' "grapes of wrath" theory with scrutiny.
III. DEFENDANTS' FACTUAL "ASSERTIONS."

Set forth below is a discussion of certain of the vague, conclusory, or simply incorrect
assertions (characterized as "fact") made by Defendants in opposition to Jacklin's Motion for
Summary Judgment (and presumably in support ofDefendants ' untimely Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment).
A. The Affidavit of Richard A. Cordes.

1.

Cordes (a principle in KLP) avers that Lots 1-4 of the JoSLP property (leased to Blue

.

Dog) "are nearly identical in location and condition" to Lots 1-4 ofthe Jacklin property (which are
colored in orange on Exhibit A and were the subject oflease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue
Dog). Any implication by Cordes that the properties are "identical" must be rejected based on the
clear record evidence. The KLP property is not subject to the RCP Covenants. Rather, it is subject
to Articles II-VI ofthe Covenants in effect in November of 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779) by way
ofincorporation under a consensually agreed to contract. Further, the KLP property is subject to the
property-unique limitations arising under the QCNJ acklin Agreement ("first class shopping center"
and "mutually acceptable design and appearance"). The Jacklin property, which actually remains
in the Riverbend Commerce Park, is subject to a wholly separate set of restrictions, in the form of
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the current Covenants and any subject amendments thereto. See Hines Affidavit at Ex. D.4
2.

Cordes refers to the QCAlJacklin Agreement that was recorded against the KLP

property in November of 1990 as "the 1990 Development Agreement." See Cordes Affidavit at ~7
and throughout. In actuality, the Agreement is captioned "Agreement," and nowhere in the same
does it contain the word "development." It is a "use" agreement, as confirmed by the obligation
imposed upon QCA (and now KLP) to ensure that the use ofthe property (a shopping center) "shall
be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park. ... "
See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. G.
3.

Cordes, who wasn't a party to the original Agreement, somehow is able to conclude

that QCA complied with its obligations under the QCAlJacklin Agreement, as of 1991, by
constructing "the Factory Outlet Malls" on Lots 7-17 and a paved parking lot on Lots 5-6. See
Cordes Affidavit at ~8. In actuality, and to be more specific, QCA complied with that portion ofthe

4

This distinction was noted by Mr. Stoeser in his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition:

Q.

Is an RV operation in general compatible with other uses in Riverbend
Commerce Park?

A.

Yes, if it complies with the CC&Rs in Riverbend Commerce Park. Now, by
"Riverbend Commerce Park" I'm excluding Lots 1-17 and Lots 1-14 because
they have a different standard.

Q.

The different standard being what?

A.

That they have difference CC&Rs, and they have - as a minimum. They also
have to have a first class shopping mall, and it has to be mutually agreed
upon with us.

See Magnuson Affidavit under Rule 32(a)(4) and Rule 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 89-90. Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition transcript of Stoeser. The cited portions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition transcript of
Stoeser were omitted from the deposition excerpts offered by the Defendants in opposition to
Jacklin's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Agreement that pertained to the lots that were developed in 1991. The Agreement applies to all of
the affected lots (i.e., Lots 1-17 of Block 1), rather than those designated by KLP some 19 years after
the fact.
4.

Cordes correctly notes in

,9

ofhis Affidavit that the KLP property was removed from

the Riverbend Commerce Park CC&Rs in November of 1990. He also correctly notes that KLP's
predecessor-in-title (QCA) contractually impressed upon the KLP property (by incorporation)
Articles ll- VI of the CC&Rs in effect in November of 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779).
5.

Cordes apparently alleges some sort of precedential value based on his allegation that

Jacklin never advised QCA or KLP that they were in violation of the QCNJacklin Agreement by
failing to develop Lots 1-4. See Cordes Affidavit at '10. Cordes' conclusion is based upon the
erroneous label he ascribes to the 1990 Agreement ("The 1990 Development Agreement"). The
word "development," as noted, is not present in the agreement. The word "use," however, is. The
Agreement is a "use" agreement. The only authorized "use" under the Agreement for the property
was a "first class shopping center" that was "mutually acceptable in design and appearance" to
Jacklin and compliant with Articles ll-VI ofthe 1990 Covenants. There is no obligation under the
Agreement, contrary to what Cordes alleges, to "develop" the property. However, if the property is
developed or "used," it must comply with the provisions ofthe QCNJacklin Agreement. Neither
KLP nor Blue Dog have so complied.
6.

At Paragraph 12, Cordes states: "that Mr. Leffel referred him [Dave Russell] to KLP

to see ifKLP would be interested in leasing the vacant Lots 1-4 to Blue Dog for its RV shopping
center." An objection is interposed to this statement in that it constitutes hearsay. Moreover, Mr.
Cordes had no contacts with Leffel or Jacklin regarding the proposed Blue Dog leasehold until after
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Blue Dog and KLP had signed a lease. This fact is undisputed. Leffel himself, the party allegedly
speaking with Russell, simply provided KLP's contact infonnation to Russell at Russell's request.
See Russell Affidavit at ~12. See also Leffel deposition transcript (Hines Affidavit at Ex. A), at pp.
39-40:

Q.

And, again, your understanding is that his [Russell's] interest in the Cordes
lots was with respect to possibly acquiring those lots?

A.

He was looking at his options and he wasn't specific on - it's just, "Is this
available?" "Potentially." "Is this available?" "Potentially." "If this is, then
who do I contact?" And so I told him.

7.

Cordes states, "Because it was Jacklin's own Property Manager who referred Blue

Id.

Dog to us, I never dreamed that Jacklin would subsequently take the position that an RV operation
was an impennissible use in the Riverbend Commerce Park or specifically on our property." See
Cordes Affidavit at ~6. The record reflects, based upon Russell's Affidavit and Leffel's deposition
testimony, that Leffel gave Cordes' contact infonnation to Russell. Cordes also mischaracterizes
Jacklin's position when he states that an RV operation was an impennissible use in the Riverbend
Commerce Park. The KLPlBlue Dog is not subject to the current Riverbend Commerce Park
Covenants. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B (pp. 89-90).
8.

Incredibly, Cordes, in a wholly conc1usory statement flatly contradicted by the record,

states:
We [KLP] had absolutely no reason to question the appropriateness of Blue Dog's
RV operation on our property based on the fact that Blue Dog was referred and
recommended to us by Pat Leffel of Jacklin (author of the CC&Rs), the very source
from which we would have otherwise sought approval. ...
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See Cordes Affidavit at ~14 (emphasis in original). No reason to question the appropriateness of
Blue Dog's RV operation? Why didn't Mr. Cordes look at a copy of his title policy he received
when he purchased the property three years earlier? See Magnuson Affidavit filed December 11,
2008 (at Ex. D). Why is it that today (or at least the date he signed the Affidavit), Cordes, apparently
a sophisticated real estate developer, professes an inability to understand the fact that the KLP
property is not subject to the current Riverbend Covenants but the Jacklin property (which Jacklin
considered leasing to Blue Dog) is? Why is it that Cordes frankly apologized when the QCNJ acklin
Agreement was brought to his attention ("[P]lease accept our apologies for not knowing this
information or being aware ofthe CC&R restrictions on this parcel. I will notify Blue Dog RV now
[July 14, 2008] and will make other arrangements.")? Why is it that this "apology" is the one
undisputed fact that Cordes fails to mention in a nine-page affidavit? Finally, why is it that Cordes
states that Jacklin was the party from "which we would have otherwise sought approval" for the Blue
Dog use, and yet produces no evidence that any such approval has been sought at any point in time,
from the inception of the lease (July 1,2008) through the present?5
9.

Cordes states that he considers a three year lease with a two year additional option

to be "a temporary use of the property." See Cordes Affidavit at ~15. The only "temporary" use

5

In his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Mr. Stoeser testified as follows:

Q.

Has Jacklin ever received a request for approval in writing from Blue Dog as
to any aspect of its current use on Lots 1-4?

A.

No.

See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. D, p. 115. These pages
were also omitted from the excerpts of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition transcript proffered by
Defendants in opposition to Jacklin's motion.
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authorized on the KLP property, pursuant to the 1990 Covenants incorporated by reference through
the QCNJacklin Agreement, is a six (6) month temporary parking exception (to be used "prior to
or during construction of improvements"). See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C, p. 4, §3.ll. It is
undisputed that no improvements have been undertaken on the KLP property leased to Blue Dog
since the inception of the lease (July 1, 2008). It is further undisputed that no request for any
approval of any improvements has been submitted by KLP or Blue Dog to Jacklin for Jacklin's
consideration under Articles II-VI ofthe 1990 Covenants. In short, the only allowable "temporary"
use of the KLPlBlue Dog property is as stated, and it does not apply.
10.

Cordes similarly states at Paragraph 17 of his Affidavit:

"[T]he 1990 Development Agreement [sic] does not set forth any use restrictions,
and does not prevent the temporary use of any of the covered property for any type
of use."
For the reasons set forth in the paragraph immediately preceding, Mr. Cordes' professed
interpretation is directly contrary to Article 3(11) of the 1990 Covenants. If not, why would Mr.
Cordes, a sophisticated real estate developer, offer his apology for not being aware of the same?
11.

Cordes states that Jacklin never attempted "to work with KLP to address any concerns

that Jacklin had with respect to Blue Dog's operation." See Affidavit of Cordes at ~8. Something
is definitely wrong with this picture. KLP, as the owner of the property, is obligated under Articles
II-VI of the CC&Rs in effect in November of 1990 (and incorporated by the QCNJacklin
Agreement) to make application for potential uses so as to ensure that prior approval is given and
that compliance is had with the applicable covenants. No request has been made, whether before
or after execution of the lease. Does Cordes suggest that Jacklin should commission a plan of
improvements that would be acceptable to it, run the same by KLP, and then submit it to itself on
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behalf of KLP? Where is the accountability? Where is the compliance with any provision in
Articles ll- VI ofthe Covenants? There is none.
12.

Cordes overstates when he claims that "Jacklin responded that any site plan submitted

by Blue Dog and/or KLP would have been rejected, and no site improvements would be satisfactory
to placate their opposition." See Cordes Affidavit at

~19.

Nowhere is there any attribution by

Cordes to any record evidence supporting this statement. In actuality, the use to which Blue Dog and
KLP actually put the property, and for which no approval has ever been sought, is noncompliant and
would not be approved. That is what Jacklin told Blue Dog and KLP. Jacklin advised KLP and Blue
Dog on August 5, 2008 as follows:
Specifically, and by way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, §6 of
Instrument No. 1155779 (as incorporated by Instrument No. 1200512) limits
permissible "uses and operation" on the owners' properties, including Lots 1-5 of
Block 1 (the current Blue Dog RV site). Any use proposed under Section 6 must be
submitted for prior approval by the project owner or its representative. No such
approval was sought nor would it be given given the inconsistent nature ofthe Blue
Dog RV Center. Further, Section 6 specifically requires that any use not "degrade
the park-like environment" ofthe Riverbend Commerce Park. As noted, a circus-like
RV center, on unimproved property, is hardly consistent with a "first class shopping
center" or "high-end industrial park."
See Complaint (as verified) at Ex. D (emphasis added). Stoeser's testimony is in accord:
Q.

That paragraph states, "no such approval was sought nor would it be given,
given the inconsistent nature ofthe Blue Dog RV Center." Do you see that
statement?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that, in fact, a correct statement of the company?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

And by that are you referring to the site as it exists as of the date the letter
was written or any attempt under any fashion by Blue Dog to utilize Lots 1-4?
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A.

That applies to the way it's operated today and has been operated in the past.

See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B (p. 110). Stoeser
further testified:
Q.

Is it the Company's position that an RV sales facility in and of itself as a use
could never be a first class shopping center?

A.

No.

Q.

Can you explain for me what circumstances would lead you to conclude that
a given RV sales center could, in fact, be a first class shopping center?

A.

It at a minimum would have to meet all of the CC&Rs. The facility would
have to enclose a lot of its operations and screen things. It would have to be
submitted and reviewed.

Id. at p. 108. Again, neither Blue Dog nor KLP have ever submitted anything other than saying they
would spend "upwards of$50,000 to make site improvements," which consisted ofgravel rather than
paving as required by the 1990 Covenants at §3.4. "The required number of parking and loading
spaces, together with driveways, aisles and other circulation areas, shall be improved with asphalt
and/or concrete surface."). See Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. C (p. 4).
13.

Cordes' last observation borders on the absurd. Specifically, Cordes states, "I find

it more than ironic that Jacklin is complaining about Blue Dog's operation .... Jacklin uses its own
four vacant lots across the street as a temporary parking area for heavy equipment auctions." See
Cordes Affidavit at '21. Cordes' statement is a gross exaggeration and contrary to the contractual
obligations that apply to KLP and Blue Dog. Stoeser testified that the Jacklin lots in the Riverbend
Commerce Park (the orange lots on Exhibit A hereto) had been used for temporary parking for an
equipment auction at the Greyhound Park (property not subject to the Covenants) for an estimated
six days out of the last 20 years. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4) and Rule 56(c)
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at Ex. B, p. 119 (another page from Mr. Stoeser's deposition transcript that was not submitted by
Defendants). Further, as established by the QCAlJacklin Agreement and Mr. Stoeser's testimony
cited above, the KLP property is not part of the Riverbend Commerce Park (since it is not subject
to the Riverbend Covenants).
14.

In essence, Cordes complains about an alleged violation of covenants that apply

uniquely to property that he doesn't own. KLP has no standing to enforce the current Riverbend
Commerce Park Covenants. Moreover, even ifthey had standing, which they do not, their complaint
about temporary parking over six days during the past 20 years would fail under the specific terms
of the Covenants that apply to the Jacklin pro~erty (i.e., the orange property on Exhibit A hereto).
Section 8.9 of the current Covenants, the ones that apply to the Jacklin property and not the KLP
property, provide as follows:
The failure to enforce any requirement contained in this Declaration shall in no event
be deemed to be a waiver of the right to enforce that requirement or any other
provision of this Declaration thereafter.
See Hines Affidavit at Ex. D, p. 18, §8.9.

B. Deposition of Dave Russell.
1.

Mr. Russell states that during his preliminary discussions with Mr. Leffel, that Leffel

"expressed no concern about Blue Do g operating either a RV sales or service operation in Riverbend
Commerce Park." This is true for three reasons. First, Jacklin couldn't lease that which it didn't
own. Second, Jacklin's holdings (unlike KLP's property) were not subject to the QCAfJacklin
Agreement. Third, any use of any Jacklin property subject to the Riverbend Covenants would need
to comply with the paving, signage, landscaping, and related provisions of those Covenants so as to
objectively ensure harmony with the remainder ofthe Commerce Park. As Stoeser testified, an RV
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operation in general is compatible with the Riverbend Commerce Park provided "it complies with
the CC&Rs in Riverbend Commerce Park." See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4) and
Rule 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 89-90.
2.

Russell states in paragraph 9 of his Affidavit: "At no time during our lease

negotiations did Mr. Leffel ever raise any concerns or objections to operating a RV center in
Riverbend Commerce Park." See Russell Affidavit, ~ 9. For the reasons set forth in the preceding
paragraph, this statement is not true.
3.

Jacklin did make a lease rate proposal, as noted by Russell, of approximately $25,000

per month for a ten-year term. See Russell Affidavit at

~

11.

In order to accomplish the

improvements necessary under the current Covenants applicable to Riverbend Commerce Park,
Jacklin would have to incur significant outlays resulting in a higher rental rate. Stoeser's testimony
confirmed as much:

Q.

During the negotiations that Jacklin had as to its property with Blue Dog,
what were the nature of the tenant improvements that Jacklin envisioned
necessary to accommodate Blue Dog's intended use?

A.

Well, there were many iterations when they first came to us. It was a larger
piece. They encompassed over $3 million of improvements to construct
facilities according to the CC&Rs, asphalt, landscaping, irrigation, lighting,
signage, all those aspects of it. And I don't think that once we pared it down
below a minimum that we could still meet theirs. It was still over a million
dollars of improvements to meet the CC&Rs.

Q.

Were you ever made aware that the dollar amount of improvements was
something that was deemed outside of the reach or not cost effective by Blue
Dog?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how was that?

A.

They made a statement that the one they wanted specifically, I believe, was
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about $2.5 million - - I'd have to look it up. About a $25,000 a month lease
payment, and they said that was too much. I believe they indicated to us that
at the site in the heart of Post Falls that they are working at, that they were
somewhere closer to $20,000 a month is where they were there.
Id. at pp. 118-19.
4.

Russell states that Blue Dog accepted KLP' s proposed lease tenns because said tenns

"were more favorable in large part because KLP offered a lower base rent and shorter lease tenn."
See Russell Affidavit at 1 15. This should come as no surprise. In order to ensure compliance with
the applicable Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants, Jacklin would need to fund improvements that
resulted in a $25,000 lease payment on the part of Blue Dog. Since KLP perfonned virtually no site
improvements, regardless of the requirements imposed under Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990
Covenants (including but not limited to requirements that pertain to paving, landscaping, lighting,
signage, and setbacks), the lease rate was less.
5.

Russell further states that when he so advised Leffel that Blue Dog had entered into

a lease agreement with KLP that Leffel, "Did not give any indication whatsoever that an RV
shopping center was an incompatible use or restricted in any way in the Riverbend Commerce Park."
See Russell Affidavit at 1 16. First, as set forth above, the KLP property is not subj ect to the current
Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. Hence, it is a misnomer to blankedly refer to the KLP and
Jacklin properties in the same manner. Second, it is undisputed that Leffel, unlike Cordes (who had
actually received a title policy identifying the agreement three years earlier), had no prior knowledge
of the 1990 QCAlJacklin Agreement.
6.

Leffel was first employed by Jacklin in March of 1993. See Leffel Affidavit (filed

December 11, 2008). At that time, QCA had already purchased the property now owned by KLP.
Id. at 1 10. As such, Leffel was unaware ofthe recorded limitations arising under the QCAlJ acklin
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Agreement when he was negotiating with Russell (for Blue Dog) for a potential lease of Jacklin
property in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Id. at ~ 10. Leffel testified that he was unaware of the
existence of the QCAlJacklin Agreement until July 14,2008, two weeks after Blue Dog and KLP
had entered into their lease arrangements.

See Hines Affidavit at Ex. A (Leffel deposition

transcript), pp. 102-105. The Defendants have not disputed this fact nor can they.
7.

Russell rhetorically posits in his Affidavit: "Why would Mr. Leffel refer me to the

owner of a potential lease site if in fact that lease site could not house an RV shopping operation?"
Perhaps the more appropriate question is why would the owner of the property, in possession of a
title policy identifying the recorded agreement together with constructive k.'1owledge of the same,
ignore the terms of the agreement, enter into a proposed lease, apologize for the error, and then do
nothing to correct the problem?
8.

Russell's conclusion "that Jacklin now opposes Blue Dog's RV operations simply

because Jacklin lost out on the leasing opportunity to a competing owner" constitutes rank
speculation lacking in foundation and should be stricken. This statement simply doesn't square with
the facts. Jacklin offered a lease rate of$25,000 a month because it intended to ensure that Blue Dog
complied with the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. KLP offered $5,000 a month by ignoring
Article 2 through 6 and the QCAlJacklin Agreement, thereby allowing Blue Dog to utilize the
property in a manner with no compliance with the paving, lighting, signage, landscaping, and other
requirements unambiguously imposed on the same under the 1990 Covenants.
9.

Russell further concludes that, "[t]he only option that Jacklin ever gave Blue Dog was

to immediately vacate the premises or face legal action." See Russell Affidavit at

~

20. Russell

further states that, "Jacklin never even identified specific site use problems with Blue Dog's RV

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- PAGE 18

operation .... " Id. This is nonsense. On August 5, 2008, Blue Dog and KLP were advised as
follows:
(1)

The property could only be used for "a first class shopping center."

(2)

KLP was obligated to work with Jacklin "to achieve a mutually-acceptable
design and appearance" so that the same "shall be aesthetically pleasing and
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park .... " No plan
had been submitted or provided.

(3)

There was no compliance with Articles 2 through 6 of the November 1990
Covenants (Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779).

(4)

Prior approval of any use was required under Section 6 of the Covenants.

(5)

There was no compliance with the landscaping restrictions in Section 2 of the
Covenants.

(6)

There was no compliance with the parking restrictions set forth in Section 3
of the Covenants.

(7)

There was no compliance with signage restrictions set forth in Section 4 of
the Covenants.

(8)

There was no compliance with the design restrictions set forth in Section 5
of the Covenants.

See Complaint (as verified) at Ex. D.
10.

Stoeser's testimony is particularly instructi ve. The use to which Blue Dog had put the

property was not capable of being approved, regardless of the fact that neither Blue Dog nor KLP
had ever submitted a request for approval.
11.

Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to undertake substantial

site improvements on the four undeveloped lots, including landscaping and surface work." See
Russell Affidavit at

~

23. He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do "to satisfy

Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." Id. Offering to pay $50,000 to put gravel on four
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vacant lots without addressing the paving requirement, as clearly specified in the November 1990
Covenants, together with the signage, lighting, setback, and landscaping requirements (ignoring for
the moment the "first class shopping center" and "mutually-acceptable design" criteria) is hardly a
proposal meriting serious consideration. Why should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one
was never submitted) which is incapable of complying with the unambiguous provisions of
Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is bound by?

IV. ARGUMENT.
A. The OCA/Jacklin A&:reement Is Enforceable As a
Matter of Law to Preclude the Uses to Which the Defendants
Have Placed the Subject Property.
1. Rules of Covenant Interpretation.
Covenants that restrict the use of privately-owned real property are valid under Idaho law.
In Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003), the Supreme Court set

forth a summary of the analysis that applies in resolving issues of Covenant interpretation:
Idaho recognizes the validity of Covenants that restrict the use of
private property.... When interpreting such Covenants, the Court
generally applies the rules of contract construction.... However,
because restrictive Covenants are in derogation of the common law
right to use land for all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by
implication any restriction not clearly expressed .... Further, all doubts
are to be resolved in favor ofthe free use ofland ... .
Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829.
Since Covenants are analyzed under generally accepted principles of contract construction,
the process is twofold. First, the Court is to determine whether a given Covenant or term is
ambiguous. To this end, the Court consults the plain language ofthe Covenant. Pinehaven Planning
Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829; Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 193,923 P.2d 434 (1996).
~
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In detennining whether or not a given Covenant is ambiguous or unambiguous, the Court

must be cognizant of the following:
Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use or
settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous merely because
they are not defined in the document where they are used.
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995). Rather, a Covenant is
ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on a given issue.
Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829. Ambiguity in the first instance is a question
oflaw. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 192. To detennine ambiguity, the Court must not only give
words or phrases their common use or settled meaning, it must view the agreement as a whole.
Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193.
Turning to the second step, ifthe Covenant is detennined to be unambiguous by the Court,
then the Court must apply the Covenant as a matter oflaw. City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello,
127 Idaho at 201. "Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the plain
meaning governs." Postv. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473, 475,873 P.2d 118 (1984).
On the other hand, ifthere is an ambiguity in a given Covenant, then the interpretation is a
question of fact. In this regard, the Court must detennine the intent of the parties at the time the
instrument was drafted. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193. To detennine the drafters' intent, the
Court looks to "the language of the Covenants, the existing circumstances at the time of the
fonnulation of the Covenants, and the conduct of the parties." Id.

2.

Mischaracterizations Advanced by the Defendants.

Certain of the rules regarding covenant interpretation, as set forth above, merit further
emphasis. This is particularly true since the import of the same have been virtually neglected or
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"glossed over" by the Defendants in their responsive Memorandum.
First, words or phrases of common usage are not rendered ambiguous simply because they
are not defined in the document.

See,~,

City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho, 198,

899 P.2d 411 (1995). The tenn "first class" has a commonly-accepted meaning. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines "first class" as "ofthe most superior or excellent grade or kind .... " Webster's
similarly defines "first class" as "the first or highest group in a classification."
Second, an ambiguity exists only if the covenant at issue is reasonably susceptible to
conflicting interpretations. Since "first class" is generally and commonly accepted as a descriptive
word implying the highest quality, is it "reasonable" to interpret the QCAlJacklin Agreement as
allowing the Defendants to utilize Lots 1 through 4, in their unimproved state, for the situs of an RV
center without even satisfying the minimum requirements imposed under Articles 2 through 60fthe
1990 Covenants? lfthe 1990 Covenants, which are clearly applicable to the property, set forth the
minimum standards, how then can a "first class shopping center" be located on bare ground that
virtually ignores those obligations?
Third, Defendants, in the argument section oftheir brief, continue to perpetuate the myth that
the QCAlJ acklin Agreement is some sort of "development" agreement. As noted above, the word
"development" does not appear in the Agreement. It only exists in the Defendants' brief.
Fourth, the Defendants seek to invoke the doctrine of "interpretation against the drafter." In
support, Defendants state, "On cross-examination, Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6) representative admitted
that Jacklin drafted the Development Agreement [sic], not KLP's predecessor." See Defendants'
Memorandum at p. 15, fu. 2. In actuality, Mr. Stoeser testified as follows:
Q.

The question was asked did Jacklin draft this Agreement [the QCA/Jacklin
Agreement]. And your answer to that was yes?
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A.

That's correct. That's what I said.

Q.

The circumstances under which this Agreement came to be, did Jacklin
unilaterally write out an agreement and give it to Quality Centers to sign, or
was this the subject of negotiations? Or how did it come to be?
MR. HINES: Object to fonn. Leading.

A.

Well, we had to pick their lawyer or our lawyer to do the writing. Our lawyer
would do the writing, send it to them, they'd make changes, it would come
back to us. So our lawyer was the one who, I guess, did the first draft to
submit to them for review. Is that what you mean?

Q.

Well, let's talk about [the Agreement]. Do you recall who the lawyer was
with whom Jacklin dealt that represented Quality Centers?

A.

Yeah. Sean Jackson ... I think it was Sean Jackson. I'd have to look at this.

Q.

I'll turn you back to [the QCAlJacklin Agreement] that you previously
referenced ....

A.

Yeah. Sean Jackson was Benderson's attorney that we worked with. And
Benderson was part of Quality Center Associates.

Q.

Do you know which part of [the Agreement] was, in its ultimate fonn, was
written by your counsel as opposed to which portions were suggested by
Quality Centers' counsel?

A.

I couldn't tell you, no.

Q.

[D]o you know whether one draft was prepared?

A.

No. No. There were many iterations of it preceded by the other agreement
which you can tell had lots of negotiations in it. No.

Q.

When you answer the question, did Jacklin draft this Agreement, what do you
understand the word "draft" to mean?

A.

Who actually did the typing of the changes. This was before all the Word
documents with the redline ability and all that, you know.
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See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 112-13. 6
Fifth, Defendants paint with an overly-broad brush when they state, "Jacklin's entire
Complaint turns on the flawed assertion that the Development Agreement [sic] expressly prohibits
Blue Dog's RV operation." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 15. Defendants unnecessarily seek
to confuse and obviate the issue. Jacklin has acknowledged that an RV sales center, in concept, is
compatible with other uses in Riverbend Commerce Park (excluding the Defendants' property)
provided it satisfies the terms of the Covenants. See Hines Affidavit at Ex. B (Stoeser Deposition
(Rule 30(b)(6» atpp. 89-90. Jacklin has also acknowledged that anRV center could be appropriate
on the Defendants' property, notwithstanding the heightened standards of the QCAJJacklin
Agreement, provided it meets Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants and is submitted and
reviewed. 7 It isn't that the "RV use" is prohibited by the QCAJJ acklin Agreement, in principle, it is
that these Defendants have undertaken virtually no effort to comply with any requirement arising
under the QCAJJ acklin Agreement or Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants.
Q.

Is it your position and that of the Company that the RV facility as it's
currently in use on the Blue DoglKLP property would not be approved?

A.

It would not be approved.

Q.

And again, are there circumstances that you can envision under which an RV
facility on that site could be approved?

A.

Yes.

These pages from Mr. Stoeser's deposition transcript were also omitted from the copy
of the transcript appended as Exhibit B to Mr. Hines' February 17,2009 Affidavit.
6

7
Stoeser testified, "It at a minimum would have to meet all ofthe CC&Rs. The facility
would have to enclose a lot of its operations and screen things. It would have to be submitted and
reviewed." See Magnuson Affidavitpursuantto IRCP 32(a)(4) andIRCP 56(c) atEx.B,pp. 108-09.
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Q.

Is the problem this operation as opposed to another one?

A.

It is this operation.

See Hines Affidavit (filed February 17,2009) at Ex. B, p. 109. "This operation," i.e., the KLPlBlue
Dog "operation," has made no effort to comply with Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants or
"to work together with [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually-acceptable design and appearance" so that the
same is "aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within the Riverbend Commerce
Park."

3. The QCAlJacklin Ae-reement Specifically Precludes the Uses
to Which the Property Has Now Been Put by Defendants.
Defendants advance five (5) arguments, at pp. 16-19 of their Memorandum, in support of
their claim of QCA/Jacklin Agreement does not prohibit Blue Dog's current use on the property.
Each ofthese five (5) arguments should be rejected.
First, Defendants argue that the QCA/Jacklin Agreement "is not a use restriction." See
Defendants' Memorandum at pp. 16-17. Defendants state: "The Development Agreement [sic] does
not state how the Lots are to be used or that certain purposes are prohibited." Id. at p. 16. Actually,
the "Development Agreement," a moniker invented by Defendants since the word "development"
does not appear in the Agreement, actually contains the word "use."

In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block 1 .... Purchaser agrees: (ii) to
work together with [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually-acceptable design and appearance
for the [first class] shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park ....
See Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G.
The foregoing 0 bligations are ob ligations that encumber the Defendants' property, have been
known to KLP since its purchase ofthe subject property in 2005 (the same being disclosed by its title
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policy) and which Defendants have virtually ignored. The Defendants have made no effort to
prepare or submit acceptable design and appearance standards for Jacklin's mutual acceptance. Even
if Jacklin found the current use of Blue Dog "aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses
within Riverbend Commerce Park," which it does not, it still couldn't consent to the present use as
there has been no effort to comply with Articles 2 through 6 of the applicable 1990 Covenants.
Second, Defendants argue that "the obligation to construct and maintain a first class shopping
center has been satisfied." In essence, Defendants argue that since Quality Centers built the "Factory
Outlet Shopping Center" on a portion of Lots 1 through 17 (excluding Lots 1 through 4), back in
1991, that any remaining obligation under QCAlJacklin Agreement has been satisfied. This argument
ignores well-settled principles of contract in covenant interpretation. The QCAlJ acklin Agreement
is a recorded encumbrance, binding upon QCA's successors (including the Defendants), and it
applies to all of Lots 1 through 17. If anyone of these lots was sold individually, it would remain
subject to the Agreement. There is no exception ifthe lots are held in aggregate by one party. There
is no exception that excludes one lot (Lot 1 for example) if development has occurred on Lot 17 (for
example). Simply put, there is neither a factual nor legal basis to claim that the appropriate use of
one legal lot satisfies requirements that pertain to a separate legal lot.
Third, Defendants incredibly claim that Blue Dog's current operation "is a first class
shopping center." If parking untold dozens ofRV s on an unimproved patch of grass, dirt, and weeds,
under the watchful eye of a giant, inflatable blue dog and fluorescent banners reminiscent of a
liquidation sale is a "first class" anything, one would hate to see what the bottom ofthe barrel looks
like. How can anyone with a straight face claim that Blue Dog's current operations (as depicted in
the photographs appended to the Leffel Affidavit or as can be readily be seen from virtually anyone
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who might drive by the property or consider Riverbend Commerce Park as a potential business
location) constitute a "shopping center" let alone a "first class shopping center"?
As previously noted, "first class" conotates a descriptive term of the highest order. It is a
word of common understanding and meaning. This is a bench trial. The Court is the finder of fact
ifthere is an ambiguity (which there is not). There is only an ambiguity ifthe QNJacklin Agreement
is subject to one or more reasonable interpretations. While there may be a set of facts somewhere,
someday that presents two reasonable interpretations, these aren't those facts. One need only look
at what the Defendants' predecessor-in-title (QCA) did with the remainder of the property, consistent
with the terms of the QCNJacklin Agreement, to obtain objective indicia of what "first class"
means. In the performance of its obligations under the Agreement, as to those portions of the
property it used, QCA sought approval from Jacklin (and obtained approval) for construction of the
Factory Outlet Malls. That was a first class shopping center. RVs parked on the dirt willy-nilly, is
neither a shopping center nor first class.
Fourth, Defendants argue that the QCNJacklin Agreement does not prohibit "temporary
uses." A five-year lease term is hardly temporary. Moreover, temporary uses are specifically
precluded by the QCNJacklin Agreement through the November 1990 Covenants (Kootenai County
Instrument No. 1155779) which are specifically incorporated therein. Article 3.11 of said instrument
specifically precludes temporary parking on any unimproved lot unless said parking is for use prior
to or during construction of improvements and does not exceed a period of six (6) inonths.
Defendants are already past the six (6) months and have submitted no plans for any construction of
any improvements of any kind or degree on Lots 1 through 4. Indeed, as evident by their submittals,
they have no intention of doing the same.
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Fifth, Defendants argue that the "first class shopping center" requirement is only invoked
when development occurs. See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 19. This is again an argument born
ofDefendant 's mischaracterization ofthe QCAJJ acklin Agreement as a "Development Agreement."
Jacklin has acknowledged that the Agreement contains no time frame for the required construction
of the necessary "first class shopping center." That does not end the inquiry. Not only are
"temporary" uses such as the one at issue precluded by the Covenants consensually impressed upon
the property, they are precluded by Subsection (ii) of the Agreement wherein the Defendants
(through their predecessor-in-title QCA) specifically agreed "to work together with [Jacklin] to
achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it shall be
aesthetically-pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park.... " See
Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G (emphasis added). Simply put, the Agreement
is a "use" agreement through the limitations expressed therein. Defendants have not satisfied those
use restrictions. Even ifthose use restrictions are ambiguous (a point not conceded), Defendants have
offered no defense to the use restrictions that arise under Articles 2 through 6 of the 1990 Covenants
nor can they.

B. Defendants' Use of the Subject Property is Clearly in Violation
of Articles II-VI of the November 1990 Covenants.
1. The Defendants' Ar~ument that Articles II-VI Do Not
Bind the Subject Property is Le~ally Unsupported.
Defendants argue that Articles IT-VI of the 1990 Covenants do not apply to the property at
issue. This is a curious assertion. It is particularly curious since KLP purchased the subject property
in 2005 and received a title policy specifically disclosing the existence ofQCA/Jacklin Agreement.
See Magnuson Affidavit (filed December 11, 2008) at Ex. D. Apparently, after purchasing the
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property, and being made aware of the limitations, but inferentially not reading the same, Defendants
now seek to disavow themselves of responsibility. Not surprisingly, the argument doesn't square
with the facts.
On June 21, 1990, QCA and Jacklin entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of
the subject property. See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. F. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement,
Jacklin agreed to remove the subject property from the Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants. Id.
The parties then agreed to contractually encumber the subject property, upon conveyance from
Jacklin to QCA, with Articles II-VI ofthe same Covenants, through a contractual undertaking. Id.
Consistent with its obligations under the foregoing Agreement, Jacklin thereafter caused the
existing Riverbend Commerce Park Covenants to be amended so as to remove the subject property
from the same. See Hines Affidavit (filed February 17, 2008) at Ex. E. That Agreement was
recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200514 after the recordation of the QCAJJacklin
Agreement as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512.
In other words, the subject property was impressed with the terms of the QCAJJacklin
Agreement (including Articles II-VI of the referenced Covenants as incorporated therein). See
Stoeser Affidavit (filed December 11,2008) at Ex. G. This occurred at 2:43 p.m. on November 7,
1990. Id. Two minutes later, at 2:45 p.m., the existing Covenants were amended to delete the
subject property from the same. This should end the inquiry. In any event, Defendants have shown
no authority for the proposition that two arms-length parties cannot contractually incorporate, as
obligations between the two ofthem, Covenant restrictions contained in anotherrecorded document.

2. Articles II-VI Prohibit a Temporary Use of the Subject Property.
Defendants state, "Nowhere in Articles II-VI is a temporary use of the KLP property
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prohibited." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. This is plainly untrue. It is more than clear,
and beyond dispute, that Defendants have used the subject property for the parking of dozens and
dozens ofRV s. This use has continued since July of2008, a period now approaching eight months.
Articles II-VI of the Covenants incorporated into the QCAlJ acklin Agreement (expressed in
Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779) allow only one temporary use. That temporary use is
defined in Article 3(11). See Stoeser Affidavit at Ex. C, p. 4. The only allowed temporary use is
for temporary parking, for a period not longer than six months, as part of the construction of
improvements pursuant to a submitted and accepted construction plan. Id.
Defendants, not surprisingly since they are past the six month period, claim that the
prohibition extends for 12 months. See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. The problem with
Defendants' argument, including the Covenant language actually quoted at page 21 of their
Memorandum, is that it doesn't exist anywhere in the set of Covenants (Instrument No. 1155779)
that was specifically incorporated into the QCAlJ acklin Agreement. Other than this one allowed
temporary use, there are no others. Finally, as to that one allowed temporary use, there is no material
issue of fact that Defendants are in breach of the same.

3. Articles II-VI Prohibit Blue D0l:'s Use of the Subject Property.
Jacklin does not argue that Articles II-VI prohibit all RV sales operations. However, the
minimum threshold standards are contained in said Articles and must be observed. There are no
exceptions.
Article 6(3)(A) specifically prohibits and precludes "storage yards." See Stoeser Affidavit
(filed December 11, 2008) at Ex. C, pp. 10-11. Not all RV sales facilities necessarily constitute
storage yards. However, this one does. At the very least, using four undeveloped lots for the parking
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of dozens and dozens ofRV s, with no improvements, certainly appears to be a storage yard. If there
is a question, Article 6(5) provides: "any use which is arguably in conflict ofthis Declaration (the
CC&Rs) shall be submitted and approved." Id. at p. 11. No request of any kind or nature has been
made for any approval by or on behalf of Defendants.
Article N sets forth minimum requirements for signage on the subject property. Article 4(7)
specifically provides: "Plans and specifications of all signs shall be submitted and approved. Plans
shall include size, lighting, color, scheme, location, and relevant technical data." Id. at p. 6. No
plans or specifications of any kind or nature, with respect to signage or otherwise, have been
submitted by or on behalf of Defendants or approved by Jacklin.
Article ill requires that any owner utilizing any lot for an appropriate purpose must submit
a parking plan that meets with the approval of the Riverbend Property Owners' Corporation. Id. at
p.3. Generally applicable requirements include landscaping (to encourage a park-like entrance).
Id. at p. 4 (§3.2). In addition, parking areas acceptable to the Riverbend Property Owners'
Corporation must be paved with asphalt or concrete. Id. at §3.4. Other requirements pertain to
drainage, lighting, access, and striping. Id. at §§3.5-3.8. No request for approval of any parking plan
with respect to the subject property has been made by or on behalf of Defendants.
Temporary uses are additionally proscribed by Article V,which sets forth minimum design
and construction standards. Id. at pp. 6-10. No submittals have been made by or on behalf of
Defendants under Article V.
Article IT pertains to landscaping. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, those requirements
apply within sixty (60) days after the lot is occupied. Id. at pp. 1-2. No landscaping plan has been
submitted nor has any landscaping been done by Defendants.
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4. The Prohibitions Under Articles II-VI of the Applicable
Covenants Are Not Tri~~ered by "Development."
Defendants essentially argue that they can do what they wish with Lots 1-4, without regard
to the requirements ofthe Covenants, since they haven't essentially built anything on the lots. This
is a concept plainly foreclosed by Articles ll- VI. Consider the following.
Articl e 2(1) provides that undeveloped areas for future expansion "shall be maintained in a
weed-free and dust-controlled condition and shall be landscaped ifrequired by Declarant." Id. at p.

1.
Article 2(6), applicable to "vacant lots," provides that lots held for longer than one year
without commencing construction "should be dust free and groundcover maintained so as not to
detract from the aesthetics ofthe Development." Id. at p. 3.
Article 3(11) only allows the use of an undeveloped lot for temporary parking if the same
does not exceed six months and is done as part of an approved construction project. Id. at p. 4.
Article 6(3) specifically precludes "storage yards," and mandates that all storage be indoors
or totally screened. Id. at p. 10. If there is a question as to whether or not a given use constitutes a
"storage yard," the issue must be submitted to and resolved by the Riverbend Property Owners'
Corporation.
Reading all of these Covenants together, or individually, it is clear, and beyond dispute, that
there is no allowed "temporary use" of an undeveloped lot, without compliance with landscaping and
parking requirements, such as the use now accomplished by Defendants. The same is clearly in
violation by Articles ll- VI. Those Covenants are not triggered by "development." They stand alone.
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5. Blue D01:'s "Efforts" to Make Site Improvements Were Not
Rendered Futile by Jacklin.
In lease discussions with Jacklin, Blue Dog was advised that in order to obtain compliance

with the Covenants applicable to the Jacklin property (colored in orange on Exhibit A hereto),
Jacklin would be required to fund leasehold improvements (asphalt, landscaping, irrigation, lighting,
and signage) that would exceed $1 million. See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and
IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 118-119. In order to recapture its investment in site improvements,
necessitated by the requirements of the CC&Rs, Jacklin would be required to charge Blue Dog
$25,000 a month in rent (or $5,000 more than what Blue Dog was paying at its former location).
Blue Dog went to the KLP site. After being immediately advised that the use was not in
compliance with the QCAlJacklin Agreement and the specific Covenants incorporated therein, Blue
Dog offered to spend $50,000 to make site improvements if Jacklin was to consent. That offer was
declined. The problem with the offer is that the $50,000 was to fund improvements (gravel) that
wouldn't even comply with the CC&Rs (which require paving). Other than gravel, nothing was
addressed or proposed by Blue Dog. If Jacklin concluded that it would cost $1 million to fund
improvements necessitated by the CC&Rs on its property, why would it expect that those costs
would be any different on the KLP property, particularly since Blue Dog only proposed to gravel the
same (ignoring its obligation to pave the property)?
In yet another example of twisting the facts, Defendants contend, "Jacklin's CFO further

concedes that it would have been 'futile' for Blue Dog to make any site improvements because
Jacklin's approval would still have been withheld." See Defendants' Memorandum at p. 21. This
is not consistent with Mr. Stoeser's testimony. Mr. Stoeser testified that given the requirements
under the QCAJJ acklin Agreement and Articles II-VI incorporated therein, and given the present use
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of the property by Blue Dog, that use (i.e., Blue Dog's existing use) was not capable of being
approved as it did not comply with the stated standards.
Q.

Is it your position and that of the Company that theRV facility as is currently
in use on the Blue DoglKLP property would not be approved?

A.

It would not be approved.

Q.

And again, are there circumstances that you can envision under which an RV
facility on that site could be approved?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is the problem this operation as opposed to another one?

A.

It is this operation.

See Magnuson Pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, p. 109. There are no disputed
issues of material fact to support the Defendants' "defense" of futility or "impossibility."
6. The Defendants Wholly Misunderstand Which Covenants Apply.
Defendants claim: "Jacklin's after-the-fact assertion that Blue Dog's RV operation violates
Articles ll-VI flies in the face of Jacklin's four month solicitation of the same Blue Dog RV
operation for its property." See Defendants' Memorandum atp. 22. First of all, it isn't an "after-thefact" assertion. It was asserted immediately and has been made known at all points in time to Blue
Dog.

See,~,

Complaint at Ex. D. Second, Jacklin does not claim that an RV operation could not

be appropriately done on the KLP property. However, if the operation was to be properly
accomplished on the KLP property, it would, like the proposed operation on the Jacklin property,
require compliance with the basic standards. That compliance comes at a cost. Defendants refuse
to acknowledge responsibility for the necessary impro vements associated with the use. IfDefendants
want to operate Lots 1-4 as an RV sale center, then they can't be excused from compliance with the
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CC&Rs and that compliance will cost more than $50,000 and require the payment of rent greater
than $5,000 a month. It strains credulity for Defendants to now argue that Jacklin's efforts
"demonstrate that Blue Dog's RV shopping center was a permissible use" on the KLP property.

7. Removal of Blue Dog, as Prayed for in the Complaint,
Is an Appropriate Remedy.
Defendants argue that Articles ll- VI, even if applicable to the subject property (which they
are) do not authorize "eviction" as a remedy. Declaratory and injunctive relief are available remedies
in Idaho. The declaratory reliefthat Plaintiff seeks, as set forth in its Complaint, is an adjudication
that the uses to which Defendants have placed the subject property are in violation of the parties'
contractual obligations and that said usage cease and desist both pendente lite and post judgment.
Obligations with respect to real property, to which parties have voluntarily agreed, may be
specifically enforced. These remedies arise at law rather than by contract.
C.

Jacklin Has Stated A Claim for Permanent Injunctive Relief.s

The permanent injunction Jacklin seeks is consistent with the declaratory reliefto which it
is entitled. That relief can be provided either by way of declaratory judgment or permanent
injunction. The Idaho case law cited by Defendants (Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681
P.2d 988 (1984)) involved a request for preliminary injunctive relief, which requires a showing of
"great or irreparable injury" given that the relief is entered during the litigation and prior to final
judgment. Where a legal right is clear, as here, injunctive relief of a permanent nature can issue to
ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain. That right may be also enforced

8
Jacklin's Complaint originally included claims for a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary injunction. In order to minimize the burden and expense on the parties, and given the
uncontroverted facts, Jacklin has elected to proceed directly through summaryjudgment on its claims
for declaratory relief and a corresponding permanent injunction.
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through declaratory relief.
In support of its citation ofMr. Stoeser's testimony, citations more appropriate in the context
of a request for a preliminary injunction, rather than a permanent injunction, Defendants once again
offer an incomplete perspective.
Mr. Stoeser, on behalf of Jacklin Land Company, testified as follows:
Q.

Has Jacklin ever received a request for approval in writing from Blue Dog as
to any aspect of its current use on Lots 1 through 4?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you have any basis to believe that Blue Dog intends to undertake any
improvements on Lots 1 through 4 or that KLP intends to undertake any
improvements on Lots 1 through 4 other than what exists there today?

A.

No.

Q.

. .. Would it be a fair characterization to say that you have been
involved with this Commerce Park since its inception?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you describe for me in general terms the nature of the tenant base that
you have out there at the Riverbend Commerce Park as its been developed?

A.

Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premier commerce park in North
Idaho with success. We've landed nationally-acclaimed tenants in there .. .
. We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives from California ... .
Generally, people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park want to acquire
land there with the hope of appreciation because of the quality of the Park.

Q.

Based on that knowledge and experience, do you have an opinion one way or
another as to whether or not the continued maintenance ofthe Blue Dog RV
Center in its current form for the remaining term of the lease that we
understand exists would cause any damage to Jacklin Land Company?

A.

I personally feel it would.
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Q.

Why do you believe that?

A.

Because as I stated before, most people come to Riverbend Commerce Park
because it is the premier commerce park in the area. Many tenants have the
option to locate in commerce parks that are less restrictive, have lower priced
land, and allow a lower level of building design. So those that come to
Riverbend are basically paying a premium for their facilities over many lower
end parks.

See Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Ex. B, pp. 115-18.

D. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair DeaIinl,!
Has No Applicability to the Pendinl,! Motion.
Defendants contend that Jacklin's claims were foreclosed by Jacklin's alleged breach ofthe
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In support of the same, Defendants have filed an untimely
motion for cross-summary judgment and!or seek to raise purported issues of fact sufficient to defeat
Jacklin's request for relief. Both efforts should be rejected.
Jacklin has neither breached any specific term ofthe Agreement nor the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants claim that Jacklin breached the Agreement by failing to
work towards a "mutually acceptable design." It is hard to fathom Defendants' argument. Is Jacklin
obligated to go out, envision what Defendants want, engage third-party professionals to prepare a
site plan that will work with Jacklin, and then submit it to itself on behalf of Defendants?
Defendants have never made any submittal of any kind under the QCAlJ acklin Agreement or the
applicable Covenants. Defendants only effort is to propose to spend $50,000 to throw some gravel
on lots that require paving if parked on for greater than six (6) months. When Jacklin discussed Blue
Dog's use of Jacklin's property, and Blue Dog was made aware of the .costs that would be
necessitated to obtain compliance with the Covenants, Blue Dog walked away. There is no breach
of any specific term of the Agreement to which Defendants can cite.
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As to the covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff acknowledges that the law imposes
that term in all contractual undertakings. However, what Defendants don't note, is the fact that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override express provisions in a contract negotiated
and executed by independent parties. See Idaho First Natl. Bank v. David Steed & Associates, 121
Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992). See also Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho
223,939 P.2d 542 (1997). Jacklin has required that Defendants perform in accordance with the
terms of the QCAlJacklin Agreement and the applicable Covenants. Even if Defendants are
somehow successful in creating an ambiguity in the QCAlJacklin Agreement as to these facts, there
is no such ambiguity under the applicable Covenants. How can Jacklin be claimed to have acted in
bad faith if it simply stands on its rights under consensually-negotiated agreements which the
Defendants apparently didn't read until after they had put their property to an improper use? If such
bad faith was present, why would Mr. Cordes, an individual with sophistication in real estate,
immediately advise Jacklin "[P] lease accept our apologies for not knowing this information or being
aware ofthe CC&R restrictions for this parcel. I will notify Blue Dog RV now and will make other
arrangements"? See Cordes Affidavit at Ex. C.

E.

Defendants Have Shown No Facts to Support the Defenses of Waiver or Estoppel.
The Defendants seek to raise material issues of fact through the affinnative defenses of

waiver and estoppel. Both defenses have no applicability given the undisputed material facts at bar.
First, as to waiver. Waiver requires "a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right that
is relied upon by an adverse party and which alters their position." A&B Irrigation District v.
Aberdeen- American Falls Groundwater District, 141 Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005).
Apparently, Defendants claim that since Dave Russell (on behalf of Blue Dog) asked Leffel
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(J acklin's property manager) who owned Lots 1 through 4 of Block 1, and since Leffel gave Russell

KLP's contact information, that somehow Jacklin has "waived" any rights under the QCAlJacklin
Agreement or the Covenants incorporated therein. The facts suggest otherwise.
There is no disputed issue of material fact that Leffel, who was first employed by Jacklin in
1993, some two years after the execution and recordation ofthe QCAlJacklin Agreement, had no
knowledge of the same. Hence, Defendants have failed to show an "intentional relinquishment of
a known right," since Leffel, the only person who dealt with Blue Dog (and who had no contacts
with KLP), didn't even know the Agreement existed.
As to KLP, KLP had no contact with Leffel prior to executing the lease with Blue Dog. KIP
did, however, have a copy of its title policy which readily disclosed the existence ofthe Agreement
(an Agreement KLP later confessed to have not been aware of). Given the foregoing, two of the
requisite elements sufficient for waiver have not been shown and cannot be shown. 9
Second, the defense of estoppel should likewise be rejected. The defense, as cited by
Defendants, requires proof that the offending party "took a different position than his or her original
position.... " See A&B Irrigation District v. Aberdeen- American Falls Groundwater District, 141
Idaho 746, 753-54, 118 P.3d 78 (2005). To this end, Defendants argue that, "Jacklin repeatedly
assured BIue Dog that its RV sales operation would be a compatible use in Riverbend Commerce
Park." See Defendants Memorandum at p. 27. Jacklin thought that an RV sales operation could be
an allowed use in the Riverbend Commerce Park (to the exclusion ofthe subject property) provided
compliance was had with the applicable Covenants. To that end, Jacklin proposed leasehold

This ignores for the moment the fact that the parties' contractual undertakings (the
QCAlJacklin Agreement) were in the form of a written and recorded instrument that, under the equal
dignity rule, could only be modified by a writing of equal import.
9
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improvements to Blue Dog, as part of the lease under discussion, that would have complied with
those requirements.
When Blue Dog asked for the contact information for the owner of Lots 1 through 4 of Block
1, Jacklin gave Blue Dog KLP's contact information. Jacklin does not dispute that an RV sales
operation can, under certain circumstances, potentially constitute "a first class operation." However,
Jacklin never advised Blue Dog, nor has any claim been advanced by the Defendants, that either KLP
or Blue Dog did not need to adhere to the applicable Covenants (those that would apply to the
Jacklin property), or to those that would apply to the KLP property (the Covenants in effect in 1990).
Jacklin's position has, based on the record evidence, remained consistent throughout. Defendants
do not allege, nor can they prove, that Jacklin ever told anybody at Blue Dog that Blue Dog did not
need to conduct its operations in a manner compliant with the Covenants. Further, no one has argued,
nor have they proved, that Jacklin had any discussions with KLP until after KLP had already signed
the Blue Dog lease.

In this regard, KLP would be hard-pressed to claim that it was induced to change any
position. KLP had its title policy, chose not to read the documents noted in the exceptions, and
entered into a lease that it later acknowledged was in error. Yet it won't act accordingly. The longer
the litigation draws out, KLP benefits by receiving rent and Blue Dog benefits by paying an amount
of rent less than that which would otherwise be required if compliance was had with the applicable
instruments. These are hardly the clean hands required for invocation of equitable remedies.

V. CONCLUSION.
KLP purchased the subject property with actual knowledge of the limitations impressed
thereon. As for the Covenants incorporated therein, those limitations preclude the use of vacant lots
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for the purposes to which they have been placed by Blue Dog. The only temporary use potentially
allowed is for parking for six (6) months as a corollary to approved construction. Those facts do not
exist. Nor does the word "develop" exist in the QCAlJacklin Agreement (which Defendants have
retitled "Development Agreement").
The relief requested can and should be granted solely upon the Covenants incorporated in the

QCAlJ acklin Agreement and the Defendants' obdurate refusal to comply therewith. Yet summary
judgment is equally appropriate under the specific language contained in the Agreement that requires
the use ofthe property in a manner "mutually acceptable" to Jacklin, so that "it shall be aesthetically
pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park," as well as the restriction
limiting the property to "a first class shopping center." Common sense should not be checked at the
door. The term "first class" has generally-understood connotations. While the term could be
ambiguous under a given set of facts, these are not the facts. Under no stretch ofthe imagination can
the current Blue Dog operations be characterized as "first class" anything.
Jacklin has repeatedly advised both KLP and Blue Dog, since first being made aware of the
lease and at all times subsequent, that the use was unauthorized. The fact that KLP and Blue Dog
chose to put their collective heads in the sand is not a problem of Jacklin's creation. Moreover, it
strains belief for Defendants to now chastise Jacklin for refusing to accept a proposal to put $50,000
worth of gravel on four lots that are required, under the applicable Covenants, to be paved (not to
mention the corollary landscaping, lighting, parking, and signage requirements).
Jacklin respectfully requests that its motion for summary judgment, on its claims for
declaratory relief and a corresponding permanent injunction, be entered as requested and that
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Defendants' motion for cross-motion be stricken as untimely or, in the alternative, denied for the
reasons set forth herein. d1DATED this

~

;-ofFebruary, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~ofFebruary,

I hereby certify that on the
2009, I served a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael J. Hines
Michael Schmidt
Lukins & Annis, P.S.
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA99201-0466

US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
X Hand Delivered
X Facsimile
FAX: 5091747-2323

JACKLIN-BLUE DOG.BRIEF REPLY-COMBINED. wpd
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Snokane. WA 99201-0466
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FacsUnile: (509) 747-2323
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISlRICT OF THE
STATE OF lDAHOJ IN AND FOR mE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership,

.
NO. CV-08-67S2

Plaintiff,

v.
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corporation;
mE PATTERSON F,AMaY2000 TRUST

CREATED Urr/A DATED FEBRUARY 25,

2000; GAYLENC. PATI'ERSON. TRUSTEE;
l1IE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED UrrlA DATED JANUARY 13,
2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; KL
PROPERTIES, INC., a Califomia corporation;
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M.
CORDES, husband and wife; DAVID
BARNES and MICHELLE BARNES, husband
and wife; GARYL. PATTERSON and
ELIZABEmPATTBRSON, husband and
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KlMBERLY L.
DION, husband and wife; and ANDREW J.
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH,
husband and wife.

DEFENDANTS' REPLY
MEMORANDUM (1) TO PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANTS' CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
(2) TO PLAINTIFF'S MOnON TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD, AND (3)
IN SUPPORT OF DEFB'NDANTS'
CROSS·MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
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Defendants hereby respe,tfully submit this reply (1) to Plaintiff's Objection to and
Motion to Strike Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) to Plaintiff's Motion
to Supplement the Record; and (3) in support of Defendants , Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment
L

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOnON FOR.sVMMARY JUDGMENt.
The Court should deny plaintiff's motion to strike because, as set forth in defendants'

Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Defendants' Cross-Motion/or Summary Judgment, Idaho
courts authorize entry of summary judgment for the party it deems entitled to prevail.
Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Com., 103 Idaho 310,647 P.2d 766 (Ct.App. 1982).
Critically, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment addresses the same legal and
factual issues as does plaintiff's motion: to wit: Does the 1990 Development Agreement
prolu'bit Blue Dog's operation? The Comt should deny plaintiff's motion to strike and hear
both summary judgment motions simultaneously in order to preserve judicial economy and to
avoid the risk of inconsistent rulings.
Notably, plaintiff fails to cite any authority contrary to Barlow's.lnc. and bases its
motion to strike solely on a claim that defendants t cross-motion for summary judgment and the
supporting affidavits deprive plaintiff of its ability to conduct additional discovery or
meaningfully respond with affidavits. However, any deprivation is a result ofplaintiff's own
rush to have its summary judgment motion beard on an unrealistic time table which anowed

insufficient time to take depositions, as well as plaintiff's election not to take any depositions
which defendants agreed to facilitate on short notice.

~ Reply Affidavir ofMu:hae1 J

Hines.

Plaintiffs assertion that defendants had six weeks of notice prior to filing the cross-motion for summary judgment miscbaracterizes the time1ine of events. Significantly, since the

first notice defendants received regarding plaintiff's intention to file a motion for summary
judgment, defendants consistently asserted that such a motion was premature until depositions
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could be taken. Reply Hines Aff.,

~, 24.

Defendants could not prepare its response papers

l.U1ti1 depositions had oCCWTed. jg. at 1f 3. Accordingly, once defendants received plaintiff's
summary judgment papers, defendants noted depositions for the first available dates that met
the attorneys' and deponents' schedules, which wasn't until the third week of January. Id. at 'If

,6, 7. This resulted in the original hearing date of January 3 to be continued to February 18.
The hearing was later continued to March 3 (which defendants accommodated and did Dot
oppose). IS. at ~ 5. Defendants then took the depositions of Pat Leffel on January 20, 2009,
and Jacklin's Rule 3O(b)(6) cmporate representative and Thomas Stoeser on January 23,
2009-0n the earliest available dates Itt at ~ 7.
At this time, defendants I counsel informed plaintifrs counsel that representatives of the
defendants were available for their depositions if Jacklin so desired. hi at 1f 7. Plaintiff
initially informed defendants that it planned to take the deposition of Dave Russell, Blue Dog's
operation manager. l!!. Defendants voluntarily agreed to produce Mr. Russell, who lives in

Oregon, without resort to subpoena on January 30. Id. at'tMJ 7-8. After concluding the last of
Jacklin's depositions on January 23, 2009, defendants were waiting for Mr. Russell '5
deposition to occW' before preparing their motion papers. Id. at" 9, 3. Plaintiff then notified
defendants that it was not going to ~e Mr. Russell's deposition. l§L at 18. At this point, with
no more depositions to be taken, defendants were in a position for the first time to prepare their
summary judgment papers and immediately proceeded to do .so.

hi- at n 3, 9, 10.

Notably, plaintitfhad the same amO\lIlt of time as defendants in order to take

depositions, although it was restricted window created by plaintiff's own haste. Plaintiffs also
knew that defendants would be supporting their response to plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, in whatever form, with deposition and affidavit testimony. As a result, it is
disingenuous for plaintiff to now claim that it didn't have time to conduct additional discovery.
Similarly, pJaintiff's claim that it cannot meaningfully respond with affidavit submissions is
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without merit because defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment raises the same legal

and factual issues addressed in plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Alternatively, if the Court :finds that plaintiff needs more time in order to take
depositions (even though defendants have not raised any new legal issues and it was the
plainti£fwho eJected not to take any depositions), then the bearing date on the cross·motions
for summary judgment could be continued. Defendants maintain that a continuance is not
necessary because defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law based on
the legal construction of the 1990 Development Agreement Under no circumstance, however.
should defendants' cross·motion for summary judgment not be heard. Defendants' cross-

motion for summary judgment is authorized under Idaho law.

~ ]Rep Rule

56(b) and (c);

Barlow, 103 Idaho 310.
fi.

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT IRE RECORD
Plaintiff asserts that in their summary judgment papers, defendants failed to include

portions of the deposition testimony and exhibits cited in defendants' briefing, implying that
defendants purposely left out those portions of the deposition transcript. See Plaintiff's Motion

to Supplement the Record on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assertion is
categorically false, and is simply another attempt by Jacklin to misrepresent the record.

Critically, plaintifffails to identify a single deposition page or exhibit which defendants
cited to in its briefing which was not attached to one of the submitted Affidavits. Indeed, all
portions of the deposition transcripts <:ited to in defendants briefing were attached to the

Affidavit ofMichael 1. Hines. Rather, the deposition pages and exhibits Jacklin identifies in the
Affidavit ofJolm F. Magnuson Submitted Pur,uant to Motion Under IRep 32(a)(4) and !Rep
56(c) were not cited by or relied upon by the defendants~ and therefore, were not submitted.

Defendants had no obligation to attach uneited exhibits and deposition testimony to a record
that was already quite substantial.
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While this issue certainly does not . dress substantive issues ot stake in the swnmary
judgment motion, it is telling of plaintiff's.

hant for misrepresenting the record. No where

. epresentations that the 1990 Development
Agreement contained express use restriotio . For instance, in Jacklin's e-mails to KLP (emails that were ghost-written by Jacklin's a omey), not only did. Jacklin cite to inapplicable
CC&Rs, but Jacklin also mischaracterized , e Development Agreement by asserting use

restrictions that did not exist by placing qu:

.on marks around language not contained in the

Development Agreement See Memoran : in Support o/Defendants' Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Pat Leffe ' Jacklin' s Property Manager, further perpetuated
this misrepresentation in his Affidavit by

putting in quotations use restriction language that

is not found in the Development Agreemen: See AjJido.vit ofPar Leffel, Re: Plainriff's Motion

Fol' Summary Judgment

~ 15.

At this point, the credibility of J

"s arguments and positions should be seriously

questioned.

m.

REPLY IN SUP ORT OF DEFE;

JUDGMENt
Plaintiff claims that there are no eli: uted issues of material facts, and then spends 20

pages of its reply brief countering defen . ts' outline of the facts of this case. The bottom line

is that this is a case that can be decided on; ummary judgment in favor of the defendants
because the Development Agreement and : .cles 2-6 of the tenninateci CC&R.s simply do not
prohibit Blue Dog's RV shopping center.. urtbermore, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction

beeause it has not suffered any irreparable;

as a result of Blue Dog's RV shopping center.

However. even if the Court decid : not to enter summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, at a minimum, the defendants~ afl:irmative defenses of waiver and estoppel raise
genuine issues of material fact that precl : summary judgment in favor of the p)aintifI
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B: FACTS,
In addition to using inflammatory rb tonc, which d

nothing but suggest a weak legal

argument, it is notable that plaintiff claims . ' matter is sui

Ie for summary judgment, then

proceeds to spend 20 pages of a 42 page r

but the facts set forth in affidavit
pt, this case is c able of a legal determination that

testimony. Despite plaintiff's rebuttal

the Development Agreement and the tel1l'1l$tled CC&R.s do ot prohibit Blue Dog's RV
shopping center.
The fact section ofplaintifi"s reply

regurgitates e baokground faots set forth in its

original motion, including additional refere ces to the
non-i..... liom defendants' perspective,

PI:

1iff1akes

eats at issue. Although it is a

excefon to the way In wbich

defendants refer to the 1990 Development . cement betw
Defendants have consistently referred to

; document, ev

KLP's predecessor and Jacklin.
before litigation commenced, as
Notably~

the development letter or agreement. See R ply HineJ A./f.,

hibit F.

to the Development Agreement as a"use

term is found no where in the

agreement

;

~ Plaintiffs Reply MemorQ

.

in Support

"Plaintiff's Reply Memo"), pp. 8-9, Plain. s allegation

plaintifi'refers

Summary Judgment (hereafter,
defendants loosely c;haracterize

the agreement serves no purpose than to di ert the COllrt fro the pertinent issues.
I

Plaintiff misunderstands the impo ' ce of Mr. Cord • reference to Jacklin's use of its
I

four vacant lots for temporary parking. Se: Plaintiff', Repl· Memo, pp, 14 - 15. KLP is not
trying to enforce the Riverbend Commerce: Park CC&Rs ag 'nst Jacldin. Defendants simply
point out that the same substantive C,...~....".' covenants that ~ legedly apply to KLP's property

also apply to 1acklin' s four vacant lots, an, that it is disinge uous of Jacklin to complain about
Blue Dog's operation when 1acklin solici : the same Blue og operation for its property,
In sum, plaintiff spends an extrao~ .' ary amount of ace attempting to rebut the facts

contained in the Affidavits of Richard Cor, es and Dave Ru sell, but there is no conflicting
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deposition testimony that plaintiff can point
stand on their own. Thus, plaintiff'S Ion

the testimony. The Affidavits

. ded rebuttal to e factual issues regarding waiver,

estoppel, good faith, and futility simply va , dates defendan argument that, at a minimum,
; prevent s~ judgment in plaintiffs favor.

there are factua1 disputes on these issues

c. REP ,~ ARGUMENT
1.

THE 1990 DEVELOPMENT AC . EMENT
PROHIBIT BLUE DOG'S RV S .OPPING

~'n

""",,lI..

Both parties outlined the rules for' . erpreting res1l'i ve covenants in their initial
briefing. This is an important issue becaus : when the expr1 terms of the Development
Agreement

are considered in conjunction

,Ih the requi,lhat all doubts regarding the

scope of the restrictive covenants are to be ;

rpreted in fav

of the free use of land, and all

ambiguities are to be interpreted against th drafter (Jacklin) of the restriction., plaintiff's

Complaint should be dismissed as a matter; flaw.
The Development Agreement and : .cles 2-6, even f applicable, do not prohibit any
uses on the property, and significantly. as ~
prohibit a RV sales operation. Hines A.ff., .xh. B, p. 33. F

ermore, the Obligation to

construct a "first class shopping center" w met with the

truction of the Outlet Mallon

lots 7·17. The Development Agreement d ;es not require a ' first class shopping center" on
each and every lot. Plaintiffreferences ''w'll-settled princi es of contract in covenant

interpretation" for its proposition that the

ent applies to all the lots owned

by KLP. See Plaintiff's Reply Memoran : in Support of otionfor Summary Judgment, p.

26. However, plaintiff faiis to cite any au , ority to support ts argument, and fails to address

why Jacklin bas not previously addressed

P's alleged fai ure to put a "first class shopping

center" on Lots 1-4.
Blue Dog's RV shopping center is: "first class sh

ing center" that sells high-end RV

ret the meaning of "first class."

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORAND
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I

Regardless of what a dictionary might say, i is undisputed

t

(the drafter of the Development Agreement' could not ans

what constituted a :first class

center. Hines Aff., Em B, pp. 42-45. 47.

1

when asked under oath, Jacklin

oreaver, plainti
definition 0 "first class." Plaintiff relies on

RV shopping center doesn't meet the dicti

hyperbole in order to characterize Blue Do . s RV shopping.' nter as less than ''first class."
Blue Dog's RV shopping center is not a st : ge yard, altho :h plaintiff absurdly cJaims as

.

much. ~ Plaintiff's Reply Memo, pp. 30- 1. The RV's at . e shopping center are inventory
that is sold in the due course of business.

If Blue Dog's RV sbopping is not

idered a "first. lass shopping center" (which

defendants dispute), it is because plaintiffr' fused to work ~ Blue Dog in ordr:r to address

.

site concerns. It is also noteworthy that the: evelopment :, eement and Articles 2·6, even if
applicable, do not contain a time deadline
center/' nor do they prolubit Blue Dog's

. use prior to the construction of a

ra:ry three·

"fIrSt class shopping center." Moreover, J : ldin admits that a "first class shopping center" only
has to be constructed when the property is :eveloped. HinesiAff., Exh. BJ p. 27. Because

Jacklin concedes that Blue Dog has not dev: Joped the prop., ,Blue Dog does not have to
meet the purported :requirements contained; the Developm I
offer any COmpelliIlg response to these leg issues.

Lastly, a threshold issue which pI .; 'ff skirts is the validity of Articles 2 - 6
.1

referenced in the Development Agreement. I The fact tbat th CC&Rs were already terminated,
!

and therefore inapplicable to defendants, n: ates all of pi ~ . s arguments. Jacklin
termiIlated all CC&Rs on the property own! by KLP on 0 ober 16, 1990. Hines Aff., Exh. E.

weeks later on November 7$ 1990,

Thus, when the Development Agreement ;

r

the referenced CC&Rs, including artlcles2 6, bad already , n tenninated. Id. Articles 2·6
therefore have no legal applicability to rai,s use of its pl'I'

y. Contrary to plaintiff's
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argument, the title policy' 5 reference to the, C&Rs does not a.k.e them valid. Notably, the
:

;

Development Agreement does not set forth ; h allegedly BP, licable article of the CC&Rs;
rather, the Agreement merely referen~s C; Rs that were II 11 and void at the time the
i

Agreement was executed and recorded.
2.

JACKLIN BREACHED TlIi DE; LOPMENT: GREEMENT AND REFUSED
TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH T ,. DEVELOP A' .ITE PLAN.
While conceding that Blue Dog's Ri shopping cen, could be an.appropriate use on

the defendants' property, plaintiff claims th: the operation' d not comply with Moles 2· 6.
.

,

Sr:ePlaintiff's Reply Memo, pp. 24.2S! Pl : tiff takes issue' ·th Mr. Cordes' statement that

Jacklin never attempted to work with KLP' address con

regarding Blue Dog's operation.

,;

J4.. at 12-13, Plaintiff also argues that defe
plans, and that Jacklin did not breach the

i

ts made no e:ffon to submit acceptable site

:velopment

Agrebent by refusing the work with

defendants to work toward a "mutuallyacc: table design."

t.

at 26,37-38. Plaintiff's

arguments are not persuasive.
Initially, the CC&Rs were null;and : oid at the time ey were incorporated by reference
into the Development Agreement, so they : not applicable i the defendants' property.
,

Moreover, Blue Dog's efforts to comply', h the CC&Rs w e rebuffed by Jacklin. It is
. :

I

evident, based on deposition testimony fro : Mr. Stoeser, th' Jacklin would have withheld
approval of Blue Dog's RV sbopping Cent : no matter what· ite improvements it made. Hines
Aff.J Exh, C, pp. 33-34.
that he didn't question the

In regard to working with Jacklin,

legitimacy of Blue Dog's RV shopping een, er because Blue' og was referred to KLP by
:

:

,
,

'

JackJin. Cordes Aff., 1 )4. Because of the : ferral, KLP
:

,

no reason to believe that Blue

'

Dog's shopping center was not approPriate: JfJacklin belie ed the operation was not
appropriate, JackJin should have contacted:
,

to achieve a mutually acceptable desi~ an:

K:\K.oo:..P024461\BLUEDOOOOOO2\J>LDO\REPL.Y~S

or Blue Do so that they could work together

I

appearance.

s is .a particularly important fact
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because Jacklin's own actions in offering t : lease to Blue D

show that Blue Dog's RV

I

shopping was pennissible under Artic~es 2 : ,the same sub

nve CC&Rs that applied to

Jacklin's property.
It remains undisputed that Jacklin

not attempt to: . ork with Blue Dog, but rather

i

the Development Agreement or
Articles 2-6. Jacklin's complete refus~ to : ork with defen

ts breached the Development

Agreement andlhe implied covenant Qf go 'd faith and fair
! !

ling contained in every con1l'act.

:

Steinerv. Ziegler Tamura Ltd,,·Co., 1~8 I : 0238,242,61 .3d 595 (2002). Plaintiff's
:
;
argument that the implied covenant o(:·g
faith and fair d ing does not apply to a resuictive

covenant is Dot supported by legal authon
contract, including a restrictive'coveD.1J.I1t. . oreover, this'
with the express provisions of the Dev.el

lied covenant does not conflict

: on! Agreement,

work in good faith with defendants.:;

~ also requires laeklin to

!

Contrary to plaintiff' s position~ defi: dants' futility ,gument is based on, and is
absolutely consistent with, the testimopy : vided by Mr. Strer. Mr. Stoeser states that no
matter how defendants

develop'ed Blue Do: IS shopping

..

.,
unacceptable to Jacklin. HinesAjf.J E~. B: p. 88. Mr. Sto
.
!

:, it would have been
even uses the term "futile,"

testifying that it wouJd have been futile for ~ 1ue Dog to

any site improvements because

Jackljn's approval wouJdhave been ~tbh.el:d regardless of ~lue Dog's efforts. Hines .4.ff., Exh.

c: pp. 33-34.

i

Plaintiff argues that Blue Dog'is 0
:

.

:

to make site i

ovements were inadequate, that

!

the problem was Blue Dog's operation. an : that Blue Dog's I hopping center could have been
. '

1

.

.

approved on the site if it came into co~li: ce with the Dey. lopment Agreement and CC&Rs.

SeeP1ainnffs Reply Memo, pp.33-3~. H , ever, plaintifr argument does not address the
\U1deniable fact that Jacklin repeatedl~ refu ed to work with iBlueDog on a site plan. The

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORAN!)
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undisputed facts are tbatBJue bog offered' make site imp vements, that Jacklin rejected the
·

.

offer out of hand, that Jacklin refused ~ w k with Blue Do ,and that no matter what Blue
i

Dog did to improve the site, Jacklin wbuld ot approve the

..
demanded immediate eviction lather than a
··

·

ue Dog operation. Jacklin

owing Blue Do ' time to make site improvements,
.

even though there is no time requirement' the Developmen Agreement or CC&Rs.
3.

THE RULES OF J:N'ttRPRETA ION DE4W........ '...,
RESOLVED IN TBEiDEFEND
S' FAVOR. .
.
~

If there is any questionias to ~
CC&Rs require, then any doubt must ~ in

eted in favor fthe free use ofJand Gabriel v.

~. 130 Jdaho 171, 173, 9gS Pold ~209 . 1987). Notably' plaintiff completely ignores this

rule in its reply.

Furthermore, all ambigUities aie to e interpreted
.

.

T.

the drafter (Jacklin) of the

Ass'n. I,Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148

(1994). laoklin dzaftod the ~lopment A eement and 80

i

Yambiguities tcgarding the

sam.ab:,b:::::::t: :!.=f: c~~

depootion

testimony that laoklin drafted !he Develop •CDt Agre~J eo Plaintiff's Reply Memo, pp.

::~H::'s::=a~: :::~~==J::~the
Development Agreement It

is unequi~oca. from Mr. StoesJ,s initial, non-coached deposition

testimony that Jacklin was the ~after ~fth Development A .
.

20.

:

:

!

.

ent Hines Aff, Exh. B, p.
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4.

AT A MINIMUM, THE
TIVE DEFEN ES OF WAIVER AND
ESTOPPEL CREATE GE~:
ISSUES OF
TERIAL FACT THAT
IN P
, TIFF'S FAVOR.
PRECLUDE SUMMARY ~G
I

As stated above, most of Pl~ff'S r1y memorand, is spent attempting to rebut the

Affidavit testimony of Mr. Cordes an&:Mr.

sell. Most ofi laintifrs rebuttal is therefore

spent addressing the factual issues tha~: sho plaintiff waiv - its right to enforce the
,

,

plaintiff takes issue with Mr. Russen'~ affi
between Russell and Leffel.

~t testimony

SGa Plaintiff's

re arding the lease negotiations

eply Memo, pp: IS-17. However, the facts

regarding the lease negotiations and re:fe

as set forth by - . Russell and Mr. Cordes (and

disputed by plaintifi), are the very factS .in i sue regarding

'ver and estoppel that would

prevent summary judgment in plaintiffs fa or.
Defendants have submitted ~s in evidence that rae in repeatedly assured Blue Dog
,

that its RV sales operation would be a:Co
;

atible use in R.i+:
- end Commerce Park. Jacklin

i

referred Blue Dog to the KLP property bo as a potential} _~ e site and as a tempomry staging
- I

site for RV units. Jacklin then reverse9 its pproval ofBlue og's RV shopping center only
P. l~ldin's : duct squarely fits the affirmative

after it lost out in the lease negotiationS to

defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel.
If

I

* rr

_

the Court determines that defenJts are not entitl

reviewing the e>qm:SS terms oilbo

10

contract interpretation that support a niling

AgretmentF'dlor applying the cannons of

defendants' fa

plaintiff's motion based on the disP~ iSSr of material

s.

to summary judgment after

~

Of, then the

Court should deny

regarding waiver and estoppel.

AN INJUNCTION CANNO'1;' ISS E BECAUSE- LAINTIPF HAS NOT SHOWN

THAT IT WD..L SUFFER -

~LE JU.l'1~;I'£

in order for the Court to issue

an injunction. Idaho courts, the NinthjC'

it, and the U.S. - upreme Court all recognize that a

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORAND

: 12

1
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!

I

,;
J.

ii
er for an in~1on to issue. Harris v. Cassia, 106
"

claimant must show :irreparable injury :in

Idaho 513,518,681 P.2d 988 (1984); No em Cheyenne Tnbe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843

(9" Cir. 2007) (g1wting eBay me. v.

~ L.Lic.;t U.S.388, 391 (2006».

Plaintiff has completely failed to plead or

~ve ineJ>aralfle. ' a prima filcie element for an

injunction to issue. Id. Jacklin's Rule 30cij)(6)

testimo~y cJuld not be more clear that Jacklin

has suffered DO injUl)' to dale, let alone ;,J..able banD.!
Critically~ Plaintiff fails to

cite any

thority to

Iif...

SrPf

Ajf., Exb. B. pp. 89, 121.

its position that an injunction

should issue, notwithstanding the absence 0 irreparable injun'. Further, p1aintiff does not
_

Udell v. Idaho State Bd orLand

m.

1l91d~ 1018, 1019.812 P.2d 325 (1991).

where the Idaho Court upheld a determinati n that the p ;'. ..

had not established a right to

injunctive reBef where they failed to demo trate irreparable injury which could not be
;

,

compensated by monetary damages.

.'

i

For the reasons set forth above and

defendants( . r submittals, defendants
,
respeetfullyrequestthe Court to (1) grant efendants' CfoSSi-Motion for Summaty Judgment
dismissing p1a:in.tifrs Complaint in full wi prejudice,

~d;t deny plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment.

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2

~"

By

Mle
LJ.
S
ISB;#6876
MlCIYJEL O. SCHMIDT
ISBi#69.11
A~m~s for Defendants

: 13
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TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 day

OfMarb,~009, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document was served upon the foJ VliDg, as

~omL below and addressed as follows:
<

JOHN F. MAGNUSON
1250 Northwood Center Ct
P.O. Box 2350
Couer d'Alene, ID 83814

: [']
[1']
:. [
! [.
~

j

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Fax: (208) 667-0500
[X Via Email '

i'

,
i
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\, :~l:
STArE OF IUAHO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTEI'lA.1

SS

F~
2009 ~1AR - 2 AM 10: 03
CLERf< DISTRICT COURT

,~

MICHAEL J. HlNBS
ISB #6876
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT
ISB#6911
LUKlNS &. ANNIS. p.s.
1600 Washirmton Trust Financial Center
717 W S1ml2Ue Ave
Sl)olcane. WA m01-0466
TeJenhone: (509) 455·9555
Facsimile: (509) 747·2323
Attornevs for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F.IRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND'FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY,

Plaintift

NO. CV·08-6752

v.

REPLY AFFIDAVIT OFMICHAELJ.

HINES

BLUE DOG RV, lNC., an Idaho cotporation;

11IE PATTERSONFAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED Uff/ADATBD FEBRUARY 25,

2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE;
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED VITIA DATED 1ANUARY 13,
2000; 10HN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; XL
PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation;
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M.
CORDES, husband and wife; DAVlD
BARNES and MICHELLE BAKNES, husband
and wife; GARY L. PATTERSON and
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husbamt and
wife; PHlLL1P r. DION and KIMBERLY L.
DION,husband and wife; and ANDREW 1.
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH,
husband and wife,
Defendants.
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)

I
MICHAEL I. HlNES, being first duly sworn on

1.

01.
I

clopo... and says:

I am over the age of 18 years, of sound ~ and am competent to testify in this

.

I

matter. l make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and/or belief.

2.

On October 3,2008, I leamed from Jacklin Land Company's ("Iacklin'')

attorney, 10hn Magnuson, that he had unilaten11y set Jan~ 8, 2009 as a bearing date for

1acklin's Motion for Summa:ry Judgment. In response, 1 Jrormed Mr. Magnuson that January
I
8,2009 was a premature hearing date because depositions land other discovery had Dot yet

I

ocOUlTed. See Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the N,rJVember 6, 2008 lette,. from Michael

J. Hi1U!s to John F. Magnuson. Indeed, at this POint. no
discovery or documents produced, and no depositions

di~VCIY bad oecurred-no wriltlm

takf. Sigaificantly, depositions

in this

I

case could not occur until plaintiff had answered outstanding Intetrogatories and Requests for

I

Production. Plaintiff did not produce the outstanding writ1:en discovery and documents until

December 2, 2008. Thus, in response to Mr. Magnuson's

~'l also inquired at this lime

about working with him for deposition scheduling and a Jalistic summary judgment hearing
I

I
I
I

~.

3.

Notwitbstandingmyrequest, Mr. Magnusoh
then filed plaintiff's summary
I

judgment motion papers on December 11, 2008, and

piCk~ January 8, 2009 as the hearing

date. Upon reviewing plaintiff's motion papers, it was

sel~.evident that deposition discoveI)'

REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL 1. HINES: 2

I
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I

had filed multiple affidavits raising issues of mawnal
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J

which needed to be rebutted.

I

Defendants could not prepare its response to plaintiff s mbtion for sununary judgment until the

I

necessary deposition discovery had occurred

4.

Accordingly, my office responded that same day and advised Mr. Magnuson

I

that the January 8, 2009 hearing date would not work bduse of the need to take depositions,

I

and the likely inability to take those depositions on such short notice over the Xmas holiday

period. See Emibit B, ;, Inte <I1Jd correct copy 0/the

*ber

11, 2008, email from Trevor

I

Pincock to John Magnuson. Mr. Magnuson initially rerJed to move the hearing date. At that
point, 1 indicated to Mr. Magnuson that defendants would be forced to file a Rule 56(1) motion

for • COIIIinuance given that Jacklin had submitted

aflidaits in support of its summary

judgment, but was refusing to allow depositions to occur

ror

to the hearing date. I then also

I

advised Mr.. Magnuson that I would proceed with taking qepositions of plaintiff's
representatives the week of December 22, 2008. See

EXh~blt C, a true and correct copy of

M'Ike Hines to' John Majon. Also, ~ Exhibit D,
I
and co"ect copy o/December J 7, 2008 email from Mike fIines to John Magnuson.

December 16, 2008 email from

Q

true

I

S.

In response, Mr. Magnuson ultimately rele~ted and agreed to reschedule the

I

summary judgment hearing date for February 18,2009. 1ihere was a subsequent request to

move this hearing date to March 3, 2009, which I did not
6.

~ppose.

I
Defendants then proceeded to schedule the/depoSitiOns of Pat Leffel (Jacklin's

Property Manager), Jacklin's Rule 3O(b)(6) representativd~ and Tom Stoeser (Jacklin's CFO).
I

While wanting to take those depositions in December, thel depositions were pushed until the

I

I
I

REPLY AFFIDAV1T OF MICHAEL J. HINBS: 3
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end of January based on the witnesses' unavailability, scJlleduling contlicts, as well as the epic
I

I

snow stann that all but shut down the eouer d'Alene and fpokane area over the Xmas period.
7.

Accordingly, I took the depositions ofPwktifl"s representatives as elU'ly as
I
.
I
reasonably possible, which occurred on January 20th and ~anuary 23tO • At this point, Mr.
I
!

Magnuson had also requested to take the depositions ofrdpresentatives from the defendants,

I

whom I agreed defendants would voluntarily produce without resort to subpoena. ~ Exhibit

~om Mike Hines to John Magnuson.

E, a true and CO"ect copy o/the JrmutJT)l20, 2009 email I

8.

We then made arrangements to produce DJve Russell, Blue Dog's leasing and
I

.

!

operations manager who lives in Oregon, for his depositiqn in Couer d'Alene on January 30,
I
I

2009. Id. Mr. Magnuson subsequently cancelled that deppsition.

9.

I

Thus, with defendants' depositions ofJaclclin's representatives completed, and
I

plaintiff's decision not to take any depositions of

defen~ts'
representatives, the end of
I
I

January was the first time that defendants were in a PDSititn to commence preparing their
summary judgment papers. At that point, no longer havin~ to wait for Mr. Russell' 5 deposition
which would have impacted defendants' summary judgmlt analysis and submittals, we then

I

proceeded to finalize defendants' summary judgment pap+rs which were timely completed and
i
filed on February 17, 2009. Defendants summary judgm~t papers included a cross-motiOD. for

I

summary judgment based on the same legal issues raised tpy plaintiff ttl its SllDlIllaIY judgment

I

motion; to wit: Does the 1990 Development Agreement Rfohibit Blue Dog's operation.
Defendants sUbmit it does not as a matter oflaw.
10.

Based on the need to take depositions 1n

,S

case and the inability to take those

depositions until the end of January, defendants were not in a position to complete their

I
I
REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL I. HINES: 4
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Ii
to mid·Felmwy, 2009

.1ccordingly, d.1imdanls did not delay
I

in filling their summary judgment papers, including their Jross-mouon seeking summary
I

i

I

judgment dismissal.
11.

Attached hereto as Euibit F is a true and ~ect copy of the July 24, 2008

email form Gary Patterson to Pat Leffel.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

kL
I

day of March, 2009.

I

~.~
. tName)
My appointment expires
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CERmCATE OF SEliVICE

i

.

j

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day qfMarcb, 2009, a true and correct copy of

I

!

the foregoing doCUlllent was served upon ~ followin~ as indicated below and addressed as
foBows:

I
i

.

,

I

'

I

I
I

JOHN F. MAGNUSON
1250 Northwood Center Ct.
P.O. Box 2350
couerd'Alene,lD 83814

,i

[ ] U.S. Mail
[>cj Ha:Dd Delivery
[ ] Federal ExpreSs

!

I
II

[ ] Fax: (208) 667-0500
I>-] Vta. :Email

i
i

i

~I-----

!
i

!i

I

I
I
I

i

i

!

!I

,i
ii
I

i

1

I

i

I

I
i
I

I
!

I
I

!

I!
i
i

Ii

. i
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11. .. ,,; Spnrgue Ave, Ste 1600
Spokane, WA 99201-0466
t 509-455-9555
fSlJ9.147-2323
luJdns.eom

,.'i

Ii

I

LUKINS&ANNIS 1ATTORNEYS!!

i

'i:

MJ:CHABL J. HINES
AtbnUted In: Washblgton tmd Idaho
trIhinesOlulcins.com

November 6, 2008

John F. Magnuson

li

Attomey At Law
1250 Northwood Center Ct., Suite A
P. O. Box 2350
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

f;;

Re:

'j

!:

/.,j

ii!

Iil

Jacklin Land Company 'D. Blue D~g RlI,:et aL.

I
i:

Dear John;

~:

.

f,i

.

.

Thanks for your letter dated October 30,~t008. We're looking forward to receiving your client's
response to the proposal we discussed, ~th winter: fast approaching, time is of the ess~e if
we are to undertake landscaping woEk tiUB year. My client is prepared to proceed in that
fashion i.mmediately if resolution can b~;!reached. .

~ur

~on,

As to a January 8, 2009 hearing date for
proposed summary judgment
I believe
that date is premature and cannot ~t
to it at this time. I anticipate needing to take
~I

.'deposttiOftS rJf'1a:tKliti"s tepresentatives-J,O respond-to -yout mol:iCm, whiCh cannofbe dOne until I

receive complete and full answers to 0'*= outstanding c:l.iscovery. Given the realistic time
parameters for receiving complete
disCoverY, scheduling depositions, working around
the christmas holiday, and accommoclcim
g the summary judgment briefing sc:hedule, I believe
I..
a January 8, 2009 hearing date is unrealiStic. Once we have a better feel as to a realistic: schedule
timeline,.I wiU be happy to talk with yt about obtaining a hearing date.
.

writ+n

We look forward to hearing your clienth~ response. '
W

Very truly yours,

.

Ii!

.

j!

:;

ij

l!

!;
M1CHAELJ.

';
j!il;

::

M]H:bab

::

/

i:

6 J7 0
Spokane: I Coeur d'Al!rI1C: t Moses LlIkt

EXHIBIT A

From:

To:

eel

Date:

SuIJ,Ject:

Trevor Plntodc
john@magIlusononllne.com
Mike Hines

12/11/2008 4:52 PM
Jilddln v. etue Dog

.lohn,
We received Jaddln's motion fOf summalY

and were 5UrprIsed to see ~ yo\.l noted the hearln9 for
January e.
We Will not be able to COInPIV With that hearing
request that the d* be contJnued until after depositions can be
raken In thIS matter.
Mr. Hines acMsed that we need to
the
of several Individuals Involved In this matter. Based on the hearing
date vouw set, the upcomIng holidays, and Mr.
calendar, we Will not be able to take the deposItIOns priOr to the
response date. Mr. Hines advISed that he Is out of tOwn and otJ1erwise unavailable to mke deposItJons until JanualY.
AclditlonaUV, we only recontIy received Jaddin's ansWers to the dIScoVery requests and are still In the process of Mluating

mke

Jaddln's answers and responses to ensure that ~ are not defident.
Please let me !moW by tnmorrow (12112) whether jm WI" agree to contlnue (he hearing elate. If you do not ilgret, we wlU

: ="'"

PU,,","" Rule 56(1).

}I

Attorney

Lukins & Annis, p.s.
717 W. Spra9ueAve., Ste.1600
fi;
/:

Spokane, WA 99201

(509) 4S5-95SS

/,
,.
,.
,i'
11

i:
"

,.

,;,.

I
i

I
::

i;

,-

i;
j-
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From:
To:
Date:
5ub,iect:

MIke HInes

John MagJIISOn
12/16(2008 S:36 PM
Re: Jadtlin Y. Blue Dog
~;

John,

U:
1/

I am surprised that you unUateral1y went forward ~ the January a, hea/1ng elate after I advised you that depositiOns
would be necessary before any summary judgment motion could be vetb!d rendering that date Impractical. Such
depositiOnS had tD wait until VOU answered our d~, whld1 we didn't rec:elve until the first of December. I then had an
extensIVe work travel schedule ttle laSt two weeks. Ilean now proceed to take depositIons in this case. At a minimum, I
need to take the depositions of Pat Leffel, Tom smnber, and 8 Rule 30(b){6). I would like to depose them December 22
and 23 at my offlCle. Please advise ImmedIately if yOU will produce those witnes.seS on those dates.
!/'

I!;.I

Michael

~;

ij:

~i

;.

•1

'1:

1,.
1

i/ :

~:"
"

~~

~:
Ii:

if

~:

a·

H,

'i

a;

,.~:
II':
"
~;

~;
,1;

i/:

~.

II:

,;~i
n~
n:

!i·

I!:

U:

iiI

~'

ij;

~:
W:

I:
II!
'!:

~,

:.,

".

N:

~1

!;:
,I:

I::

'i:

II'

if
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From;
To:

r

~:

Mike HInes
John Meonuson

i':

1l'eIIor Pincocx

Iii

Date:

12/17/2D08 8:55 AM

SUbject:

Re: Jadclln v. Blue Dog

~:

CC:

;1'

~;
The surprise is that you schedule a summa'Y judgmJbt hearing In a manner over the Xmas period where you submit
John,

declarations, thereby puttfng factual matt.ers at iSSUeV yet do not provide enough tim! to tate deposllons, nor make your
declarants available for depOslUons.
I:
~i

We are entitled to take the reQUested deposfUons, sO;1 again urge you to be reMOnilbie to re:hedule the hearrng
voluntar1Jy.. We could resdledule it for later In lan~ or February whICh would allow the necessary ClepositJons to oa;ur
the first part of January and maintzlln a normal
period. You have stated that it Is your dient whO refuses to
cooperate on this scheduling matter. unfortunately)j:vour dlent's apparent intransigence on thiS ISsue will necessitate
bringing a Rule 56{f) motiOn, creating unneeessary cmts for the parties and Inconvenience for the Court. Given the
demands of our respective litigation practices, we wJIIlikely have many SCheduling isSues In this case, and I suggest a
course of cooperatiOn Will better serve all interests. ~;

b,..
.j:

f

I am not avall&bIe December 29 and 30.
.

.

g:

Please advise by close of business b)day wtlether VQ.lI' client has agreed to move the January 8th hearing date 1D allow
deposItIonS to proceed.
~:
~:

1: 1

fr·
,f,

>>> "JOhn MagnL/50n" <jq!Jn@magnusononllne,com> 12116/2008 6:20 PM »>
MIkeHI
~:

I am still perplexed why you are surprised at the ~,ng. You set forth
your position, I set forth mine, and we disa9reed. 'I told you by tetter
dare Nov. 7 that the heartng would go forwiIrd froJJ, my end and that we
disagreed with your contention that the motlon
premature.

was
~;

The discovery was pl'Ollidecl to VOU 31 days alter itI~1$ serwd so that no one
could dalm undue delay.
~!
I adviSed last week that I would wort with you o~i ttte timing of your
submiSSIons given the hoIIdaVS. I am stilI amenable to that.
~;

As set forth In the dlscove'Y responses, Mr. LeffeI~ retired and now
lives In california. I cant compel hIS attendanc:e ~ deposlUon. 1 wIR
make Inquiry of Mr. Stoeser, who would likely be ~ Rule 30(b)(6) designee
(although this is a presumption since I cIont p~ know what your
proposed subject areas of Inqul'Y are under Rule 30), as to hIS avallatJUily
next week. We may have to amsIr:Ier his ~ (end the Rule 30(b)(6)
depo) early the t'oIlowing week IS albmttives pe(idlng his availlbUity. I
have iJ depoSitIon In another matter on Dec 23 a~Jlpm.
D:

~.

I wiD fonow up with you bmlorrow. Thanks.

i.
!Ii

John Magnuson

II'

-

~:

Original Message -

From: 'Mke HInes" <mblnes@l/Ylslns.mm>
g;
To: 'John Magnuson" <jphn@magDusongDline,cPm>
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 5:36 PM
Ii;
SubjeCt: Re: Jacklin v. Blue Dog

,
> John,

I,.

!l:
n:

ij:

,!.:
il:

f
);

f

,.

r.:
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> I am surprISed that you unllatel1llv went forward WIth the January 8,
> hearing date after I advised you that depositions wPUId be necessary

> before anv summary judgment motion could be ~ rendering that clate
impradical. Such depositions had to walt until yoU answered our
> discovery, which we cfIdn't receive until the I'lr$t of~. I then
> had an extensive work travel schedule the last
I am now
> proceed to mice depoSItIons In this case. At a mlnlf.i1um, I need to take
> the depositions of Pat Leffel, Tom Storeser, and a p.ule 3O(bX6). I would
> like to depose them December 22 and 23 at my offlc:e. Please attvlse
> immediately I' you will produce those wttnesses ori):hose cI8\:eS.
>
~
> MIChael
I::
'>

twoIWeeks.

r:

>
>

t

;
r'

>

,.

I,:

>-

j;;
> This message has been seenned for vlJ'USIeS
> and dangerous content bv lukins & Annis, PS. 1,1"
'.'
>
.
> NO'IlCE: ThIs eman mav contain conf'identlal or if~
> prlvleged material, and Is Intended SOIeIV
r::
> for use by the above referenced redplent. Anv ii
> review, copying, printing, disclosure, distr!r:
'.
> bution, or anv other use, Is striCtIV prohibited.

>

> If you are not the ~ lind believe that
> you have reeeIved this In error, please notify
> the sender and delete the copy you received.
>
> ThankVou!
>

>
>

f;

I.;

i·'
>
I;
>L
> No virus found In this Incoming message.
;:
> Checked by AVG.
> VersiOn: 7.5.552 / Vtrus Database: 270.9.18/1851;· Release Date:
> 12116/2006 8:S3 AM
t:
>
I:
>
I:

l'

i:

I:;
This message has been scanned for vinwes and
dangerous content by MallScanner, and is
beUeved to be dean.

/:
j'.

.;'I'
1.1
I:
t·!.

i-:
j:;
j.:

r;

I';

r'

I'

i:

i:

!#"I
".'"

P.

--,

-:.:....,-.-....--

"'_

.... -

---

-~.

CC:l

Mike Hines
John Magnuson
Bette Brown

Date:
Subject:

Re:

FnHn:

To:

I

1/20/2009 S!40 PM
,.
"
J.:

John,

I::
I received your phone message. We will proceed with both the 3086 and Mr. 5toeser'$ deposition this FridaV commencing
In CDA at 8 am and going to 2 pm. We WIll not have/any deposltions tomorrow.
I

;1:

[will work on Mr. Russell's scheduling for his depo 0& 1/30. Per our arrangement, you will agree to pay for Mr. RusseU's
airfare as I agreed to do for Mr. LeffeI's, eorrecG .li

Midlael

,.

j,

•. !:.:

I'

~:

>>> "John Magnuson~ <jOhn@magllUSQDO!lllne.c;grri~ 1/20/2009 3:4S PM »>

f;

MIke.

January 30th works for me for Mr. Russelrs

i.
~.

we need more than 2 to 3 hours.
JOhn Magnuson

t:

Please advise as to the time. For his plannIng purposes, I dont think

i.:

ThiS message has been scanned for vtruses and
dangerous content b'( MallScanner, and is
believed I:D be dean.
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Pat Leffel
.,.

.....

From:
Sent:

To:

Gary .Patterson [glpatt@klpproperti~~com]
Thursday, July 24,20084:17 PM ,1:
Pat Leffel
. :1:
'i;

Cc:

jblaek@lukins.com; 'Rick Coretes'
Subject: FW:Blue D~ RV

'j,
'j

..i", •

:Ij
.;

l'
.' :i
'!:

Hi Pat,

!:

:~

Our counsel. lim Black of Lukins It. Amlis, $, has reviewed the original t 990 development letter mid
CC&R.'s and has advised us that the infonna.Ubn of record does Dot restrict us from a land Jease to a
temporary use on the vacant 1~t. Additionalli:, 'Vt ·would not be bound by any changes that occurred to
the cc&:R's without our written approval after the 1990 version. Mr. Black has offered that
your counsel may contact him directly ~ (SO~) 623..2031 to discuss.
!.

Sincerely,
Gary Patterson, President
KLP PROPBRTlES, TNC.

.~

.j=

.f:::

] 343 Locust Street, Suite 203
·Walnut Creek, CA 94596

;

:(925) 933-16QO

f
-f:
I.

.,.!:
:r,
.;

.::
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STATE OF I[/AHO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
FILED:

JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
ISB #04270

SS

2009 H,~R 31 PM 2: 28
y
C Em, DISTRICT

COURT~~

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
lUtritedpartnership,

CASE NO. CV-08·6752

SUPPLEMENT AL CITATION OF
AUTHORITY BY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
VS.

BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho
corporation; THE PATTERSON
FAMIL Y 2000 TRUST CREATED
UrrlA DATED FEBRUARY 25,2000;
GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE;
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED Urr/ADATED JANUARY
13,2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH,
TRUSTEE; KL PROPERTIES, INC., a
California corporation; RICHARD A.
CORDES and SUZANNE M. CORDES,
husband and wife; DAVID BARNES and
MICHELLE BARNES, husband and wife;
GARYL. PATTERSON and
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERL Y
L. DION, husband and wife; and
ANDREW J. BRANAGH and ANNE C.
BRANAGH. husband and wife,
Defendants.

SUPPLEMENTAL CITATION OF AUTHORITY BY PLAINTIFF- PAGE 1
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The above-referenced matter came on for hearing on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment all March 3,2009 at 3:00 p.m. Attached hereto for the Court's convenience is a copy of
Sage Healthcare, PLLe v. Bushi, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4, 2009). The cited decision holds:
"[C]ontract terms are not overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Bushi
v. Sage Healthcare, 09.6 ISCR at 246 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
DATED this

31!7£y of March, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5 ......

I hereby certify that on the~ day of March, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael 1. Hines
_x_us Mail
Lukins & Annis, P.S.
1600 Washington Trust Financial __ Overnight Mail
Center
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201·0466
FAX: 5091747-2323

JACKl.JN·BLUE DOG SUPf'LEM1CltArlON OFA AUTHOR.ITY BY P"CNTF.wpd

SUPPLEMENTAL CITATION OF AUTHORITY BY PLAINTIFF-- PAGE 3
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lOAHO SUPREME COURT REPORT

acc:oundng to be completed.. The coun rejected the request. Nancy
renewed hcr request for family allowan~ at the district court;
however, the coun made no mention of it. Mary bas Dot completed
the occounting and has not paid any family allowance to Nancy.
Nancy bas ~uested tbat this Court vacate the orders entered by the
magistraLe judge alloWing Mary to'(iefer making the accounting and
instruct the court to finally detennine and pay her family allowance.
The Idaho legislature repealed the family allowance provision,
I.e. § 15·2-404, in the last legislative session. 2008 S.L. cb. 182, §
4. p. 550. However. new legislation is not given retroactive effect
unless "expressly so declared." I.e. § 7",101. The legislation
repealing I.C. § 15·2-404 does not provide for retroactive effect
Accordingly, we address this claim.
The granting of a family allowance punuant to I.C. § 15·2·404
is eommlttecl to the discretion of the trial coun. MQu~r oJ Bowman 's
Estate, 101 Idaho 131, 136,609 P.2cI663. 668 (1980) (holding no
abuse of disorctioR by the trial court either in granting the famiJy
allowance or in the amount thereof). Abuse of that discretion is
tound when the reviewing coun is convinced tbat the award was
clearly arbitrary and manif~stly unreasonable. Jd.
By de~lining to set a deadline for the accounting to be
completed. the magistrate judge effectively allowed Mary to
withhold any allowance Nancy may have been entitled to throughout
the course of these proc:eedings, effectively denying Nancy her
statutory entitlement. The magistrate judge, rather than exercising
his discretion in the matter. do1egated the resolution of me issue.
Although MIIlY's attorney rcprcscntcd that the a~ounting would be
complete sometime around the end of October 2005, Mary bas failed.
to complete the accounting even now-threc years later. The
magiStrate judge's refusal to act was an abuse of discretion, and the
district court should have so held. We now remand with instructions
to the district court to direct the magistrate judge to determine and
award to Nancy such family allowance as she is enLitled to. if any.
JV. CONCLUSION
we affirm the district ~ourt's deeisioll vacating the grant of
summary judgment against Nancy On the partnership issue. We
revecse the district court's decision affinning the granl of summai;'
judP'lent against Nancy on the omitted spouse issue. We remand
with inslnlctions that the uial coun rule on objections prior to
deciding the motions for summary judgment We affirm the district
court's decision affirming the dismissal of the creditor's claim.
FUlally. we insuuct the trial coun to determine what, if any. family
allowance is due to Nancy. In view of tbe mixed result. no costS are
awarded.

Justices BURDICK, 1.10NES, W.I0NES and Iusti~ Pro Tern
IODWELL, CONCUR.

2009 Opinion No. 30

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34827

Cite as: 09.61SCR 244
STEPHEN BUSHI, M.D.,
Plaintiff.Appellant.
v.

SAGE HEALTH CARE, PLLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
CHARLES C. NOVAK. M.D.: DAVID A. KENT, M.D.j and
ROBERTO NEGRON, M.D.,
Defendants.Respondents.
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SAGE HEALTIl CARE, PLLC. an Idaho limited liability company;
CHARLES C. NOVAK, M.D.: DAVID A. KENT. M.D.; and.
ROBERTO NEGRON, M.D ..
Counterelaimants-Respondents,
v.
STEPHEN BUSHI, M.D.,
Co~nterdefendant·Appet1ant.

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho. Ada County. Honorable Cheri C. Copsey,
District Judge.
The deCision of the district coWt is affirmed in part, lIaclll~d in
part, and remanthd for further l'1'0ceedings.
APPEARANCES:
Halliley, Troxell, ennis & Hawley, Boise. for appellant. Steven
Schossberger argued.
Capitol Law Group, Boise, anel Munther Goodrum Speny.
Boise, for respondents. Forrest Goollnlm argued.
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HORTON, Justice
This is an appeal from a district couct's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sage Health Care, PLLC (Sage), Charles C.
Novak, M.D .• David A. Kent, M.D., and Robcno Negron, M.D.
(collectively referred to as Respondents). Stephen Bushi. M.D ..
(Buslli) appeals the district court's summary judgment ruling that
Respondents acted properly in terminating Buslli's membership in.
Sage and its award of attorney fees to R.espondents. We affirm in
patt, vacate in pan, and remand this case for further protccdings.

i
·
~

I. FACnJAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1994, licensed psychiatrists. Charles C. Novak. Stephen T.
Bushi. David A. Kent, and Cantril T. Nielsen. formed The Sage
Group. LLC, under the Idaho Umited Uability ACt-I.C. §§ 53-601
ttt seq. In 1996, the members cbanged the limited liabilitY
company's name to Sage Bebavioral Health Care, LLC. In 1997.
the members again cbanged the LLC's name fO Sage Health Care.
PLLC. Each of the original members contributed $2,000 8J'Id held
a 25% interest in the LLC. Dr. Nielsen subsequently withdrew fr()m
Sage. and Or. Roberto Negron acquired a 25% ownership interest in
Sage.
All the members of Sage were signatories to the operating
agreement, including amendments. The agreement ~ested equal
management rights in the members. It provided that to amend its
tetms, consent of aU but one of the members was required.. It also
addressed the grounds for dissociation of its members. MandatOt)'
dissociation would occur if a member withdrew with the consent of
the majority of the remaining members or with the deeth or decree
of incompetency of a member. A member could be -dissociatc:d by
a majoriry vote of the other' members upon me happening of the
following: bankruptcy of the member: attachment or levy upon the
member's interest; the member's loss of professional license; a
finding by the member's professional society that the member is
gUilty of an ethical violation; me member's inability to obtain
professional liability insurance; or the member's conviction for a
felony. The operating agreement also -provided a calculation for
&

.

.

.

.

••

"
J

!,

~.

j1.

tUU~.

l:n~~MA' U ~UN

LAW

UrrH;t~_ _ _ _ _" " '_ _ NU. j?~~_W.

BUSHI v. SAGE HEALTH CARE

1:
J"

.;.

Stllrting around 2002, Bushi began to date a nurse practitioner
employed at Sage. This was not prohibited under the terms of the
operating agreement; however, because the other members had
concerns about potential liability stemming from the relationship.
Sage arranged for Bushi to bave no role in supervising the nurse
practitioner.
In July 2003. Sage obtained a business line of credit loan from
Wells Fargo Bank, which was intended (0 serve as a source of
liquidity tot' Sage if and when it was needed. Sage never used the
line of credit and never approved jts use by any member. In October
2005, Respondents received correspondence from Wells Fargo
indicating that nearly $45,000 bad been bOll'o'llled on tbe line of
credit at 15.5% inLerest. Respondents learned lbat Bushi had applied
for and received funds on Sage's line of credit based solely on his
signature; Respondents had nOt consented to or known about this
extension of credit. The name on lbe line of ctedit .account was
listed as "Sage Health Care, PLLC Stepben Bushi," and Bushi
maintains that be believed tha[ this line of credit was his personal
lille of credit. not 8 business line of credit After Respondents
confronted bim, Sushi admitted he had borrowed the funds on the
line of credit and used them for his personal expenses. Respondents
demanded be repay the funds to WeUs Fargo.
At a members' ~ting on October 27,2005, Respondents,
accotdingto Bushi, informed him they wanted him out as a member
of Sage because he was dating t!'le nurse practitioner. The second
item on the agenda for that meeting states "discuss NP." After this
meeting, coneentecl about his future with Sage, Bushi joined another
psychiatry group in November 200S. Bushi thought be was within
his rights under the operating agreement to join the competing
group. The minutes from a December 8, 200S members' meeting
reflect that Respondents voted to deny Bushi profit sharing in 2006,
and that "onc reasOn for him tlor being involved with tbe profit
sharing was due to his connection with (Sage's) competitor." At this
time, Respondents stopped schccluling Bushi to provide services for
various Sage concr8CC/l in which he had previously been
participating.
At mac same December 8, 2005 meetill8, Respondents also
offered to buy OUt Bushi's share in Sage for a figure prepared by
Sage's accouotant anc tOld Sushi be needed to decide whether to
accept the offer by Jarnwy 2006. Busbi thOUght the offer was
"rjdiculous" and told Respondents he would not comment on any
amouDt until he had spoken to his attorney.
At a members' meeting on January 17, 2006, Respondeots
presented Sushi with a non-eompete agreement that would have
prohibited him from participating in any practice competing against
them. In return, Bushi wou1£! be paid $15.000 for his withdrawal
and dissociation from Sage lind relinquishment of any and all rights
of ownership in Sage. Following this meeting, Bushi's counsel
wrote a letter to Respondents rejecting their offer and explaining that
Bushi would continue as a member and retain his rights, includiog
his tight to a share. in the profits of Sage, until a mutually
satisfactory agreement had been teached.
On January 24, 2006, Respondents served Bushi notice that a
members' meeting would be held on January 30, 2006. The notice
stated that three items were on the agenda: an amendment to the
operating agreement; following the amendment, the termination of
the membership of a member pursuant to the operating agreement as
amended; and continuation of the business. Bushi's counsel
appeared at the meering by proxy in Busm's absence. At the
meeting, Respondents voted to amend Ihe operating agreement to
require mandatory dissociation of a m¢mber upon an affirmative
vote by all but one of the members. FolloWing lhe amendment,

I~
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effective immediately. Applying the formula in the operating
agreement, Sage's accountant determined that the value of Bushi' s
membership interest as of January 30, 2006 was $11,245.
In a letter dated luly II, 2006, Respondents sent two checks to
Bushi, one for 511,245 (for his membership interest) and one for
55.138.27 (ror his 2006 pfofit share and for the remainder of his
2005 profit share, the first part of which Bushi had directed be put
towards paying off the Wells Pargo credit line). These were
tendered as full payment upon Bushi's dissociation. By letter dated
July 18,2006, Bushi's attorney refused tender of the two checks and
retUrned them.
As of June 6, 2006, Bushi had not paid off the Wells F8f$o
credit line and Sage continued '0 be liable for tbat loan.
Respondent.~ filed a civil action against Bushi in rh¢ Fourth Judic.inl
District. After the SUit ",as filed, Bushi paid all ampunts due and
o\iljng to Wells Fargo, and Respondents dismissed the lawsuit.
Bushi filed lbe instant case on October 19,2006, assening
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of lbe implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment. breach of
operating agreement. and seeking declaratOry reUef and an equitable
~counting.
Respondents filed an answcr and couDterclaim,
asserting in the first lXlunt of the counterclaim that Bushi breacbed
the operating agt'e¢meDt through his use of che Wells Pargo credit
line and seeking in the second cO\lnt deelaratory relief related to the
validity of their actions in amending the operating agreement.
Bushi moved to dismiss count one of the counterclaim, which
the district court granted 00 grounds that the claim was moot. This
d~ision has not been appealed. Between the time Bushi filed the
motion to dismiss and wben the court granted it, Respondents filed
a motion for summaI}' judgment. As to the viable portion of the
counterclaim that remained follOwing dismisso.l of the first COUDt.
RespondeDts asked the 1Xl1.lrt to grant summary judgmetl[ as follows:
cIeclaring that Bushi' s membcrship in Sage was properly terminated
under the terms of the operating agreement as amended nnd [ne
Idaho Limited Liability Company 'Act; declaring that the value of
Bushi's membership was properly detennincd underthelenn5 of the
operating agreement and in compliance with the tenns of the Idaho
Limited Liability Company Act; declaring that the profits of Sage
were properly determined and distributed among the membors ill
accordance with the signed written agreements of the members
regarding distribution of profits; and awarding attomey fees and
costs to Respondents in the action as a prevailing plU'ty.
The district COUrt granted Respondents' motion for summary
judgmenc, finding that: RespondentS did not breach the contraCt with
Sushi by amending the operating agreement to allow his involuntary
dissociation; Sushi's allegations of breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing did not create an issue of material fact tbat
precluded summ81Yjudgment: there were no issues of material fact
precluding summ8I)' judgment on Bushi's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty; and the valuation provisions upon dissociation W(.,"Te
clear and unambiguous and Sage's valuation followed those
provisions. The court awarded Respondents $73,233.19 in attorney
fees pursuant to I.C. § lZ.l20(3) as well as $$.665 in discretionary
costS fot expert witness fees.
,.
Bushi timely appealed the district court's decision.
Respondents ask for attorney fees on appeal.

n, STANDARD OF REVIEW

6

When ,his COUrt reViews a trial coun's decision on summary
judgment, it employs the same smndard as that properly employed
by the trial coun when originally ruling on the motion. Kolin v.
~btf Luke's Reg" Med. Cu., 130 Idaho 323,327,940 P.2d 1142.
tt46, (1997) (citing Thomso'l '1'. Irklho Ins. Agency. Inc., 126 Idaho
---

--- -
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construed in favor of rhe non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-movins party. UJckheed Marlin Corp. v. Idaho SIDrg Tax
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 190, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006).
"Summ81y judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions. and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits. jf any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Id.
Dl, ANALYSIS
Bushi chal1enges the district court's grant of summlUy
judgment as to his claims for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty. Sushi also asks
that we reverse the district court's award of attorney fces and costs
to Respondents. We affirm the district coUrt'S grant of summary
judgment regarding Bushi's cJaim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair <iealiDg. vacate the district court's
grant of summary judgment regarding Bushi' s claim for breach of
fidUcilUy duty, vacate tbc district court's award of attomey fces
below, and decline to award attorney fees on appeal.
A. The district court did Dot err wbeD it aranted summary
judgment ill fa.vor of RespondeQts on Dushi's claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
The district court correctly decided that Respondents did not
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fait dealing. The
court noted that "[tJhe impJied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing arises only regarding terms agrud to by the partics." Taylor
v. Browni7lg. 129 Idaho 483,491,92.'7 P.2d 873, 881 (1996) (clung
ldaJu; First Nat" Bank, 121 Idaho 266,288, 824 P.2d 84), 863
(1991)). Furthermore:
No oovenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms
of the contraCt negotiated and executed by the parties.
The covenant requires "that the partieS perform in good
faith the obligations imposed by their agreement," and a
vioJation of the covenant occurs only when "either party
... violates. nullifies or significantJy impaits any benefit
of the ... contraet .... "

Idaho First Nat'IBat1k v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 288, 824
P.2d at 863 (citations omitted). Sl.lShi can identify no specific term
wjtbin the operating agreement that RespondentS breached by
amending the agreement in order to involuntarily dissociate him.
Instead, Sushi argues that fte was denied the benefits of the
original opcrating agreement, which did not expressly allow the
other members of Sage [0 involuntarily dissociate him. In response
to tWs contention, me district coun noted [hat:
[W]hile Sushi claims he "relied" on the then existing
dissociation provisions which tbe Members changed ...
the Coon finds that the Operating Agreement also
specificaJly provides "[oJo Member shalll1ave any vested
rigbtS in the Company Agreement wbich may not be
modified through an amendment to the Company
Agreement." Article XIV, Section 1. Therefore. such
reliance, to the extent reasonable at aU, was simply not
justified and his argument is sp~ous.
The COM reiterated that, in any case, "contract temlS are D.Q!
overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
(Citing Clement v. FQl'l'Mrs Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298, 300, 766
P.2o. 768,770 (1988): Olson v. Idaho SUlce Un.iv., 125 Idaho 177,
182,868 P.2d 505, 510 (Cr. App. 1994)) (empbasis in original).

1

We agree with the district COutl. Sushi cannot show thal
Respondents violated, nullified, or significantly impaired the
operating agreement. and thus llis contention that R.espondents acted
in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails to
create an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Bushi also argues that Respondents breached the covenant by voting
to deny Sushi profit sharing in 2006. Despile their vote,
RespondentS did (ender to Bushi his share of the 2006 ,profitS, and
Bushi nas not aJleSed any further contract damages as a result of the
vote. Thus. this claim also fails to 'Preclude summary judgment
Consequently, we affmn the district court's grant of summary
judgment regarding Sushi's assertion that Respondents breached che
impJied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. The district court erred by concluding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact pretluding summary
judgment OQ Sushi's claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
In Ol'der "[tJo establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, [a]
plaintiff must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary
duty and that the fidueilUy duty was breached." Tolley v. THI Co.,
140 Idaho 253, 261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004) (citation omitted).
Respondents do not contend that they did not owe Sushi fiduciary
duties; rather, they assert that tbey did nOl breach Lhose duties.
Although tbis is not a disputed point of law, this COUrt has not yet
directly addressed the question of whether members of a limited
liability company owe each other fiduciary duties. Accordingly. we
address this threshold question before conSidering whether there is
a gcowne issue of material fact whether there was a breach of
Respondents' fidueiary duties to Bushi.
ldaho's origiDalsct governing llmitedliability companies, the
Idaho Limited LiabiJity Company Act. is codified at I.C. §§ 53·601
et seq. I Idaho Code § 53.622 identifi~ certain specific duties that
members of an LLC owe to one another; 110wc\'er. it does not use
the term "fiduciary." does not state that it is an exhaustive Ust of
duties members owe one another. and does not address the conduct
at issue in this case. In l008, the Iegislarute enacted c:omprehensive
amendments (0 me statutory scbeme through the Idaho Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, LC. §§ 30·6-101 er seq. 2008 S.L.
ch. 176, § I, p. 480. The new act states unequi vocally that members
of an LLC owe each other me fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
I.C. § 30-6-409(1). Until My 1,2010, the origjnal act govems all
limited liability-companies formed prior to July 1,2008 that do not
elect to be subject to the new act. I.C. § 30·6·1] 04. Sage was
formed prior to July), 2008, and tWs litigation began prior to the
enactment of the new act. Thus, the original act governs this case.
While the original act does not expressly state that members of
an LLC owe one anoti1er ficluciasydulies, it does state thac "(u)nless
displaced by particular provisions of this chaptet, the ptinciples of
law and equity supplement the proviSions of this ohapter." I.C. §
53-668(2). It appears that the majority of courts considering the
issue have concluded that member.; of an LLC owe one another the
fidudaty duties of trust and loyalty. See NTS Am. Jur. 2d Limited
Liability Companies § 11 (2008) (citing McContUlll \I. Hunt SportS
EnL, '72S N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio App. 1999) (holding a limited liability
company, like 11 partnership, involves a fiduciary relationship);
Purcell v. Sou/hem Hills Investmems, UC, 847 N.E.2d 991 and.
App. 2006) (holding that common law fiduciary duties, similar to
the ones imposed on partnerships and closely-held corporations, are
applicable to Indiana u..cs). We conclude that, under Idaho's
original LLC act, members of an LLC owe one another fiduciary

I The leeislature repealed the Idaho Limited Liability Company Aot
effective July 1,2010. 2008 S.l.. ch. 176, §§ 5,6,,,. S22.
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dudes.
Generally, wbether a fiduciaty has bteached his duty is a
question of fact. See First Bank & Trust o/Idaho 11. Jones, 111
Idaho 481. 484. 72S P.2d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 1986) {holding
question of (eet precluding summary judgment existed as to whether
there was breach of panners' fidudary duties regarding status of
certain property as partnership propeny)j Musselman Y. Southwinds
Realty, 704P.2d 814, 816 (Ariz. App. 1985) (noting rule of law that
whether a fiduciaJY duty has been breached is a question ot tact for
the jury).
In addressing Bushi's claim for breach of fidueiary duty, the
district coun stated; "Whether the other Sage Health Care Members
owed a fiduciary duty to Busbi under these circumstances and with
respect ttl IIIe buy-our offers is debacable." (Emphasis added). By
this statement. llIe district coun seems to have been acknowledging
that the question of whether Respondents breached their fiduciary
duties to Bushi is a question of fact ana that the facts surrounding
Bushi's termination are disputed. The coun Went on to State
however that "breach of fiduciary duty is a ton claim and Bushi
failed to introduce any case law that stands for lhe-proposition that
a breach of fiduciary duty precludes enforcemenc of a contract."
This latter statement appears to reflect the ttial court's view that
summary judgment on this issue was appropriate as a matter of law,
despite the existence of disputed facrs, because those facts were not
material in light of the legal conclusion. This was etTOt.
While it is uue that generally a member of an LLC is not liable
to the LLC or any oCher member for actions taken in compliance
witb che operating agreement. Che member must bave relied on the
piOvisions of the agreem~t in good faith. Schafer v. RMS Rtflll)"
741 N.E.2d ISS, 175-76 (Ohio App.2(00). In Schtifer, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio considered ·whether Schafer. a mjnority partner jn
a realty pl\J1llcrship, had ~ c.lnim fOt breach of fiduciary duty against
tbe partnership and the other parme.rs when, in compliance with tbe
partnership agreement, the other panners bsued a capital call that
Schafer could not meet. [d. at 162. Schafer's failure to meet the call
triggeted a provision in the partnership agreement that diluted the
interest of any panner who could not meet a call. It Schafer'S
interest decreased from twenty-five to nineteen percent pursuant to
tbe dilution provision. and this result was, Schafer claimed, the true
motivation for the call. [d.
Like Respondents, the partners in Schafer urged that no breach
of fiduciary duty had occurred since their actions were taken in
compliance with the partnership agreement. Id. at 17S. The Schafer
court began its analysis of this argument by loo.king to itS earlier
decision in l.4igh \/. Crescent Square, Ltd.. 608 N.E.2d 1166 (Ohio
App. 1992), in which one panner claimed the other partners
breached their fiduciaIj' duties [0 him when tbey voted to expel him
from the partnership without prior notice. [d. at 1167-68. The
Leigh COUrt held that the lack of norice of the ouster did not
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty because the expulsion was not
initiated in order fOT the remaining partners to extract financial gain.
Jd. at 1170. The Scha/el· courc extrapolared Crom this holding that
"wbether a technical breach has occurred is not the sole
consideration" because "actions talren in accordance with [an
operating] agreement can still bc a breach ot fiduciary duty if
[members) have improperly taken advantage of their position to
obtain financial gain." 741 N.E.2d at 175.
The Schaf!!r court then turned [0 a case in which action taken
in accordance with an operating agreement did result in a breach of
fiduciary duties. ld. at 177.78. In LAbovirz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d
304 an',APp. 1~89), the court he~d ~at a general partne: who used
econonnC coerCIon to make the lunl!ed parmers sell thear shares to
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partners, even though he acted in accord with the pannership
agreement. ld. at 306. Specifically, the Labovit:z court stated. that:

It is no answer (0 the claims that plaintiffs make in this
case that partners have the right co establish among
themselves their right$, duties and obligations, as though
the exercise oC that right rcleas~s, waives or delimit$
somehow the high fiduciary duty owed to them by the
general panner·a gloss we do nol find anywhere in our
law. On the contrary, the fiduciary duty eXlst$
concurrently with the obligations set forth in the
pannersbip agreement Whether or not expressed. therein.

Jd. at 310. Applying this rule. the Scha/(JI' court affirmed tbe jury's
fincling thac the other partners breached chelf fiduciary duties to
Schafer when they caused his ownership interest to be diluted:
(W]hile the partnership agreement allowed thl'. panner5 to
voce for capital calls "as required for the purposes of the
partnership," the majority's ability jn this regard was
"encumbered by [the] supreme fiduciary duly of fairness,
honesty, sood faith, and Joyalty" to their minority parmer.
LabOvilz, 54S N.E.2d at 313.

741 N.E.2d at 179. Similarly, even if Respondents' actions in
dissociating Bushi were technically in compliance with the terms of
the opetatiJag agreement, this does not necessarily bar Bushi' s claim
for breach of fiduciary ducy if those actions were improperly
motivated. 2
Responcient$ offer a number of reasons why they terminated
Bushi, inCluding: their concern that Bushi's romance could subject
chem to potential liability undet federal Jaw; their view that Bushi's
association with a competitor of Sage breached the operating
agreement; anel, finally, tbe fact that Sushi ran up approximately
$60.000 in debt On Sage's line of credit without the knowledge 01
authorization of the other members of Sllge, also in breaeh of the
operating agreement. Bushi. however, aUcgc.s that Respondents
were motivated by financial gain. He points out that each member
of Sage, in applying for the line of credit with WeUs Parse, valued
his membership interest at $250,000. In contraSt, Sage's accountant
determined that Bushi's interest in Sage was $11,2A5 under the
cenns of the operating agreement governing disso~iation of a
member.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Bushi' s favor. this Courc
cannot conclude that Ulere is no genuine issue of material fact as to
Respondents' motivation in dissociating Sushi. A reasonable person

• Respondents cite to McConnell v. Hunt SpOriS Em., 725 N.E.2d ! J93
(Ohio App. 1999), for their argument that compliance with an agrtcmcnt
precludes a finding ofbl'¢ach of fiduoil\JY duty. Rospondents correctly note
that in McConMII''the coun beld that there had been no breach of fiduciary
duty because ... (u]nder the operating agreement, tile members wen: not
prohibited ftom engaging In a venture that was competitive with the
company's investing in ... a national hockey league franchise." This
holding does not defeat Bushi', claim tha! Respondents breached their
fiducl81l' duties to him by terminating his membcrJlhip in orderlo increase
their individual interests in Sage. The operating agreement in McCOIIflt!111
specifically allowed the members 10 take the action complained ofin that
case. Jd... 725 ~.E.2d at J.212 (hot~ing that it could not be considered a
breach offid.uClary duty, an and ofltsclf, for a member ofan LLC to
compete against the LLC because the operating agreement allowed sucb
~petition). 8yeonlrast, there is no provision in [he Sage agreementtbat
-...duthorizcs removal ofmcmbcn in ordN 1.0 in~"..u,. thr III.hll' nrrh"
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could infer that Respondents acted in bad faith by removing Bushi
from the LLC in order to advance their personal financial interests.
If that were the cas~ Respondents would be liable to Bu&bi despite
their technical compliance with the operating agreement
Accordingly, we vacate the diStriot court's grant of summary
judgment with respect to this issue and remand to the district coUrt
for further proceedings.
C. The award or attorney tees below is vacated nod no
attorney fees are awarded on appeal
Because we vacate the district court'S grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings with respect to
Bushi's breach of fiduciary duty claim, Respondents can no longer
be considered the prevailing party below. Thus. we vacate the
district court's award of attorney fees.
We conclude !hat thereis no prevailing pany on appeal because
we bave affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as
to Bushi's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and \'acated the district court's grant of summary
judgment as to Busbi's claim for breach of fiduciary duties.
Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fcos or costs on appeal.
IV, CONCLVSION
In ligbt of the fact that Bushi is unable to point to any breach
of the operating agreement. wc affirm the disttict court's grant of
sumnwy judgment as to his claim of breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. However, ·because Respondents,
despite having technically complied with the operating agreement,
may have acted in bad faith in temUnating Dushi. we vacate the
district court's grant of summary judgment to Respondents and
remand for further proceedings on Busbi's claim of breacJl of
fiduciary duty.) The district court's award of attorney fees is
vacated. No attorney fees Or costs are awarded on appeal.
Iustices BURDICK, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tern
KIDWELL, CONCUR.
1. JONES, 1., specially concurring.

r concur in the Coun's opinion, particularly the Court's
statement of the law. My concern relateS to the substanee of Bushi' s
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In my estimation, Bushi barely
cleared !he hurdle for surviving summary judgment. The record
contained a bare minimum of facts [0 back up Bush!' s assertion that
the other members of Sage took the action they did in oreler to obtain
improper gains at his expense. It is somewhat difficult to overlook
the fact that Bushi improperly took advantage ofthe.company·s line
of ctedit for his personal benefit. On tbe other hand, Sage did not
aSSign major importance to this fact as a ground for dissociating
Bushi until well after the dissociation. In any cVent, 1 agree that
thete was just enough in the record to allow bim to survive summary
judgment. leavins it to tbe trier of fact to sort OUt these matters.

, The cfislrict court found that, because Bushl bad refused tender of his
membenhip interest and outstallding share of profits as determined under
the operating agreement, he suffered no damages. ihis is incolTect, and
Respondents acknowledsed at oral argument that barring 8 diffmnt
outcome upon remand to the district coun they must re-tender tbose: funds
to

IU

Sushi.
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RANDOLPH E. FARBeR, SCOTI' ALAN BECKER and CRlTI'ER
CLINIC, an Idaho professional association.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN,
its manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE
MC LAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDeS,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI DANIBLSON. JOHN GOEDDE.
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their capacity as
members of the Board of Directors of the STATE INSURANCE
FUND,
Defendants-Respondents.

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, Canyon County. The Honorable Thomas 1.
Ryan. District Judge.
.
The summary judgment is rtversed and the case is remanded.
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Lojek Law Officcs, Chtd., and Gordon Law Offices, BOise, for
appeJiants. Donald W. LOjek and Bruce S. Bistline argued.
Hall, FarJey, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A., Boise. for
respondents. Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke argued.
Boise. February 2009 Tenn
Filed: March 5, 2009
Steplten W. Kenyon, Clerk
J. JONES, Justice

This class action lawsuit arises OUt of a decision by the Idaho
State Insurance Fund (the Fund) to distribute dividends pursuant to
i.C. § 72-915' only to those policyholders who paid more than
$2,500.00 in premiums. The Plaintiffs - those policyholders whose
annual premiums were .52.500.00 or less - sued the Pund, itS
Manager, and its Board of Dil:cctors' for damages and injunctive
relief. Both parties movrd for partial summary juelgment regarding
the interpretation of I.e. § 7~915. The district court denied the
Plaintiffs' motion and gran led the Fund's motion. We reverse anel
remand.
L
The Fund was created in 1917 [0 provide worker's
compensation insurance to Idaho employers. particularly chose
employers who could Dot otherwise obtain insurance from private
carriers. Set I.C. § 72-901. The Board of Directors sets the FundI,
policies while the Manager conducts the Fund's day-to-day
operations. I.C. §§ 72·901 & 902. Since the Fund's inception, the
Manager has, on occasion, distributed a dividend to policyholders
pursuant to 1.C. § 72·915. This dividend is different (rom 'he
dividend issued to stockhOlders of a corporation and is instead more
aptly described as a refund of unused premium. Set id. From at
, This opinion will rcfI:r 10 the defendants collectively as "the Fund."
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho
corporation, et al.

Case No.

CV 20086752

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
---------------------------

I. BACKGROUND.
As part of plaintiff Jacklin Land Company's (Jacklin) development of the
Riverbend Commerce Park, which was platted in 1988, Jacklin recorded an original set
of covenants, "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Riverbend
Commerce Park." Affidavit of Tom Stoeser, Exhibit B. These covenants were later
amended in 1989. The amended covenants encumbered the property which is
presently leased by defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc. (Blue Dog), which is the subject of this
litigation. Affidavit of Tim Stoeser, Exhibit C.
In 1990, Quality Centers Associates (QCA), the predecessor in interest of
defendant KL Properties, Inc. (KLP), wished to purchase the property KLP now owns,
and QCA asked Jacklin to remove the 1989 covenants then in effect, as a matter of
title. Jacklin agreed on the terms and conditions memorialized in the QCA/Jacklin
Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), dated November 7, 1990, which removed the
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then-existing Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions in return for QCA
agreeing: (1) to construct and maintain a first-class shopping center; (2) to work with
Jacklin to achieve a mutually accepted design and appearance for the shopping center,
and (3) to agree to comply with Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declarations of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions recorded in 1988, as subsequently amended. Affidavit of
Pat Leffel, Exhibit B. This agreement between QCA and Jacklin was unique to the
property now at issue, Lots 1 to 4 (of Lots 1 to 17) of Block 1 of Phase I of the
development, and differs from the covenants applicable to the Riverbend Commerce
Park generally. After purchasing lots 1 to 17, QCA worked with Jacklin and achieved a
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the Factory Outlets on Lots 5-17 of
Block 1. In 2005, KLP purchased the property from QCA, including Lots 1 to 17 of
Block 1.
On July 1, 2008, Blue Dog entered into a lease with KLP for Lots 1-4 of Block 1.
Jacklin filed its motion for summary judgment on December 11, 2008. Jacklin moves
for summary judgment on its claims for a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of the
property for an RV dealership/facility and for declaratory judgment that the uses the
defendants have put the property to violate the QCAlJackiin Agreement. Defendants
argue no interpretation of the Agreement would prohibit Blue Dog's RV Center.
Defendants argue Jacklin has not made a showing of irreparable injury to support
injunctive relief. Defendants argue Jacklin itself breached the Agreement. Finally,
defendants argue defendants' waiver and estoppel defenses preclude summary
judgment in Jacklin's favor. On February 17, 2009, defendants filed "Defendants
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment." Following extensive briefing and submission of
affidavits by both parties, which the Court has considered, oral argument was heard on
March 3, 2009. On March 31,2009, Jacklin filed a "Supplemental Citation of Authority
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 2

by Plaintiff." That supplemental authority is Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 2009
Opinion No. 30, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4, 2009), a case concerning good faith and fair
dealing. The cross-motions for summary judgment are at issue.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is mindful that
summary judgment may properly be granted only where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P.
56(c). In determining whether any issue of material fact exists, this court must construe
all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, together
with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P.
56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App.
1985). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Samuel v. Hepworth,
Nungester& Lezamiz, Inc., 134, Idaho 84,87,996 P.2d 303, 306 (2002). Summary
judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No.2,
128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).
Where, as here, both parties file motions for summary judgment relying on the
same facts, issues and theories, the judge, as trier of fact, may resolve conflicting
inferences if the record reasonably supports the inferences. Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518-20,650 P.2d 657,661-62 (1982). Where both parties file
motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the fact
that both parties have filed summary judgment motions alone does not in itself establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho
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515, 518, 650 P.2d 657, 661, n. 1. This is so because by filing a motion for summary
judgment a party concedes that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the
theory that he is advancing, but does not thereby concede that no issues remain in the
event that his adversary seeks summary judgment upon different issues of theories. Id.
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
jUdgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.
III.

MOTIONS PRIOR TO CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A. Jacklin's Objection to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment is Denied.
Jacklin objected to defendant's Cross-Motion for summary judgment as being
untimely under I.R.C.P. 56. Affidavit of John Magnuson in Support of Plaintiffs
Objection and Motion to Strike Defendants' Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5.
Jacklin moves this Court to strike the cross-motion for summary judgment as it cannot
now timely conduct additional discovery and meaningfully respond. Id. Defendants
urge the Court to deny the motion to strike because its cross-motion addresses the
same legal and factual issues as Jacklin's motion for summary judgment. Defendant's
Reply Memorandum, pp. 2-3. Defendants state they could not prepare responsive
briefing until after depositions could be taken in late January. Id., p. 3.
Idaho' Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires motions and affidavits for summary
judgment and proceedings thereon to be filed 28 days before hearing, and responsive
affidavits and answering briefs are to be served 14 days before hearing. "The court
may alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this n:rle for good cause
shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney's fees and sanctions
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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against a party, a party's attorney, or both." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The hearing on the motion
for summary judgment was set for March 3, 2009. Jacklin filed its motion and
memorandum in support on December 11, 2008. Defendants filed their cross-motion,
memorandum in support, and motion to shorten time on February 17, 2009. It will be
noted that defendants failed to ask permission from this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court
(scheduling clerk) to add hearing on defendants' motions. On February 25, 2009,
Jacklin filed an objection to the cross-motion and motion to shorten time, along with its
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (addressing
Defendants' cross-motion). Jacklin's reply memorandum is forty-two pages in length
and thoroughly rebuts defendants' factual assertions. Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 7-20.
Sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 are a matter left to the Court's discretion as
evidenced by the Rule's "may" language. Similarly, evidentiary rulings, such as ones on
the motion to strike before the Court, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,50,995 P.2d 816, 820
(2000). Where, as here, a party has time to respond and address the arguments in the
opposing party's untimely filing, it is unlikely that they are prejudiced. I.R.C.P.61
instructs the Court that, at every stage of a proceeding, the Court "must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." I.R.C.P. 61; See McClure Engineering, Inc. v. ChannelS KIDA, 143 Idaho
950, 155 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Ct. App. 2006). For example, the Court of Appeals has
declined to reverse summary judgment merely because the summary judgment motion
and supporting documents were not mailed to the opposing party at least thirty-one
days in advance of the hearing as [then] required by I.R.C.P. 56(c). Ponderosa Paint
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310,317,870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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of Appeals held that technical error did not require reversal because the appellants had
not demonstrated whether, if given additional time, they could have submitted evidence
or legal argument that would have prevented summary judgment against them. Id. The
only party arguably prejudiced here is the Court, who received Jacklin's objection on
February 26, 2009, and Defendants' Reply Memorandum on March 2, 2009. This Court
denied the objection and motion to strike brought by Jacklin on the record on March 3,
2009.

B. Jacklin's Motion to Supplement the Record is Granted.
Jacklin moved this Court for an Order allowing it to supplement the record
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and 56(c) because defendants opposed its motion for
summary judgment and had submitted extensive excerpts from Pat Leffel's and Tom
Stoeser's deposition transcripts. Leffel is a former employee of Jacklin, and Stoeser is
a current employee and the I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deponent. Motion to Supplement the
Record, pp. 2-3. Jacklin's proposed submissions, attached to the Affidavit of John
Magnuson Submitted Pursuant to Motion Under I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and I.R.C.P. 56(c),
were proffered because the excerpts submitted by defendants "did not include portions
of the referenced deposition transcripts, and certain exhibits referred to therein ... " Id.,
p. 3. As set forth by Jacklin, I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) states, "[i]f only a part of a deposition is
offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require the party to introduce any
other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any
party may introduce any other parts." Whether portions of depositions should or should
not "in fairness" be admitted is a matter for the discretion of the Court. Slack v. Kelleher,
140 Idaho 916,924,104 P.3d 958,966 (2004) (citing State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho
180,687 P.2d 570 (1984».
Defendants argue Jacklin has not identified any deposition pages or exhibits
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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cited to in defendants' briefing which was not attached to a submitted Affidavit.
Defendants' Reply Memorandum, p. 4. The deposition pages Jacklin identified in its
motion to supplement were not referenced by defendants and were therefore not
submitted. Id. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the Court has discretion to
determine whether portions of transcripts ought in fairness be considered with portions
already introduced, and either party may introduce any other parts of depositions. See
I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4). This Court granted Jacklin's motion to supplement the record at the
hearing on March 3, 2009, recognizing the decision to be a matter of discretion.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. The QCA/Jacklin Agreement is Enforceable Against Defendants.
1. This is a "Use" Agreement.
As a starting point, the two parties cannot agree as to whether this is a use
agreement or a development agreement. Defendants in their brief call the agreement a
"Development Agreement" on more than twenty occasions in five pages of briefing.
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1520. Defendants claim that the term "use agreement" is found nowhere in the
Agreement. Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 6. While the Agreement does not
contain the phrase "use agreement", it does contain the word "use". While the
Agreement does not contain the phrase "development agreement", it also does not
even contain the word "development." This Court finds, as Jacklin correctly points out:
"Actually, the 'Development Agreement,' a moniker invented by Defendants since the
word 'development' does not appear in the Agreement, actually contains the word 'use'.
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 25. The
November 6, 1990, Agreement between Jacklin and QCA reads in pertinent part:
The parties agree as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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In consideration of the purchase of Lots 1-17, Block one, Riverbend
Commerce Park, Phase I, City of Post Falls, County of Kootenai, Idaho
("Purchased Property"), by Purchaser and the removal of record on even
date herewith ofthat certain Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions (as amended) as it affects the Purchased Property, and other
good and valuable consideration, Purchaser agrees: (i) to construct and
maintain upon said Purchased Property, a first class shopping center
which shall be in compliance with all state and local building codes and
ordinances; (ii) to work together with Seller to achieve a mutually
acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it shall
be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend
Commerce Park; and (iii) despite its removal of record as to the
Purchased Property, Purchaser agrees to comply and conform to Articles
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in those Declarations of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions recorded * * * which are incorporated herein
by this reference in its use and maintenance of the Purchased Property
excepting those which are inapplicable to a retail shopping center (as shall
be mutually agreed upon) or which violate applicable local building codes
and ordinances.
Purchaser's obligations under this Agreement shall terminate in the
event it no longer owns the Purchased Property, but said obligations shall
inure to and be binding upon Purchaser's successors and/or assigns.
Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit G; Cordes Affidavit, Exhibit B. (bold added).
2. Incorporation of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
Jacklin argues the Agreement specifically incorporates Articles 2-6 of the
covenants in force at time of QCA's closing on the property (and binding on QCA's
successors). Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 12.
Defendants argue the Articles were previously terminated as the Amendment to the
Covenants, dated November 7, 1990, terminates the restrictions of the 1990 and prior
CC&Rs. Affidavit of Hines, Exhibit E. Jacklin responds this termination was made
pursuant to the Agreement and at the time the Agreement was filed, two minutes prior
to the filing of the Amendment, the 1990 CC&Rs were still in effect. Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 29. Jacklin also points
out defendants cite no support for the proposition that parties cannot contractually
incorporate covenant restrictions found in another recorded document. Defendants
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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reply the Agreement merely references CC&Rs that were null and void at the time the
Agreement was executed and recorded." Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 9..
However, despite the fact that the Agreement was executed on November 7, 1990, and
the Amendment was executed on October 16, 1990, the Agreement was filed before
filing of the Amendment and the Agreementexplicitly states, " ... on removal of record on
even date herewith of that certain Declaration of Covenants, Condition, and Restrictions
(as amended) as it affects the Purchased Property ... " Affidavit of Leffel, Exhibit B. It is
without question that the property was removed from the Riverbend Commerce Park
Covenants as part of consideration for sale and that Articles 2-6 were intended to
remain binding.
Defendants argue Articles 2-6 do not prohibit Blue Dog's use as its use is a light
industrial and commercial use and is not one of the specific uses prohibited.
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 20.
Jacklin responds that storage yards are specifically prohibited by Article 6, and while
not all RV sales facilities constitute storage yards, this one does. Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 31. Further, if there is any question as
to whether using four unimproved lots to house RVs is appropriate, Jacklin argues
Article 6(5) provides, "any use which is arguably in conflict with this Declaration ... shall
be submitted and approved." Id. To this, defendants reply its use is not that of a
storage yard; the RVs are inventory which are sold in the due course of business.
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 8. However, as Jacklin has filed suit seeking relief,
clearly there exists a conflict as to use, and no request for approval has been made by
defendants. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.
31. As to Articles 4 (signage), 3 (parking), 5 (lot usage and 5 ft. parking setback), and 2
(landscaping), defendants argue they are only triggered when the property has been
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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developed, which Blue Dog has not done. Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21. Jacklin urges the Court to read all
portions of the Articles in conjunction and consider the requirements that undeveloped
areas be maintained in a weed-free and dust-controlled condition, be landscaped if
required, and have groundcover maintained so as not to detract from the aesthetics of
the Development. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.
32. Jacklin also states no requests for approval of conflicting uses, signage, parking
plan, landscaping, or temporary uses have been submitted for approval by defendants.
Id., p. 31.

Defendants argue Blue Dog made efforts at site improvement which were
rendered futile by Jacklin's refusal to work with defendants on site issues.
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 21- 22. In
response, Jacklin points out the only offer of improvements made was to fund providing
of gravel, which Jacklin argues does not comport with the paving requirement found in
the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Jacklin also argues its Rule 30(b)(6)
deponent only stated the current use of the property was not capable of being
approved, not that no RV park would ever be approved. Id., p. 34. Defendants'
argument still does not provide the Court with definitive evidence of its attempts
(beyond the gravel) to work together with Jacklin or to submit for approval uses which
arguably conflict with the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
Defendants argue Jacklin breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by refusing to work with defendants to develop a site plan and thereby has
breached the Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 24. Defendants argue violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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dealing occurs when either party nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the
contract. Id., p. 25. Jacklin responds that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot override express provisions in a bargained-for contract. Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 38. Although defendants point to the
testimony of Jacklin's Property Manager, Leffel, stating that Jacklin categorically
refused to work with defendants to address concerns about "Blue Dog's shopping
center operation," (Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 26), this testimony presupposes that Jacklin had mutually agreed to the design and
appearance of the RV shopping center location. The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this opinion.
This Court finds as a matter of law that the Agreement specifically incorporates
Articles 2-6 of the covenants in force at time of QCA's closing on the property (and
binding on QCA's successors).

3. Violation of the Agreement by Blue Dog/KLP.
Jacklin argues the Agreement is enforceable as covenants restricting use of
privately-owned land are valid under Idaho law. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 4. Jacklin states because restrictive covenants are analyzed
under the principles of contract construction, the Court must determine if a given
covenant is ambiguous. If the covenant is not ambiguous, the Court applies the plain
meaning. If the covenant is ambiguous, the Court determines the intent of the parties
at the time of drafting. Id., pp. 4-5. While Jacklin argues "first-class shopping center"
has a common meaning and is unambiguous, defendants argue the term is never
defined, that even Jacklin admitted it does not know the distinction between a first,
second, or third-class shopping center, and that its RV shopping center does not violate
any definition of first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. Jacklin argues that no matter what
definition is given the term, defendants' "circus-like flea market" certainly would not
equate to a first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 8. Jacklin goes on to argue defendants made no effort to "work
,

together" with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance.
Defendants respond that it made efforts at site improvement, offering to spend in
excess of $50,000, but Jacklin categorically rejected its efforts. Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21.
As argued by the parties, Idaho recognizes covenants restricting the free use of
land as valid and enforceable,
[h]owever, since restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common
law right to use land for all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by
implication any restriction not clearly expressed. Further, all doubts are to
be resolved in favor of the free use of land.
Berezowski v. Schuman, 141 Idaho 532,535, 112 P.3d 820, 823 (2005). Courts apply
the general rules of contract construction to covenants. Pinehaven Planning Bd. v.
Brooks, 138 Idaho 826,829,70 P.3d 664,667 (2003). A covenant is ambiguous if
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation; if a covenant is unambiguous, the
court must apply its plain meaning as a matter of law. Id. If a covenant is ambiguous,
its interpretation is a matter of fact. Intermountain Eye and Laser Centers, PLLC v.
Miller, 142 Idaho 218,221,127 P.3d 121,125 (2005). Ambiguity is not established

simply because parties present differing interpretations to the court. Rim View Trout
Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,823,828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992). Thus, this Court must
view the agreement as a whole to determine the intent of the parties at the time of
contracting. See Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813,817, 172 P.3d 1088,
1092 (2007).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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The Agreement at issue, despite defendants' argument to the contrary, clearly
binds them to construct and maintain a first-class shopping center, to work with Jacklin
to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and
to conform to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Defendants argue the Agreement is not a "use"
restriction and does not state how the lots are to be used. Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. This Court disagrees, and
finds the Agreement does concern how the property is to be used.
What is crystal clear to this Court, and beyond doubt, is that the Agreement
requires defendants to work with Jacklin to ensure the first-class shopping center to be
compatible with other uses within the Riverbend Commerce Park. Affidavit of Pat
Leffel, Exhibit B; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.
25. Defendants next argue its obligation to construct and maintain a first-class
shopping center was complied with because QCA constructed the Factory Outlets and
no further development was required. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, p. 17. But this argument does not take into account
that only lots 5-17 encompass the Factory Outlets, and Blue Dog, on lots 1-4, has not
complied with the requirements of the Agreement. See Reply memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 26. Defendants argue its operation is a first-class
shopping center as it is a retailer selling high-end RV units. Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. But defendants made no
attempt to work with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance
for the shopping center compatible with other uses, and even if Blue Dog's RV sales
could be a fist-class shopping center, to date there has been no working together to
achieve a "mutually acceptable" design and appearance. Reply Memorandum in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 26. Defendants argue Blue Dog's use is
temporary and the agreement does not prohibit temporary use prior to construction of a
first-class shopping center. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 18. Jacklin responds that a five-year lease is not temporary
and the only reference to temporariness in the Agreement (Article 3 on parking
incorporated by reference thereto) precludes temporary parking on unimproved lots
unless prior to or during construction and not to exceed six months. Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27. Defendants' final
argument on this issue is that a first-class shopping center must only be constructed
after development of the lots, and Blue Dog has never developed the property.
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 19.
Jacklin responds the Agreement is a use agreement and defendants never worked
together with Jacklin to achieve a mutually acceptable aesthetically-pleasing design and
appearance for the shopping center compatible with other uses in the Riverbed
Commerce Park. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.
28.
Ultimately, any interpretation of the use of "first-class shopping center" is left to
the Court as the trier of fact. This will be a Court trial, not a jury trial. It appears from a
plain reading of the Agreement and the Articles of the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions incorporated therein, that Jacklin sought the purchaser
(and thus the successors now before the Court) to build a shopping center which all
parties found aesthetically pleasing and which was compatible with the uses already in
place at the Riverbend Commerce Park. The approval of QCA's Factory Outlets
provides the Court with an idea of what Jacklin found acceptable. This Court agrees
with Jacklin's argument: "the First phase of the Factory Outlet Malls, as constructed
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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and as depicted on Ex. H, constitutes irrefutable objective evidence of the parties'
understanding as to the use of the phrase 'first-class shopping center." Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10. Although the parties
dispute what "first-class" is and whether Blue Dog's RV sales is first-class, a large
difference exists between the QCA's Factory Outlets approved by Jacklin in the past,
and Blue Dog's business, and the reason for that difference was QCA's adherence to
the Agreement. Jacklin states QCA worked with it to achieve a mutually acceptable
design and appearance and operated consistent with the Agreement. Plaintiffs
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, p.

11 20).

8,11 23 (citing Affidavit of Tom

Stoeser, p.

8,

Jacklin claims defendants made no effort at any time to take corrective action.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11. Certainly there is no
evidence in the record of the defendants' working together with Jacklin to achieve a
mutually acceptable design. Defendants point to their offer to spend $50,000 to make
site improvements, but this offer relates specifically to its obligations under the Articles.
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgemnt, pp. 21-22. Jacklin
states it refused Blue Dog's offer to spend $50,000 as the offer would only provide
gravel while the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions required paving.
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33.
Defendants argue: "It is further undisputed that Jacklin categorically failed to
work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site concerns that Jacklin had or to work
on an acceptable plan. Russell Aff.

11 20; Cordes Aff. 11 19; Hines Aff.,

Exh. A, pp. 63-

65; Exh. B. pp. 65, 67, 126." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 11, see also p. 24-26. Cordes' Affidavit reads:
19. Moreover, at no time did Jacklin ever attempt to work with KLP
to address any concerns that Jacklin had with respect to Blue Dog's
operation. The only option Jacklin ever gave KLP was to have Blue Dog
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 15

immediately vacate the property or be sued. Exhibit C. Jacklin never
made any attempt to work with Blue Dog or KLP on a site plan or to
address any site concerns with Blue Dog's operation. KLP even offered
to spend upwards of $50,000 to make site improvements, which Jacklin
summarily rejected. In fact, Jacklin responded that any site plan
submitted by Blue Dog and/or KLP would have been rejected, and no site
improvements would be satisfactory to placate their opposition.
Cordes' Affidavit, p. 8,

1f 19.

As pointed out by Jacklin, there is no citation to any part of

the record to support Cordes' claim. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. The only citation is to Exhibit C, a string of
emails in which at one time Pat Leffel of Jacklin wrote on July 15, 2008: "Not sure if
you gave Blue Dog RVa date when they would need to move but we would like Blue
Dog RVoffthe site within the next 10 days." In context, that string of emails shows it
was the use to which Blue Dog and KLP made of the property to which Jacklin
objected. That use, to which Blue Dog had already made of the property, for which no
prior approval had ever been sought by Blue Dog and KLP, was non-compliant, and as
such, Jacklin was pointing out it would not be approved. See Plaintiffs Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. A few weeks after
this email string, on August 5, 2008, Jacklin advised Blue Dog and KLP:
Any use proposed under Section 6 must be submitted for prior approval
by the project owner or its representative. No such approval was sought
nor would it be given given the inconsistent nature of the Blue Dog RV
Center.
Id., Complaint, Exhibit D. The point is, given the terms of the Agreement, approval

needed to be sought by Blue Dog and KLP in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog
simply started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from anyone.
Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement. Thus, defendants' argument that
" ... Jacklin categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any site
concerns that Jacklin had or to work on an acceptable plan", ignores the fact that Blue
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Dog's business, which was already existing, at that time failed to conform with the
Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 11. Blue Dog put itself in violation by starting its business without
checking (or if it checked, then disregarding) the terms of the Agreement. When Blue
Dog is already in violation of the Agreement, through only its own fault, why would
Jacklin have a duty to "work with" Blue Dog on an acceptable plan? Keep in mind the
Agreement at subsection ii, reads: "[QCAlKLP's predecessor agrees] to work together
with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses
within Riverbend Commerce Park." There was no "mutually acceptable design" to be
worked toward because Blue Dog had already implemented its business. This Court
finds Jacklin's following argument persuasive:
Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to
undertake sUbstantial site improvements on the four undeveloped lots,
including landscaping and surface work." See Russell Affidavit at 11 23.
He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do "to satisfy
Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." !!1. Offering to pay
$50,000 to put gravel on four vacant lots without addressing the paving
requirement, as clearly specified in the November 1999 Covenants,
together with the signage, lighting, setback, and landscaping requirements
(ignoring for the moment the "first class shopping center" and "mutuallyacceptable design" criteria) is hardly a proposal meriting serious
consideration. Why should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one
was never submitted) which is incapable off complying with the
unambiguous provisions of the Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is
bound by?
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 19-20.
While there may be an ambiguity in what constitutes a "first-class" shopping
center, this Court finds there is no ambiguity that Big Dog's RV sales lot is not a
"shopping center." Accordingly, this Court finds part "i" of the Agreement has been
violated.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 17

Even more clearly, this Court finds no dispute of fact that there was absolutely no
effort by Blue Dog or KLP, prior to Blue Dog's RV park materializing, to "work together
with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the
shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses
within Riverbend Commerce Park." Thus, part "ii" of the Agreement has been violated
by Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog and KLP's argument that Jacklin has
not "worked together" with them to be unavailing, for the reasons set forth above.
Finally, this Court finds no dispute that part "iii" of the Agreement has been
violated in that "Articles ... 3, (and) 4, contained in those Declarations of Covenants",
have been violated. Article 3 pertains to parking, and requires any owner utilizing any
lot for an appropriate purpose must submit a parking plan that meets with the approval
of the Riverbend Property Owners' Corporation. Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit C, p. 3.
This includes landscaping (to encourage a park-like entrance (ld., p. 4, § 3.2), and
parking areas must be paved with asphalt or concrete. Id., § 3.4.

There are

requirements for lighting, access and striping. Id., § 3.5-3.8. There is no dispute that
there has been no request for approval of any parking plan with respect to Blue
Dog/KLP's property. Stoesser Affidavit, p. 10, ~22. Compliance with this provision is
crucial, as parking is essentially all of Blue Dog's business ... parking RVs as inventory
waiting for them to be sold. Article 4 pertains to signage, and requires:
All signs shall be properly maintained and kept in a neat and proper state
of repair. To assure sign quality and design format, all signs shall be
submitted and approved by the Owner's corporation.
Stoesser Affidavit, Exhibit C, p. 5. There is no dispute that Blue Dog has not complied
with or made any request for approval under Article 4. The remaining Articles (2, 5, 6
and 7) may have been violated, but at this juncture, this Court finds such Articles to be
ambiguous and/or disputed as to Blue Dog's violation.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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As pointed out by Jacklin, if this Court determines that any of these terms of the
Agreement are unambiguous, enforceable and have been violated, summary judgment,
at least as to the violation should be granted. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. This Court finds the Agreement is
applicable and binding on Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog/KLP have
violated part i, ii, and iii (via Articles 3 and 4 of the Declarations of Covenants), and
summary judgment is granted in favor of Jacklin on these issues.

4. Jacklin Has Not Breached the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing.
As mentioned above, defendants argue Jacklin breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by refusing to work with defendants to develop a site plan
and thereby has breached the Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 24. Defendants argue the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is violated when either party nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the
contract. Id., p. 25. Jacklin responds that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot override express provisions in a bargained-for contract. Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 38. Although defendants point to the
testimony of Jacklin's Property Manager, Leffel, stating that Jacklin categorically
refused to work with defendants to address concerns about "Blue Dog's shopping
center operation," see Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 26, this testimony presupposes that Jacklin had mutually agreed to the
design and appearance of the RV shopping center location.
There is no evidence that Jacklin has breached either a term of the Agreement
or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and
fair dealing cannot override express provisions in a contract. Bushi v. Sage Health
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Care, PLLC, 2009 Opinion No. 30, 09.6 ISCR 244 (March 4,2009). See also Idaho
First Nat!. Bank v. David Steed & Associates, 121 Idaho 356,360,825 P.2d 79,83

(1992). Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.
38. This Court agrees with Jacklin's question: "How can Jacklin be claimed to have
acted in bad faith if it simply stands on its rights under consensually-negotiated
agreements which the Defendants apparently didn't read until after they had put their
property to an improper use?" Id.
Defendants make essentially three arguments on this breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. First, defendants argue: " ... the CC&R's were null and
void at the time they were incorporated by reference into the Development
Agreement..." Defendants' Reply Memorandum, p. 9. The Court has already rejected
this argument and has found the CC&R's apply to the Agreement (not a "Development
Agreement" as consistently, but errantly, argued by defendants). Second, defendants
argue Jacklin referred Blue Dog to KLP (and why would Jacklin do such a thing jf
Jacklin knew Blue Dog could never satisfy the Agreement). Id. This Court finds
Jacklin's argument persuasive:
Apparently, Defendants claim that since Dave Russell (on behalf of Blue
Dog) asked Leffel (Jacklin's property manager) who owned Lots 1 through
4 of Block 1, and since Leffel gave Russell KLP's contact information, that
somehow Jacklin has "waived" any rights under the QCAlJacklin
Agreement or the Covenants incorporated therein. The facts suggest
otherwise.
There is no disputed issue of material fact that Leffel, who was first
employed by Jacklin in 1993, some two years after the execution and
recordation of the QCAlJacklin Agreement, had no knowledge of the
same. Hence, Defendants have failed to show an "intentional
relinquishment of a known right," since Leffel, the only person who dealt
with Blue Dog (and who had no contacts with KLP), didn't even know the
Agreement existed.
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 39.
Third, defendants argue: "It remains undisputed that Jacklin did not attempt to work
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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with Blue Dog, but rather simply sought eviction ... " Defendants' Reply Memorandum,
p. 10. This argument has already been resolved by the Court against defendants.
Jacklin is entitled to summary judgment on defendants' allegations of Jacklin's breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

B. Blue Dog and KLP's Defense of Waiver and Estoppel.
Defendants argue Jacklin waived its right to now enforce the Agreement
because prior to leasing from KLP, Blue Dog negotiated with Jacklin and Jacklin
repeatedly assured Blue Dog an RV sales operation would be compatible. Defendants
argue that Jacklin only changed its position once KLP entered into a lease with Blue
Dog (the "sour grapes" argument). Indeed, the first words in defendants' briefing is:
"This is a case about sour grapes." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' CrossMotion for Summary Judgment. Defendants also argue Jacklin should be estopped
from changing its position. Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 27.
Jacklin argues its property manager had no knowledge of the QCAlJacklin
Agreement and never had contact with KLP, although KLP had record notice of the
Agreement. (See the discussion by this Court regarding good faith and fair dealing
immediately above). Thus, there was no "intentional relinquishment of a known right."
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 38-39.
Importantly, the record does not reveal Jacklin ever assured defendants that Blue Dog's
RV sales operation would be a compatible use regardless of compliance with the
Agreement. Absent such a specific showing (that defendants could ignore written and
recorded restrictive covenants to the contrary), Jacklin should not now be estopped for
having allegedly waived its right to rely on the written, recorded restrictive covenants.
But the most important reason waiver and estoppel do not apply in this case is
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS·MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the parcels defendants discuss are not at all the same. KLP's Richard Cordes in his
affidavit swears that Lots 1-4 of the KLP property which are leased to Blue Dog "are
nearly identical in location and condition" to lots 1-4 of the Jacklin property, which were
the subject of the lease negotiations between Jacklin and Blue Dog. Affidavit of
Richard A. Cordes, p. 3,

~

6. That sworn statement is simply not true. As noted by

Jacklin, the KLP property is not subject to the RCP Covenants, but is subject to Articles
2-6 of the Covenants in effect in November 1990 (Instrument No. 1155779), via
incorporation under a consensually agreed to contract. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. "The KLP property is subject to the
property-unique limitations arising under the QCAlJacklin Agreement ("first class
shopping center" and "mutually acceptable design and appearance")." Id. Finally, "the
Jacklin property, which actually remains in the Riverbend Commerce Park, is subject to
a wholly separate set of restrictions, in the form of the current covenants and any
subject amendments thereto." Id., pp. 7-8, citing Hines Affidavit, Exhibit D. (emphasis
in original). Estoppel and waiver cannot apply when the subject matter of the
comparison is so vastly different.
C. Declaratory Relief.
This Court has found Blue Dog has breached the Agreement and the Articles.
The question remaining is whether in light of that breach, at the summary judgment
level, can this Court grant Jacklin the relief sought: eviction of Blue Dog and
permanently enjoining its business on the property?
One of the prerequisites to a declaratory judgment is an actual and justiciable
controversy. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). A
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties
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who have adverse legal interest. Welson v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho
31,36,855 P.2d 868,873 (1993) (quoting Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516,
681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). In Harris, the Idaho Supreme Court stated a right sought to
be protected by declaratory relief "may invoke either remedial or preventive relief; it may
relate to a right that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a status
undisturbed but threatened and endangered; but in either event, it must involve actual
and existing facts." 106 Idaho 513,516-17,681 P.2d 988, 991-92. "We have also
stated that a declaratory judgment must clarify and settle the legal relations in issue,
and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy which gave rise to the action."
Harris, 106 Idaho 513, 517, 681 P.2d 988, 992. Again, all doubts about restrictive
covenants are resolved in favor of free use of land. Pinehaven Planning Board, 138
Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667. In order for Jacklin to have Blue Dog evicted, the
Agreement must have clearly stated such limitation, and the Court will not read into the
Agreement and find such relief by implication. See Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of
Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584,590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007). "Courts do not possess the
roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." Smith v.
Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (1988).
Thus, declaratory judgment in this matter would relate to the fact that defendants
breached the Agreement and the applicability and validity of the Agreement and Articles
it incorporates.
The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the
authority to evict Blue Dog. However, the declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would
provide Jacklin the authority to have this Court order Blue Dog cease its business as it
presently exists, since it is in violation of the Agreement and the Articles. However,
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Blue Dog would still be entitled to its leasehold interest with KLP and could make use of
that property if such use conformed with the Agreement and the Articles.

D. Injunctive Relief.
Jacklin seeks an Order of the Court permanently enjoining the use of the
property as an RV dealership/facility and ordering removal of items associated with that
business by a date certain. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 15. Defendants reply this claim fails for Jacklin's inability to prove irreparable injury;
Jacklin did not plead any irreparable injury in its Complaint and Jacklin's Rule 30(b)(6)
deponent could not testify to any harm or injury caused by Blue Dog's RVoperation.
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. Jacklin
replies it seeks a permanent injunction and states "injunctive relief of a permanent
nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain."
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary JUdgment, p. 35. However, no
authority is cited for this proposition. Jacklin cites to Stoeser's testimony (which it seeks
to supplement pursuant to I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4» in which Stoeser opines Blue Dog's
continued operation would cause damage to Jacklin because tenants that come to
Riverbend Commerce Park pay a premium for their facilities over less-restrictive, lowerpriced commerce parks. Id., pp. 36-37, quoting Affidavit of Magnuson Pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) and I.R.C.P. 56(c), Exhibit B, pp. 115-118.
A District Court's decision to grant a permanent injunction is both a question of
law and fact. D & M County Estates Homeowner's Ass'n v. RomrieJl, 138 Idaho 160,
163-164, 59 P.3d 965, 968-69 (2002). On questions of fact, the Court's decision will
not be set aside unless findings of fact are clearly erroneous; questions of law are freely
reviewed. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997). The
Agreement at issue here unambiguously requires three things of defendants:
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construction and maintenance of a first-class shopping center, working with Jacklin to
achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and
conforming to Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Although "first-class" is arguably ambiguous,
"shopping center" is not. Most importantly, defendants have not worked with Jacklin
and have not conformed to the requirements of the Articles or the Agreement.
Injunctive relief is granted as a matter of discretion of the trial court and an appellate
court will not interfere absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Harris, 106 Idaho 513,
517,681 P.2d 988, 992. The party seeking an injunction bears the burden of proving a
right thereto. Id. Here, Jacklin bears the burden of proving I.R.C.P. 65(e) grounds for
preliminary injunction, Jacklin must show: (1) it is entitled to the relief demanded, which
consists of restraining continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period
or perpetually; (2) the complained-of act would produce waste or great or irreparable
injury to plaintiff; (3) the defendant is doing something in violation of plaintiffs rights,
respecting the subject of the action and tending to render judgment ineffectual; (4) the
defendant threatens to or is about to remove or dispose of its property with the intent to
defraud. I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1 )-(4) (subsections (5) and (6) are not applicable to this matter).
Jacklin has shown an entitlement to enjoin Blue Dog from continuing its business in
violation of the Agreement. Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary
judgment) with evidence of waste or great injury. Stoeser only testifies that tenants who
operate in Riverbend Commmerce Park pay premiums to not operate in lower-end
parks. Stoeser's testimony on this point was noted by Jacklin in its last brief:
Q. Can you describe for me in general terms the nature of the
tenant base that you have out there at the Riverbend Commerce Park as
it has been developed?
A. Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premier commerce park
in North Idaho with success. We've landed nationally-acclaimed tenants
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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in there .... We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives from
California .... Generally, people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park
want to acquire land there with the hope of appreciation because of the
quality of the Park.
Q. Based on that knowledge and experience, do you have an
opinion one way or another as to whether or not the continued
maintenance of the Blue Dog RV Center in its current form for the
remaining term of the lease that we understand exists would cause any
damage to Jacklin Land Company?
A. I personally feel it would.
Q. Why do you believe that?
A. Because as I stated before, most people come to Riverbend
Commerce Park because it is the premier commerce park in the area.
Many tenants have the option to locate in commerce parks that are less
restrictive, have lower priced land, and allow a lower level of building
design. So those that come to Riverbend are basically paying a premium
for their facilities over many lower end parks.
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 36-37,
citing Magnuson Affidavit pursuant to IRCP 32(a)(4) and IRCP 56(c) at Exhibit B, pp.
115-18. There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony or even
argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary award. The
testimony of damage, while logical and understandable, seems speculative at the
present time in that Jacklin has not pointed to a tenant that has left, is thinking about
leaving, or a prospective tenant that has decided not to rent land as a result of the
presence of Blue Dog.
Another impediment is that this Court finds it is quite possible that declaratory
judgment in favor of Jacklin would entitle it to essentially all the relief it seeks. A
temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its effect is to give plaintiff
principal relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Rowland v. Kellogg Power &
Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869, 872 (1925); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big Creek
Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720, 722(1936); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144
P.2d 194, 195 (1943).
Jacklin has demonstrated that defendants are acting in violation of its rights
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under the Agreement. Jacklin has not alleged defendants are removing or disposing of
their own property with the intent to defraud Jacklin. Jacklin has not provided this Court
with evidence at this time entitling it to enjoin Blue Dog's continued business on the
subject property pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e). Those issues will be left for trial.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED
in favor of plaintiffs on the following issues: 1) The QCAlJackiin Agreement is
enforceable against defendants; 2) the Agreement is a "Use" agreement and not a
"development" agreement; 3) Articles 2,3,4,5, and 6 of the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions apply to defendants; 4) defendants have violated the
Agreement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED
as to its entitlement to declaratory relief sought (eviction) and injunctive relief sought, at
this time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendant's motion for summary judgment is
DENIED in all aspects, and specifically, this Court finds plaintiff has not breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and defendants are not entitled to the defense
of waiver or estoppel
th

Entered this 15 day of June, 2009.

1'3

I certify that on the
day of June, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following:

Lawyer
John Magnuson

Fax #

1f"'1-0.fj0t>

I

Lawyer
Michael Hines

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(7

Fax #

)J 5111-1L/-7-:J.-?O-3

671

Page 27

ST,I\iE OF lDAH0
!"
COU~i i Y OF KOOTENAlf S~

FILEO:
JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
ISB #04270
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership,

CASE NO. CV-08-6752

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs.

BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho
corporation; THE PATTERSON
F AMIL Y 2000 TRUST CREATED
UITIA DATED FEBRUARY 25, 2000;
GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE;
THE BRANAGH F AMIL Y 2000 TRUST
CREATED UITIA DATED JANUARY
13,2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH,
TRUSTEE; KL PROPERTIES, INC., a
California corporation; RICHARD A.
CORDES and SUZANNE M. CORDES,
husband and wife; DAVID BARNES and
MICHELLE BARNES, husband and wife;
GARY L. PATTERSON and
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERLY
L. DION, husband and wife; and
ANDREW J. BRANAGH and ANNE C.
BRANAGH, husband and wife,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION -- PAGE I

672

COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to IRCP
11(A)(2)(b), for reconsideration of the following portion of the Court's June 15, 2009
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, [that] Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED as to its entitlement to declaratory relief sought
(eviction) and injunctive relief sought, at this time.
See Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 27. Jacklin has alternatively moved the Court again for
summary judgment on the issue of the relief to be afforded, by way of declaratory judgment or
permanent injunction, as to the Defendants' impermissible uses of the subject property as previously
determined by the Court on summary judgment.
As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows:
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and
decreeing that the uses to which Defendants and each of them have
placed the subject property [are] in violation of the terms of the
recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff Jacklin is
further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage,
as alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post judgment.
See Complaint at ~ 39.
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought:
entry ofa permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that
Defendants and each of them cease and desist from utilizing any and
all portions of the subject property for purposes of a commercial RV
sales and/or rental facility or business, and directing that Defendants
and each of them take any and all steps necessary to comply with the
terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited
to the removal of any items of personal property that could or are
utilized in the operation of such a business.
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See Complaint at ~ 36.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the
submissions previously filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the March 3, 2009 hearings on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

/3

hday ofJuly, 2009.
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husband and wife; DAVID BARNES and
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to IRCP 56, for
summary judgment as follows.
On June 15, 2009, the Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order on CrossMotions for Summary Judgment." Through the subject Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Jacklin, and against Defendants, on the following issues:
(1)

The Quality Centers Associates/Jacklin Land Company Agreement (Kootenai County

Instrument No. 1200512) is enforceable against the Defendants named herein, and the real property
owned by KLP Properties, Inc. ("KLP") and leased by Defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc.
(2)

The QCAlJacklin Agreement is a "use" Agreement and not a "development"

Agreement.
(3)

Articles II, III, IV, V, and VI of the Declarations of Covenants, Conditions, and

restrictions recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155659 (and re-recorded as Kootenai
County Instrument No. 1155779), apply to the Defendants and their use of the subject property as
that property is defined in Paragraph 3 of Jacklin's Complaint.
(4)

Defendants have violated the QCAlJacklin Agreement and Articles III and IV of the

referenced Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15,2009) at p. 27.
Jacklin's Complaint (filed August 22, 2008) included the following claims for relief:
Declaratory Relief (Claim 4), and Permanent Injunction (Claim 3).
As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows:
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and
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decreeing that the uses to which Defendants and each of them have
placed the subject property [are] in violation of the terms of the
recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff Jacklin is
further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage,
as alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post judgment.
See Complaint at ~ 39.
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought:
entry ofa permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that
Defendants and each of them cease and desist from utilizing any and
all portions of the subj ect property for purposes of a commercial RV
sales and/or rental facility or business, and directing that Defendants
and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply with the
terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited
to the removal of any items of personal property that could or are
utilized in the operation of such a business.
See Complaint at ~ 36.
The Court has determined, as a matter oflaw, that the Defendants' usage of the subject
property is in violation of the recorded limitations thereon. Jacklin seeks, through this motion,
summary judgment consistent with the claims for declaratory relief and permanent injunction as set
forth above. In particular, Jacklin seeks entry of declaratory relief and a permanent injunction
declaring and decreeing that the uses to which Defendants have put the property, as already
determined to be in violation of the recorded limitations impressed thereon, cease and desist by a
date certain.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the
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Affidavit submissions previously filed by Plaintiffin conjunction with the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment heard March 3, 2009.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DA TED this/

3

'T2--

day of July, 2009.
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US Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
X
Hand Delivered
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company (hereafter "Jacklin"), by and through its
attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of its
(1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Motion for Reconsideration (both filed herewith).
This Memorandum is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, including the
submissions previously filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the March 3, 2009 hearings on the
parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Jacklin's Complaint (filed August 22, 2008) included the following claims for relief:
Declaratory Relief (Claim 4) and Permanent Injunction (Claim 3). As to the claim for declaratory
relief, Jacklin requested as follows:
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and decreeing that
the uses to which Defendants and each of them have placed the subj ect property [are]
in violation ofthe terms of the recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff
Jacklin is further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, as
alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post-judgment.
See Complaint at ~39.
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought:
entry of a permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that Defendants
and each of the cease and desist from utilizing any and all portions of the subject
property for purposes of a commercial RV sales and/orrental facility or business, and
directing that Defendants and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply
with the terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited to the
removal of any items of personal property that could or are utilized in the operation
of such a business.
See Complaint at ~36.
The parties thereafter filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Those motions came on
for hearing before the Court on March 3, 2009.

On June 15, 2009, the Court entered its
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"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment."

The Court

determined, as a matter oflaw, that the Defendants' usage of the subject property is in violation of
the recorded limitations thereon.
Through its Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Jacklin seeks entry of judgment
consistent with the claims for declaratory relief and permanent injunction as described above. In
particular, Jacklin seeks entry of declaratory relief and/or a permanent injunction declaring and
decreeing that the uses to which Defendants have put the property, as already determined by the
Court to be in violation of the recorded limitations impressed thereon, cease and desist by a date
certain.
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS.

The undisputed material facts pertinent to Jacklin's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motion for Reconsideration are as previously determined by the Court in its June 15, 2009
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." Those undisputed
material facts are summarized as follows:
(1)

Quality Centers Associates and Jacklin Land Company entered into an
Agreement (referred to herein as "the QCAlJacklin Agreement") which was
recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 on November 7, 1990.

(2)

The property encumbered by the QCAlJacklin Agreement includes Lots 1-4
of Block 1 of Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park, City of Post Falls,
County of Kootenai, Idaho. This specifically-described property is referred
to herein as "the subject property."

(3)

The subject property is owned by the KLP Defendants as successors-ininterest to QCA. On July 1,2008, KLP entered into a written lease of the
subject property with Defendant Blue Dog RV, Inc.

(4)

The QCAlJacklin Agreement is a "use" agreement and not a "development"
agreement. See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15, 2009)
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at pp. 7-8.
(5)

The QCNJacklin Agreement incorporates Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs in
effect at the time QCA closed on the purchase of the subject property. Id. at
pp.8-9. Those CC&Rs were recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No.
1155659 (and re-recorded as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1155779). Id.
at p. 11.

(6)

The QCNJackiin Agreement clearly binds Defendants to construct and
maintain a first-class shopping center, to work with Jacklin to achieve a
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center, and to
conform to Articles 2-6 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions last amended in 1989. Id. at p. 13.

(7)

Under the QCAlJacklin Agreement, "approval needed to be sought by Blue
Dog and KLP [from Jacklin] in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog simply
started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from
anyone. Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement." Id. at p. 16.

(8)

There is no ambiguity that Blue Dog's RV sales lot is not a "shopping
center." Id. at p. 17. Accordingly, subsection (i) of the QCAlJacklin
Agreement has been violated by Defendants. Id.

(9)

There was absolutely no effort by Blue Dog or KLP, prior to Blue Dog's RV
Park materializing, to "work together with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a
mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it
shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within
Riverbend Park." Id. at p. 18.

(10)

Accordingly, subsection (ii) ofthe QCAlJacklin Agreement has been violated
by Blue Dog and KLP. Id.

(11)

Subsection (iii) of QCAlJacklin Agreement incorporates Articles 2-6 of the
CC&Rs in effect at the time ofQCA's closing on the property (which binds
QCA's successors, including the Defendants). ld. at p. 11.

(12)

There is no dispute that Blue Dog has not complied with or made any request
for approval under Article 4 of said CC&Rs. Id. at p. 18.

(13)

There is no dispute that there has been no request for approval of any parking
plan with respect to the subject property as is required by Article 3 of said
CC&Rs. Id. "Compliance with this provision is crucial, as parking is
essentially all ofBlue Dog's business ... parking RV s as inventory waiting for
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them to be sold." Id.
(14)

As summarized by the Court:
This Court finds the [QCAlJacklin] Agreement is applicable and binding on
Blue Dog and KLP. This Court finds Blue Dog/KLP have violated part i, ii,
and iii (via Articles 3 and 4 ofthe Declarations of Covenants), and summary
judgment is granted in favor of Jacklin on these issues. Id. at p. 19.
III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Court is well-acquainted with the applicable standards to apply in resolving motions for
summary judgment. Those standards were fully set forth and summarized at pages 3-4 ofthe Court's
June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order" and will not be repeated here. The Court's
summarization is incorporated herein as though set forth in full.
IV. ARGUMENT.

A. Ar2ument re: Jacklin's Claim for a Permanent Injunction.
1. The Nature of Jacklin's Claim.

Jacklin has alternatively sought similar relief, in the nature of permanent injunctive relief,
through both its claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.e. §10-1201, et seq.) and
byway of permanent injunction. As to the claim for declaratory relief, Jacklin requested as follows:
Plaintiff Jacklin is entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging and decreeing that
the uses to which Defendants and each ofthem have placed the subject property [are]
in violation of the terms of the recorded instruments that bind said property. Plaintiff
Jacklin is further entitled to entry of declaratory relief adjudging that said usage, as
alleged herein, cease and desist both pendente lite and post-judgment.
See Complaint at ~39.
As to Jacklin's claim for a permanent injunction, Jacklin sought:
entry of a permanent injunction ordering, directing, and decreeing that Defendants
and each of the cease and desist from utilizing any and all portions of the subject
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property for purposes of a commercial RV sales and/or rental facility or business, and
directing that Defendants and each ofthem take any and all steps necessary to comply
with the terms of said preliminary [sic] injunction, including but not limited to the
removal of any items of personal property that could or are utilized in the operation
of such a business.
See Complaint at 1[36.
Blue Dog has leased the subject property from the KLP parties. The Court has correctly
, noted that the validity ofthe lease itself is not an issue. It is the use to which Blue Dog has placed
the property that is an issue. The Court has also correctly noted that Jacklin cannot per se seek the
eviction of Blue Dog. However, Jacklin can seek entry of declaratory and/or injunctive relief that
would allow the lease to remain in effect but require Blue Dog to cease its business as it presently
exists (given the Court's findings that Blue Dog's use is in violation ofthe QCAlJacklinAgreement
for the reasons previously set forth).
The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the authority
to evict Blue Dog. However, the declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would provide
Jacklin the authority to have this Court order Blue Dog cease its business as it
presently exists, since it is in violation ofthe Agreement and the Articles. However,
Blue Dog would still be entitled to its leasehold interest with KLP and could make
use ofthat property if such use conformed with the Agreement and the Articles.
See Memorandum Decision and Order (entered June 15,2009) at pp. 23-24. As set forth above,
Jacklin's claim for declaratory relief and permanent injunction seek entry of relief directing that the
Defendant cease the uses to which they have currently placed the subject property as those uses are
unquestionably in violation of the QCAlJacklin Agreement. This type of relief is available both in
terms of a permanent injunction and declaratory relief.
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2. The Concept of "Irreparable Iniury" or "Irreparable Dama~e"
is Not Applicable to a Claim for Permanent Injunctive Relief
That Seeks to Ensnre Compliance With Recorded Use
Limitations as to Real Property.
Through its original Motion for Summary Judgment, and through this Second Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration, Jacklin seeks entry of a permanent injunction
granting the relief described above. In denying Jacklin's prior motion for summary judgment, the
Court made the following observations.
First, the Court observed that "Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary
Judgment) with evidence of waste or great injury." Id. at p. 25. The Court further noted:
There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony or even argument
as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary award. The
testimony of damage, while logical and understandable, seems speculative at the
present time ....
Id. at p. 26.
Second, the Court held that Jacklin was not entitled to summary judgment as to a permanent
injunction, notwithstanding the Court's finding that the Defendants were using the subject property
in violation ofthe recorded limitations thereon, due to Jacklin's failure to comply with IRCP 65(e):
Jacklin has not provided this Court with evidence at this time entitling it to enjoin
Blue Dog's continued business on the subject property pursuant to IRCP 65(e).
Id. at p. 27.
IRCP 65(e) provides in pertinent part:
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases:
(1)

When it appears by the Complaint that the Plaintiff is entitled to the
relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of,
either for a limited period or perpetually.
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(2)

When it appears by the Complaint or affidavit that the commission or
continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste,
or great irreparable injury to the Plaintiff.

(3)

When it appears during the litigation that the Defendant is doing, or
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act in violation of the Plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject
of the action, intending to render the judgment ineffectual.

See IRCP 65(e)(1) through (3) (emphasis added).
The stated conditions contained in Rule 65( e) applied to requests for preliminary injunctive
relief rather than permanent injunctive relief. When a claim for permanent injunctive relief is
sought, so as to enforce restrictive covenants consensually impressed upon real property, it is not
necessary to show that an award of monetary damages will not afford adequate relief. I

3. Permanent Injunctive Relief is an Available and Appropriate
Remedy to Ensure Compliance With Consensual Covenants
Impressed On Real Property Re&:ardless of the Complainin&:
Parties' Ability to Prove the Inadequacy of an Award of Monetary Dama&:es.
Injunctive reliefis equitable in nature, and is the most commonly requested remedy in actions
to enforce restrictive covenants encumbering real property.

See 20 Am. Jur.2d, Covenants,

Conditions, and Restrictions, §§274, et seq. The remedy may take the form of an injunction
restraining someone from further violation of a restrictive covenant.
A valid agreement that the use of the land conveyed shall be so restricted that no
building shall be erected thereon within a specified number of feet from a definite
line or object is susceptible of specific performance by the equitable remedy of an
injunction to restrain the forbidden encroachment or a mandatory injunction to undo

In its June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order," at p. 24, the Court
addressed this argument in part as follows: "Jacklin replies it seeks a permanent injunction and
states 'injunctive relief of a permanent nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains
the benefit of its bargain.' However, no authority is cited for this proposition." The authority for
this proposition is discussed infra.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT;
AND (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -- PAGE 8

687

what has been done in violation ofthe agreement.
Levy v. Dundalk Co, 177 Md. 636, 652-53, 11 A.2d 476, 484 (1940).
A showing that an award ofmonetary damages will not afford adequate relief is not generally
required, in the context of actions or declaratory relief or permanent injunctions to enforce restrictive
covenants. An independent showing of irreparable harm is not necessary to obtain injunctive relief
for breach of a restrictive covenant because the damage incident to any such breach is generally
incapable ofmonetary valuation and is thus irreparable per se. The following cases demonstrate this
point.
First, in Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 31 Kan. App.2d 889, 75 P.3d 278
(2003), the Court dealt with a restrictive covenant prohibiting the construction of fences absent
approval of the applicable homeowners' association and/or fences exceeding four feet in height if
on a boundary line. The Association sued homeowners who had purchased property subject to the
covenant. The District Court denied the requested injunctive relief solely due to a perceived failure
by the Association to demonstrate irreparable injury. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed.
The Court held as follows:
In the context of the substantive law of restrictive covenants, Courts have
generally recognized that damages are irrelevant to enforceability.

"As a general rule, a restrictive covenant may be enforced irrespective
of the amount of damage which would result from the breach, and
even though there is no substantial monetary damage to the
complainant by reason of the violation. The right to enjoin the breach
ofrestrictive covenants does not depend upon whether the covenantee
will be damaged by the breach; the mere breach is sufficient ground
for interference by injunction. Thus, for example, restrictive
covenants as to the nature, location, or use of buildings will be
enjoined even though no substantial damage is shown. A landowner
in a subdivision seeking to enjoin a violation of a residential-only
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covenant need not show irreparable injury where there has been a
substantial breach of the covenant." 20 Am. Jur.2d Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions, §277, pp. 695-96; see also §283.
Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 75 P.3d at 282. The Court further reasoned:
Since money damages need not be shown, nor are they an element of a claim for
relief based upon restrictive covenants, any inquiry into the adequacy of a money
damage remedy is simply unnecessary in this context. This may explain why our
cases discussing restrictive covenants reflect no analysis of irreparable harm. The
injury sustained by the violation of such covenants is inherently irreparable in nature;
i.e., one can generally never achieve a full, complete, and adequate remedy of the
breach of restrictive covenants through recovery of calculable money damages ....
Persimmon Hill First Homes Assoc. v. Lonsdale, 75 P.3d at 283.
The Persimmon Court favorably cited consistent authority from a legion of other states,
including Iowa, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wyoming. Id. The Court concluded by citing with favor the rationalization previously stated by the
Georgia Court of Appeals:
"[T]he violation of a restrictive covenant that is part of the development scheme
affects the grantor and all other grantees, causing irreparable harm to the value of
their respective property interests, because such restrictive covenant was part of the
valuable contract consideration given and relied upon in the conveyance ofthe land.
[Citation omitted.] Thus, irreparable harm automatically occurs as a matter oflaw
arising from a violation of a covenant running with the land, the relationship of the
parties as grantor/grantee, and the consideration of the conveyance ofless than a fee
simple absolute for the burden imposed upon the land in the form of a restrictive
covenant to protect the grantor and others who may wish to purchase the remaining
land in the future."
Id. (quoting Focus Entertainment v. Partridge Greene, 253 Ga. App. at 127-28, 558 SE.2d 440).
Second, in Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d 1045 (1999), the Supreme Court of
Hawaii similarly held:
"Every covenant has a burden to the covenantor and a benefit to the
covenantee." .... An individual may suffer a violation of his or her rights without
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suffering actual damages. It follows, therefore, that a breach of a covenant alone may
be grounds for injunctive relief, "even absent a showing of the amount of damage
which has in fact been caused by that breach." Sandstrom, 59 Haw. at 501,583 P.2d
at 979; see also 9 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property §60.07, at 60-120
[1997] (injunctive relief may be granted for breach of covenant "irrespective ofthe
amount of actual monetary damage" (emphasis added)); Cordogan v. Union National
Bank of Elgin, 64 Ill. App.3d 248 (1978) (observing that "'it is well settled that
equity would entertain bills for injunctions to prevent their breach although the
breach would cause no substantial injury'" (citation omitted)).
Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d at 1061 (citations omitted where indicated).
Third, in Ridgewood Homeowners Assoc. v. Mignacca, 813 A.2d 965 (2003), the Supreme
Court ofRhode Island reversed a trial court's denial ofinjunctive relief. On appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held:
The trialjustice recognized that enforcing a restrictive covenant is important
to all who are burdened and benefitted by the restriction. For precisely that reason,
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce restrictive covenants need not establish money damages
or any other hardship to receive equitable relief.... The trial justice therefore erred
by denying enforcement of the covenant on the ground that Plaintiffs did not
experience any hardship by the [Defendants] keeping a horse. Establishing that the
[Defendants] violated covenant number 8 was sufficient for a court to provide the
injunctive relief sought by the Association.
813 A.2d at 975 (citation omitted).
Fourth, in Houck v. Rivers, 450 S.E.2d 106 (1994), the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held:
Having found [Plaintiff] is entitled to declaratory relief, we now tum to
whether the master erred in refusing to grant [Plaintiff] an injunction restraining and
enjoining [Defendant] from using her property to operate a bed and breakfast
operation in the future. [Defendant] summarily argues, that because the award of
damages would provide [Plaintiff] an adequate remedy at law, he is not entitled to
the intervention of equity by way of injunctive relief....
Although an injunction, like all equitable remedies, is granted as a matter of
sound judicial discretion, and not as a matter of legal right, ... the right of a Plaintiff
to an injunction to enforce restrictive covenants has long received special treatment.
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See Sprouse v. Winston, 212 S.c. 176,46 S.E.2d 874 (1948) (While it is true that the
awarding of an injunction is addressed to the conscience of the Court, this rule is not
applicable where it clearly appears that an injunction is necessary to prevent one :from
violating the equitable rights of another where he has notice, actual or constructive,
of such rights); 43 Ac. J. S. Injunctions §100 (1978) (Restrictions which are fixed,
definite, and unambiguous should be enforced as written and should not be extended
by judicial construction) ....
450 S .E.2d at 418 (additional citations omitted).

4. Althou2h Not Generally Required in the Context of Injunctions
Related to Violations of Recorded Covenants, the
"Balan cine- of the Equities" Favors Jacklin.
In Jim Rutherford Inv., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Community Assoc., 25 S.W.3d 845 (2000),
the Texas Court of Appeals heard an appeal :from a trial court summary judgment in favor of an
association of subdivision homeowners who had alleged that the developer (who had purchased lots
in the subject subdivision) had violated certain setback requirements. The Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Court's entry of a permanent injunction. In so doing, the Court held:
The trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction was proper. First, the
[Association's] summary judgment proof demonstrates [the developer] sub stanti all y
breached the set back and prior approval of building specifications deed restrictions.
[The Developer] admitted he never received approval for the set back violations ....
Further, the record clearly demonstrates the home [the Developer] built ... has side
set back lines ... violating the ten foot setback restrictions.... The record also
demonstrates that when asked to stop construction ... because of deed restriction
violations, [the Developer] did not stop. Instead, he contacted his attorney and
sought his own injunction to enjoin [the Association] :from impeding his construction
in the future ....
Second, a balance of the equities demonstrates that those favoring [the
Association] significantly outweigh any equities favoring [the Developer].... As
discussed, [the Developer] purchased the property with knowledge ofthe restrictions.
At [a meeting with the Association], he represented he did not have to follow the
deed restrictions. Finally, when informed his property was subject to the deed
restrictions, he refused to halt construction and sought an injunction to keep [the
Association] at bay. By contrast, [the Association] consulted its legal counsel
following the meeting and repeatedly informed [the Developer] he needed to comply
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with the existing deed restrictions. Further, when it became apparent [the Developer]
would not willingly comply, [the Association] instituted legal action to force him into
compliance with the deed restrictions. Thus, the equities of enforcing the deed
restrictions favor [the Association].
25 S.W.3d at 850.
In its June 15, 2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order," the Court already held and
determined why the "balancing of the equities," if necessary to implement the relief requested by
Jacklin through a permanent injunction, favors Jacklin over the Defendants:
The point is, given the terms of the [QCAlJacklin] Agreement, approval needed to
be sought by Blue Dog and KLP in the first instance. Instead, Blue Dog simply
started its business on KLP's property without asking for approval from anyone.
Blue Dog's business runs counter to the Agreement. Thus, Defendants' argument
that " ... Jacklin categorically failed to work with Blue Dog and KLP to address any
site concerns that Jacklin had or to work on an acceptable plan", ignores the fact that
Blue Dog's business, which was already existing, at that time and failed to conform
with the Agreement.... Blue Dog put itself in violation by starting its business
without checking (or if it checked, then disregarding) the terms of the Agreement.
When Blue Dog is already in violation ofthe Agreement, through only its own fault,
why would Jacklin have a duty to "work with" Blue Dog on acceptable plans? Keep
in mind the Agreement at subsection ii, reads: "QCAlKLP's predecessor agrees to
work together with Seller [Jacklin] to achieve a mutually acceptable design and
appearance for the shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and
compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park." There was no
"mutually acceptable design" to be worked toward because Blue Dog had already
implemented its business. This Court finds Jacklin's following argument persuasive:
Russell finally concludes by stating that, "Blue Dog offered to
undertake substantial site improvements, on the four undeveloped
lots, including landscaping and surface work." See Russell Affidavit
at '23. He concludes that there wasn't anything Blue Dog could do
"to satisfy Jacklin's concerns short of vacating the premises." Id.
Offering to pay $50,000 to put gravel on four vacant lots without
addressing the paving requirement, as clearly specified in the
November 1999 Covenants, together with the signage, lighting,
setback, and landscaping requirements (ignoring for the moment the
"first class shopping center" and "mutually acceptable design"
criteria) is hardly a proposal meriting serious consideration. Why
should Jacklin consider a proposal (even though one was never
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submitted) which is incapable of complying with the unambiguous
provisions of the Covenants that KLP acknowledges it is bound by?

See "Memorandum Decision and Order" (entered June 15,2009) at pp. 16-17 (emphasis in original).

B. Areument re: Jacklin's Claim for Declaratory Relief.
Jacklin's claim for declaratory relief essentially seeks the same form of prospective relief as
Jacklin's relief for a permanent injunction. In other words, Jacklin does not seek an adjudication that
Blue Dog has no right in the KLP property. Jacklin does not seek an adjudication that Blue Dog has
no valid lease in the KLP property. Rather, Jacklin seeks a determination that the Defendants'
ongoing and current use of the subject property is in violation of the terms of the QCAlJacklin
Agreement. The Court has so held.
Consistent with the authorities cited in the context ofthe availability ofpermanent injunctive
relief in the covenant context, Jacklin seeks entry of an order that said use, as already determined to
be in violation of the Agreement, "cease and desisL .. " See Complaint at ~9.
The Court has already determined that the Defendants' current use of the subject property
was not done with the prior consent of Jacklin as required in the QCAlJ acklin Agreement.
Moreover, said use violates the parking, lighting, and landscaping requirements contained in Article
3 of the CC&Rs. Finally, Defendants' use ofthe subject property, for storing RVs, is not within the
scope of the phrase "shopping center."
Accordingly, Jacklin is entitled to entry of relief, through this Second Motion for Summary
Judgment, whether characterized as permanent injunctive relief or declaratory relief, adjudging and
decreeing that Blue Dog's current uses ofthe subj ect property cease and desist by a date certain, and
that any future use of the subject property by Blue Dog, under its leasehold rights with KLP, be
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undertaken in a manner consistent with the protections and procedures set forth in the QCAfJ acklin
Agreement and the CC&Rs (Articles 2-6) incorporated therein. Should Blue Dog make request of
Jacklin under the QCAfJacklin Agreement or the applicable CC&Rs, after complying with the terms
of this Court's order directing that said current activities cease and desist, and if Blue Dog or KLP
believe they are legally aggrieved by any determination made by Jacklin on any such proposal that
does not now exist, then they will be free to pursue their own claims for legal redress in a separate
proceeding.

v.

CONCLUSION.

Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, Plaintiff Jacklin Land Company
respectfully requests that the Court grant Jacklin's Second Motion for Summary Judgment and/or
Jacklin's Motion for Reconsideration on Jacklin's claims for permanent injunctive relief and/or
declaratory relief as to those violations already determined to exist by this Court through its June 15,
2009 "Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment." That relief
should, at a minimum, consist of declaratory and/or injunctive relief ordering and decreeing that
Defendants and each ofthem cease and desist from using the subject property for the storage and/or
parking ofRVs by a date certain, and that any future uses ofthe subject property by either or both
of the Defendants conform with the substance and procedures contained in the QCAfJacklin
Agreement and Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs incorporated therein.
DATED this

/3 ~y

of July, 2009.
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Michael Schmidt
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1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
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__ Overnight Mail
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Defendants respectfully move the Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
11(a)(2)(B) to reconsider its June 15,2009, Memorandum Decision and Order on CrossMotions for Summary Judgment with respect to the decision to reserve for trial the issue of
irreparable injury and/or damages.
Defendants request the Court to reconsider this decision and enter summary judgment in
favor of Defendants that 1) an injunction cannot issue because Jacklin has suffered no
irreparable injury; and 2) Jacklin is not entitled to damages because it failed to request them in
its Complaint or otherwise notify Defendants that it was seeking damages.
This motion is supported by the Memorandum and Affidavit in Support filed herewith.
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STATEOFWASHINGTON
County of Spokane

)
: ss
)

MICHAEL J. HINES, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, and am competent to testify in this

matter. I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and/or belief.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the

Deposition of the 30(b)(6) Representative ofJacklin Land Company taken January 23,2009.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Responses

to Defendant K.L.P. Properties, Inc. 's First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production
ofDocuments.
4.

Jacklin has not identified an expert witness pursuant to Defendants' discovery

request, and did not disclose an expert witness pursuant to the Court's case schedule order.
5.

Jacklin has not identified any individuals or witnesses with knowledge regarding

~h1./~
~

(Signature)

Pe.,V\ V\,L{ W\. L~wJa
(Print Name)
My appointment expires ---=:;.d_-->.l-LJ_-..IO""--__
.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JACKLIN LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff
NO. CV08-6752

v.
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho
corporation; et als.,
Defendants

DEPOSITION OF THOMAS P. STOESER
as 30(b) (6) Representative of
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY
Friday -- January 23, 2009
Pages 1 to 129

Joan M. Snover, CCR/RMR/CRR
SNOVER REALTIME REPORTING
522 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1560
Spokane, Washington 99210
(509) 467-0666 Fax (509) 467-3844
Website:
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MR. HINES: Joan, would you read that back.
(Reporter read back as requested.)

1
2

Q. Did you ever tell Blue Dog that their
operation was a prohibited use for operating on the
BY MR HINES:
3 Jacklin property?
Q. And I meant did Jacklin.
4
A. No because on our property it would have been
5
A. Jacklin, yeah. That's what I thought you
5 put together with the CC&R's. On that property, it's
6 meant.
6 like apples and oranges, because it had a different set
7
Q. And that's what I intended to say.
7 of CC&R's. It had to be mutually acceptable. And it
8
A. Good catch.
8 had to be a first class shopping mall.
9
Q. During the entire time period that Jacklin was
9
Q. Didn't you communicate that no matter how Blue
10 negotiating to lease its property to Blue Dog, did it
10 Dog attempted to develop the property on KLP's site,
11 ever -- which is from the April to first of July 2008
11 that it would still have been unacceptable in the eyes
12 time period, did Jacklin ever advise Blue Dog that its
12 of Jacklin?
A. Yes.
13 RV operation would be in violation of any applicable
13
14 CC&R's?
14
Q. How has Jacklin been injured or damaged as a
15
A. Say that again.
15 result of Blue Dog's RV operation on KLP's property?
16
Q. Sure. During the approximate four months that
16
A. We have already received complaints from
1 7 Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog to lease its own
17 tenants about Blue Dog's operation in Riverbend
-.
18 property to Blue Dog for its RV operation, did it ever
18 Commerce Park.
~
19 communicate to Blue Dog that its use would be
19
Q. You received a complaint. How has that
~
20 prohibited under the applicable CC&R's?
20 damaged or injured Jacklin?
it
221 b A. We WOuldnth't have made ~tbrlePfiresentatiol~
. h 2221
A: .~e ha~en'tBrelceivDed one in~uiry on land
t.:
2
ecause we were e ones responsl e or comp ymg WIt
acqUISItIOns smce ue og came m.
.
;.
23 the CC&R's as the landlords.
23
Q. Has anyone said to you that they did not -24
Q. You would not have been negotiating with Blue
24 they were not interested in a land acquisition because
~
2_5__~D~0~gt~0~I~eas~e~J~ac_kl
__
in~'s_0~w_n_~PI~~0~pcerty~~fo~r~I~'ts~R~V________-+_2_5__0~f~B~I~u~e~D~0~)g~"s~aCQ~lu=is=it=io~n=?~________________~__~f
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Page 87

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
.., 5

operation unless Jacklin believed it would be a
permissible use under the applicable CC&R's, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And with respect to Jacklin's understanding of
Blue Dog's operation that they were going to put on
Jacklin's property, did that differ in any material way
to the operation that it currently has on KLP's
property right across the street?
A. Absolutely. Across all facets it differs.
Q. How is the actual operation of that RV center
on KLP's property different from what they were
proposing to put on Jacklin's property?
A. Okay. This will take a while to answer. So I
want to make sure we've got it all. The current
operation has no setbacks. It has no landscaping. It
has no irrigation. It has no paved parking. It has no
lighting. It has no proper signage. It has no
screening, no enclosures.
It doesn't -- I don't know -- it doesn't
comply at all with anything we would have built.
That's why the cheapest we could do it was $1.2 million
and up to $3 million to improve that site to the
standard of the Cc&R's where it was laughable that
they'd throw some gravel down for $40,000 on the site
they're on and think that complied.

4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

~

A.. No.

1
2
3

Q. Are you able to quantify for me any monetary
~
damage or injury as a result of Blue Dog's RV
operation?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of any facts to indicate that
Jacklin has been irreparably harmed as a result of Blue
Dog's operation?
A. As stated before, the current tenant. There's
been inquiries as to what's going on because everybody
else has had to.comply with the CC&R's, and they're
wondering what's going on with Blue Dog.
Q. But how has that caused any irreparable harm
to Jacklin?
A. It hasn't yet.
Q. SO sitting here today you're not aware of any
'I
facts to suggest that Blue Dog's operation has caused
~
any irreparable harm, correct?
.~
A. Not as of yet.
l.
Q. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is an RV operation in general compatible with
other uses in Riverbend Commerce Park?
A. Yes, if it complies with the Cc&R's i n .
Riverbend Commerce Park. Now, by_ "Riverbend Commerce ~.
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Park" I'm excluding lots 1 through 17 and I through 14
because they have a different standard.
Q. The different standard being what?
A. That they have different CC&R's, and they
have -- as a minimum. They also have to have a first
class shopping mall, and it has to be mutually agreed
upon with us.
Q. Well, with respect to the CC&R's though, which
is again Articles 2 through 6 that we've talked about,
doesn't the 1988 CC&R's represent that uses need to be
compatible with other uses within the Riverbend
Commerce Park?
A. I think 2 through 6 says that. You tell me.
Q. And is an R V operation in general a compatible
use with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park?
A. Well, that's Articles 2 through 6. They have
the additional requirement of the first class shopping
mall.
Q. I understand. But I'm talking about - that's
your position. I'm just talking about Articles 2
through 6, which talks about uses being compatible with
other uses in Riverbend Commerce Park; and is an RV
operation, in Jacklin's opinion, a compatible use with
other uses in the RiverbendCommerce Park?
A. If it complied with the CC&R's.

1 couldn't afford to operate under our proposal with the
2 higher standards.
3
Q. Isn't it true that it was Blue Dog who cut off
4 lease negotiations with Jacklin as opposed to Jacklin
5 deciding it didn't want to lease space?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Can you identifY for me specific property
~
8 owners who have complained about Blue Dog's operation? i
9
A. They didn't complain to me. They complained
i
10 to the current property manager Bruce Cyr. And the one t~
11 that I am aware of is W oodshop Specialties.
.~
12
Q. SO sitting here today you're aware of only one
t
13 owner within the Riverbend Commerce Park who has
~
14 complained; is that correct?
15
A. That's all I'm aware of.
~
16
Q. Woodshop Specialties, where are they located
~
1 7 in the Riverbend Commerce Park?
. i'
18
A. Right here.
19
Q. And you're pointing to?
20
A. I can tell you the lot and block numbers.
21 They occupy Lot I, Block 4, Phase -- is that 3? Phase
22 3.
23
Q. Who at Jacklin made the decision, after Blue
24 Dog came back and said that they were leasing space
25 from.KLP as opposed to leasing space from Jacklin, who

1
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Q. Is an RV operation a -- does Jacklin consider
it to be a light industrial or commercial use of
property?
A. I don't know the zoning definitions. I don't
know if it's commercial or retail. I believe it's
considered retail.
Q. Well, is it compatible with light industrial
and commercial uses?
A. I don't know. I'd have to see what's
submitted as a plan.
. Q. Does Jacklin, sitting here today, have an
opinion as to whether an RV operation is compatible
with light industrial and commercial use?
A. I have an opinion today. And once I saw how
Blue Dog operated, I don't think that they could have.
met our standards and complied.
Q. During the four months that you were
negotiating with Blue Dog, did you ever communicate
that to them?
A. We never got far enough along.
Q. Isn't it true, sir, that the only reason that
you did not continue to pursue leasing space to Blue
Dog was because Blue Dog cut off the negotiations and
said they had leased space with KLP?
A. I think prior to that they indicated that they
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made the decision at Jacklin to oppose Blue Dog's
operation on KLP's property?
A. I did.
Q. When did you make that?
A. As soon as I saw that they were there.
Q. That was after Blue Dog had informed Jacklin
that it was no longer interested in leasing space from
Jacklin, correct?
A. I don't know the exact timing. It was right
around the 4th of July. I was on vacation when they
moved on the site. And then subsequent to coming back,
I think Pat was on vacation. But as soon as we could
get together and I saw it, we let them know through
Pat.
Q. From a timing standpoint, that was after you
learned that they were no longer interested in leasing
space from Jacklin, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. With respect to the property that you were
proposing to lease to Blue Dog, lots 1,2,3, and 4,
Phase I, Block 2, colored in orange on Exhibit 4, have
you been able to lease that property to any other
tenant?
A. We have not leased it to any other tenant.
O. And you haven't otherwise developed the
•
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, that we worked with. And Benderson was part of Quality
Center Associates.
Q. Do you know which part of Exhibit 10 was, in
its ultimate fonn, was written by your counsel as
opposed to which portions were suggested by Quality
Centers' counsel?
A. I couldn't tell you, no.
Q. Was one -- do you know whether one draft was
prepared?
A. No, no. There were many iterations of it
preceded by the other agreement which you can tell bad
lots of negotiations in it. No.
Q. When you answered the question, did Jacklin
draft this agreement, what did you understand the word
"draft" to mean?
A. Who actually did the typing of the changes.
This was before all the Word documents with the red
line ability and all that, you know.
Q. You're talking about Exhibit 10?
A. Yes. Exhibit 10. At this time in 1990 we
didn't have the capability of sending documents back
and forth electronically and demonstrating changes. So
I couldn't tell you who did what. And once we had a
final agreement, all the back and forth draft
documents, I just threw away back then.
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Corporation, their worldwide facility is in Riverbend
Commerce Park on the water.
We were instrumental in relocating Buck Knives
from California. On the front page of the business
section this morning was an article about the high end
facility that Alk Abello is putting in. Generally
people that come to Riverbend Commerce Park want to
acquire land there with the hope of appreciation
because of the quality of the park.
Q. Have you been involved in negotiation of the
lease arrangements with the tenants that you've just
described?
A. Yes.
Q. Based on -A. Can I make a point of clarification? Either
lease arrangements, meaning Buck Knives, we own the
building and lease it to them. Or the sale of the land
and then the compliance with the CC&R's as they build
it, which is Alk Abello will be an exam pie of that.
Q. That's a good point to note. And you've been
in that process for 20 years?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would it be fair to say that ultimately no
tenant or prospective purchaser of a given nature is
allowed in the Riverbend Commerce Park absent your
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Q. Has Jacklin ever received a request for
approval in writing from Blue Dog as to any aspect of
its current use on lots I through 4?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any basis to believe that Blue Dog
intends to undertake any improvements on lots I through
4 or that KLP intends to undertake any improvements on
lots I through 4 other than what exists there today?
A. No.
Q. You indicated to a question about -- let me
back up. Would it be a fair characterization to say
that you have been involved with this commerce park
since its inception?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you been involved in the screening,
negotiation, or acceptance of the lease proposals with
prospective tenants during the entirety of that period
of time?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you describe for me in general terms the
nature of the tenant base that you have out there at
the Riverbend Commerce Park as it's been developed?
A. Yes. We've marketed ourselves as the premiere
commerce park in North Idaho with success. We've
landed nationally acclaimed tenants in there. Tamatic
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prior approval?
A. That's correct.
Q. Based on that knowledge and experience, do you
have an opinion one way or another as to whether or not
the continued maintenance of the Blue Dog RV Center in
its current form for the remaining tenn of the lease
'~
that we understand exists would cause any damage t O l
Jacklin Land Company?
';1,
A. I personally feel it would.
Q. And by that counsel asked you some questions
about damage that you could articulate as oftoday.
I'm looking for your opinion based on your personal
know ledge as a representative of the owner of the
property, whether you expect to suffer irreparable harm
in the next four and a half years if the Blue Dog RV
Center continues in its current status.
A. I do. I think we will either lose prospective
tenants, or we'll be forced to -- I guess that's the
.best way to put it - forego land sales because people
won't want to buy in there.
Q. Why do you believe that?
A. Because as I stated before, most people come
to Riverbend Commerce Park because it's the premiere
commerce park"in th~ area. Many tenants have the
option to locate in commerce parks that are less
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restrictive, have lower priced land, and allow a lower
level of building design. So those that come to
Riverbend are basically paying a premium for their
facilities over many lower end parks.
Q. During the negotiations that Jacklin had as to
its property with Blue Dog, what were the nature of the
tenant improvements that Jacklin envisioned necessary
to accommodate Blue Dog's intended use?
A. Well, there were many iterations when they
first came to us. It was a larger piece. They
encompassed over $3 million of improvements to
construct facilities according to the CC&R's, asphalt,
landscaping, irrigation, lighting, signage, all those
aspects of it. And I don't think that once we pared it
down below a minimum that we could still meet theirs.
It was still over $1 million of improvements to meet
the Cc&R's.
Q. Were you ever made aware that that dollar
amount of improvements was something that was deemed
outside of the reach or not cost effective by Blue Dog?
A. Yes.
Q. And how was that?
23
A. They made a statement that the one that they
24 wanted specifically, I believe, was about $2.5
25 million -- I'd have to look it up. About a $25,000 a
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on Exhibit 4 have been used for parking?
A. That's my best estimate.
Q. What was the amount of money - do you know
the amount of money that Jacklin made as a result of
those parking arrangements as you've described them?
A. I didn't recall. I haven't checked it, but
Mr. Leffel thought it was like $750 per event.
MR. MAGNUSON: I don't have any further
questions. Counsel?
MR. HINES: I have some follow-up questions.
RE-EXAMINATION
BY MR HINES:
Q. During the approximate four months from April
through July that Jacklin was negotiating with Blue Dog
to lease its property to Blue Dog and have Blue Dog put
on its RV operation, was the Riverbend Commerce Park
marketed during that time period as a premiere commerce
park?
A. Yes.
Q. During the course of those negotiations, with
the intent that Blue Dog would operate an RV center.
within Riverbend Commerce Park, did you ever reach the
conclusion that the existence of an RV operation was
going to be contrary to a premiere commerce park? ..
A. No.

Page 119

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
..... ')
!."

month lease payment, and they said that was too much.
I believe they indicated to us that at the site in the
heart of Post Falls that they are working at, that they
were somewhere closer to $20,000 a month is where they
were there.
Q. Lastly, the parking that was testified to by
you and Mr. Leffel on lots 1 through 4, the orange
property, as depicted on I believe Exhibit 4?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many times
those four lots -- first of all, when they were used
for parking, were they always all four used, or was a
smaller portion used?
A. I believe it was a smaller portion. I believe
it was more like lots 1 and 2. I'd have to say. There
was no, here's the lot line, put it out.
Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many times
that occurred?
A. I would say it happened maybe two or three
times for two or three days each. So days, six to ten
days total.
Q. Over how long of a period of time?
A. Since the inception of the park.
Q. You would estimate for six days of the last 20
years those portions oflots I through 4 colored orange
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Q. And, in fact, had you thought that, you would
have discontinued lease negotiations, correct?
A.Correct.
.
Q. With respect to alleged damages caused by the
r
RV center operation, that operation has been going from ~
July 2008 until today, correct?
A. Correct.
~
Q. Can you identify a single perspective tenant
who Jacklin has lost as a result of the operation?
.~
A. No.
Q. Can you identify a single land sale that was
~
foregone because of the operation?
A. No.
!
Q. Have you done any -- have you commissioned any i
study or analysis to determine whether the Blue Dog
.
operation would have a negative impact on prospective
t
tenants or prospective land sales?
A. Don't need to. I know it does.
Q. Didn't answer my question.
A. No.
Q. Have you undertaken -- strike that. Have you
engaged an expert to assess whether or not the RV
operation would cause Jacklin to lose tenants or to
forego land sales?
A. No. We're the expert.
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1
Q. And do you think that the real estate market
2 in the Post Falls area is currently depressed because
3 of the economic climate?
4
A. I would say no, not ours. We have still had
5 strong commercial sales with rising prices up until
6 maybe earlier this year. So it might be happening now.
7 I mean, right now it's starting to wane. Commercial
8 land tends to lag residential in general.
9
Q. Do you think that the depressed economic times
10 that the nation as a whole is suffering, that the
11 region is suffering, is having any impact on land sales
12 within the Riverbend Commerce Park?
·13
A. Yes.
14
Q. Is it fair to say for the time period from
15 1990 through the present that this is probably the
16 worst economic time with respect to selling commercial
17 property that this area has ever faced?
18
A. By "this area, you mean Riverbend Commerce
19 Park?
20
Q. For the Post Falls area.
21
A. Post Falls in general? Probably.
22
Q. You referred to an Exhibit F to your
23 declaration, which wasn't marked as an exhibit.
24
MR. HINES: But if you don't mind, counsel, if
25 I could take a look at it.
It
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A. Correct.
2
Q. And would that -~ and could constitute a first
3 class shopping center, correct?
4
A. It could.
5
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MR. MAGNUSON: Absolutely.
BY MR. HINES: '
Q. The first page of Exhibit F is a letter, cover
letter, and then there's an attached agreement. Do you
see that, sir?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When Mr. Magnuson examined you, this is what
your testimony concerned, correct?
A. ,Correct.
Q. This agreement, was it ever a recorded
agreement?
A. That agreement was not recorded.
Q. Was it ever a recorded encumbrance on the
property at issue in this lawsuit?
A. Not that agreement.
Q. And, in fact, the only recorded encumbrance is
Article 10MR MAGNUSON: Exhibit 10 you mean.
BY MR. HINES:
Q. Exhibit 10, which we have talked about
extensively, correct?
A. Exhibit 10 was recorded.
Q. You testified that an RV sales center could be
a permissible use within the Riverbend Commerce Park,
correct?

~

Q. And as such it could then be a permissible use
for KLP's lots I through 4, correct?
A. It could.
Q. Was that ever communicated to KLP?
A. They had the CC&R's. Anybody who buys a piece
ofland, we don't track them down and say, hey, by the
way. We don't have that obligation, no.
"
Q. I didn't ask why you didn't do it. I asked
did you ever communicate to KLP or Blue Dog that an RV ~
sales center could, in fact, be a first class shopping
!
center and be a permissible use on lots I through 4.
MR. MAGNUSON: Objection. Asked and answered. ,
A. I didn't hear what you said.
." ~
MR. MAGNUSON: You can go ahead. I objected.
~
A. We never specifically stated that.
!
BY MR. HINES:
Q. And, in fact, you personally, and your
individual deposition is going to follow here, but you
personally had no discussions with Blue Dog or KLP with
respect to the R V operation; is that correct?
A. No, that's not correct. I believe it was Dave

i
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Russell who called me from his cell phone while I was
in Portland on my cell phone while Mr. Leffel was on
vacation, and I indicated that what they were doing on
the KLP property wasn't in compliance with the CC&R's
and didn't meet the first class shopping mall standard.
Q. When was that communication?
A. It had to be in early july. I don't have the
date, and I'm not even sure 'if it was Dave Russell.
But I can't imagine it would be anybody but Dave
Russell because that was the only contact Pat had. And
Pat had given Dave Russell my contact information. So
it was kind of a callout of the blue.
Q. Was it after Blue Dog's RV operation was in
place?
A. Yes.
Q. Other than that one contact, did you ever have
any communications with Blue Dog or KLP with respect to
the RV operation?
A. No.
Q. AU other communications would have been
between Mr. Leffel and KLP, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And in the one conversation that you had, did
you ever offer to sit down and work with KLP or'Blue
Dog to come up with'an acceptable configuration of the
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
ISB No.4270
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-08-6752

JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT K.L.P.
PROPERTIES, INC.'S FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff,

vs.
BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corpo~ation;
THE PATTERSON FAMIL Y 2000 TRUST
CREATED UITIA DATED FEBRUARY 25,
2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON,
TRUSTEE; THE BRANAGH FAMIL Y 2000
TRUST CREATED UITIA DATED
JANUARY 13,2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH,
TRUSTEE; KL PROPERTIES, INC., a
California corporation; RICHARD A.
CORDES and SUZANNE M. CORDES,
husband and wife; DAVID BARNES and
MICHELLE BARNES, husband and wife;
GARY L. PATTERSON and ELIZABETH
PATTERSON, husband and wife; PHILLIP 1.
DION and KIMBERLY L. DION, husband
and wife; and ANDREW J. BRANAGH and
ANNE C. BRANAGH, husband and wife,
Defendants.
TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS;

AND TO:

YOUR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, MICHAEL J. HINES, MICHAEL
SCHMIDT, AND LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 33(a) and 34, Plaintiffhereby responds to Defendant K. L. P. Properties,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT K.L.P. PROPERTIES, INC.'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
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Inc. 's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, to Plaintiff, dated
October 22, 2008.

DISCOVERY REQUESTS
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify each and every individual participating in
answering the discovery requests contained herein.
ANSWER: Tom Stoeser, President and CEO, Jacklin Land Company, 4752 West Riverbend
Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho 83854; Bruce Cyr, Property Manager-Riverbend, Jacklin Land Company,
4752 West Riverbend Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho 83854; and John F. Magnuson, attorney for Jacklin
Land Company, P.O. Box 2350, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-2350.
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please state the name and address of each person known to you
who has knowledge of the facts and circumstances at issue in this lawsuit and the substance of the
knowledge each individual is believed to possess.
ANSWER:
Tom Stoeser. Mr. Stoeser's address and current relationship with Jacklin Land Company is
set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 1. Mr. Stoeser was formerly CFO of Jacklin Seed
Company. Mr. Stoeser held that position in 1990. Mr. Stoeser was also property manager for
Riverbend Commerce Park in 1990. In that capacity, Mr. Stoeser negotiated the terms of the
Agreement between Jacklin Land Company and Quality Centers Associates which is recorded as
Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint on file
herein. Mr. Stoeser also has knowledge of the consensual encumbrances placed upon the property
now owned by the Defendant owners and leased to Defendant Blue Dog. Mr. Stoeser also has
knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the allegations in this Complaint, to wit, that
Defendants are in breach of the recorded and consensual limitations that pertain to the use of the
property owned by the Defendant owners and leased by Defendant Blue Dog.
Bruce Cyr. As set forth in response to Interrogatory No.1, Mr. Cyr is the current Property
Manager for Riverbend Commerce Park and is employed by Jacklin Land Company. Mr. Cyr began
his employment with Jacklin Land Company in September of2008. Mr. Cyr has knowledge that the
current use of the property owned by the Defendant owners and leased to Defendant Blue Dog is in
violation of the recorded limitations that pertain to the same. Mr. Cyr also has general knowledge
ofthe recorded limitations that pertain to the remainder of the Riverbend Commerce Park properties.
Pat Leffel. Mr. Leffel is currently residing in the State of California. Mr. Leffel can be
contacted through Plaintiff s counsel. Mr. Leffel is the former Property Manager for Riverbend
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT K.L.P. PROPERTIES, INC. 'S
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Commerce Park. In that capacity, he was employed by Jacklin Land Company between March 29,
1993 and his retirement in approximately September of2008. Mr. Leffel has knowledge of certain
contacts by or between Jacklin Land Company on the one hand, and Blue Dog, RV and/or the
Defendant owners, on the other hand, which pertain to Blue Dog's efforts to find a leasehold and the
knowledge provided to Blue Dog and the Defendant owners that the current use of the subject
property is disallowed under the recorded limitations that pertain thereto. Mr. Leffel's contacts with
the Defendants are as further described in response to Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12. The
answers set forth in response to said interrogatories are incorporated herein as though set forth in
full.
Shaun Jackson. Mr. Jackson, at the time of the negotiation of Kootenai County Instrument
No. 1200512 (the Agreement) between Jacklin Land Company and Quality Centers Associates, was
in-house counsel to Benderson Development Company, Inc., one of the parties to Agreement. Mr.
Jackson was last known to be at 570 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202-1284 (phone 716886-0211). Mr. Jackson has knowledge of the negotiations leading up to the execution and
recordation ofInstrument No. 1200512 and the fact that the uses to which the Defendant owners and
Blue Dog have placed the subject property are inconsistent with the terms of said Agreement.
Quality Centers Associates. Quality Centers Associates was a joint venture with offices at
570 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202. Quality Centers Associates, through qualified
agents, which possibly include H. Gary Stetson, Randall Benderson, and David H. Baldauf(signators
to Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512), has knowledge ofthe facts and matters attributed to
attorney Jackson in the paragraph immediately preceding.
The Defendant Owners. The Defendant owners (i.e., all defendants named herein exclusive
of Blue Dog RV, Inc.) have personal knowledge that the subject property at issue in this proceeding
was purchased with actual and constructive knowledge of the recorded limitations that pertain
thereto (including those arising under Instrument No. 1200512), that the uses to which the property
has been put by said owners (Blue Dog RV, Inc.) are unauthorized, and that said unauthorized uses
were knowingly made and perpetuated, continuing to this date.
Blue Dog RV, Inc. Blue Dog has knowledge that the uses to which it has placed the subject
leasehold (i.e., the Defendant owners' property) is impermissible under the terms of recorded
limitations that pertain thereto, including those set forth in, or otherwise incorporated into, Kootenai
County Instrument No. 1200512.
Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery
merits.
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INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please state the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
those individuals you intend to call as witnesses at the trial on this matter.
ANSWER: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to those individuals it intends to call
as witnesses at trial. The identities of said individuals will be seasonably disclosed in conformity
with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial Order as may hereafter be entered by the Court. Plaintiff
notes, however, that it is reasonable to presume that those individuals identified in response to
Interrogatory No.1 will likely be called to testify at trial.
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify and set forth the name and address of each
person whom you expect to call as an expert witness at trial. With respect to each person, please
state:
a.

the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify.

b.

the subject matter of the facts and opinions to which each expert is expected testify.

c.

a summary of the grounds of each opinion.

d.

the names and addresses of any treaties, books, articles, essays or other writings,
published or unpublished by the expert relating in any way to the subject matter to
which he is expected to testified. For each published article and essay, state the title
of the book, journal or the work in which it can be found and the name of the
publisher. For each unpublished article and essay, attach copies of such article or
essay to these Interrogatories.

e.

state the title of each case, the court in which filed and the docket number of each
case in which said witness has testified at trial or in deposition.

f.

set forth the qualifications of said witnesses.

ANSWER: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to those individuals qualified as
"expert witnesses" whom it intends to call to testify at any trial in this proceeding. The identities of
said individuals will be seasonably disclosed in conformity with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial
Order as may hereafter be entered by the Court or a determination to call said witnesses has been
made.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce all documents identified in,
supporting or otherwise relating to the immediately proceeding interrogatory, including without
limitation each expert's entire expert file, all expert reports (including drafts), all written
communication between the expert and counsel, and all documents relied upon by the expert in
forming the expert's opinion or generating expert reports. ("Expert") is defined to include all
persons who worked with or on behalf of the expert who is expected to give testimony even if such
person(s) is/are not expressly identified as an expert in this matter.
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RESPONSE: Plaintiff has yet to make a determination as to the identities of any expert
witnesses it expects to caIl to testify at trial in this proceeding.

Accordingly, there are no

"documents," at present, responsive to Request for Production No.1. The identities of said experts,
if any, wiIl be seasonably disclosed in conformity with the terms of such Uniform Pre-Trial Order
as may hereafter be entered by the Court. Upon said disclosure, if any, Plaintiff wiIl seasonably
produce any discoverable material encompassed by Request For Production No.1.
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and any
of the defendants named in your complaint regarding their use of the Subj ect Property.
ANSWER:
Pat Leffel
On April 15, 2008, Dave RusseIl of Blue Dog, RV, phoned Pat Leffel. RusseIl asked if the
three to four acres ofland westward of and adjacent to the Jacklin Land Company office was for sale.
This property is generaIly depicted on the photograph produced in response to Request For
Production No.2 (for identification purposes) and labeled "Jacklin." RusseIl indicated he was having
a problem with his current landlord and was looking at his options.
On April 17,2008, RusseIl came to the Jacklin Land Company office and asked if Jacklin
Land Company would give him a lease rate on a 10,000 square building and six acres ofland (with
5 of the acres paved). This is also property depicted on the map described in the preceding paragraph
(and produced in response to Request For Production No.2) labeled "Jacklin."
On April 18,2008, Leffel caIled RusseIl to discuss his response to the projected lease rates.
RusseIl said the company (Blue Dog RV, Inc.) was "on hold" and would see if they could get any
"action from their landlord" and if the landlord would not so act, RusseIl would caIl Leffel back.
On April 22, 2008, RusseIl caIled Leffel asking for the contact information on the "Factory
Outlet" property and said he was "just keeping his options open."
On April 29 ,2008, Leffel phoned Russell. RusseIl indicated that it looked like Blue Dog was
going to work things out at their current location but that he would caIl Leffel first ifhe ran into any
problems again.
On May 13, 2008, RusseIl caIled and again wanted to talk about 4 acres (adjacent to the
Jacklin Land Company office to the west (depicted in general terms as "Jacklin") on the photograph
produced in response to Request For Production No.2, with just a sales office and a service facility
in a different location. He suggested that the service facility could be in an existing structure on
other Riverbend Commerce Park property in the Phase 4 area. RusseIl also indicated that he was
checking on the property across the street (lots 1 through 4 of Phase 1) (the property at issue in this
proceeding) to see if the owner expected to build anything in the next few years or if the owner
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT K.L.P. PROPERTIES, INC.'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS PAGE-5

714

would sell.
On June 19, 2008, Russell called Leffel again asking about space for lease in an existing
building in the Riverbend Commerce Park. Jacklin Land Company checked into the cost to put in
a bathroom, relocate the power, and put in a floor drain into the space (approximately 3,200 square
feet) and provided the information to Mr. Russell. Russell indicated that he would talk with Blue
Dog's owner and get back to Leffel. The anticipated cost was estimated at $15,000.00. Leffel
advised Russell that this "may not be a good fit" but that the parties could talk more after Russell
had talked with Blue Dog's owner.
On July 7, 2008, Russell came to the Jacklin Land Company office and told Leffel that Blue
Dog had leased property "from the Outlets" and was going to do site work the week of July 14.
Russell indicated that Blue Dog would like to rent two acres west of the Jacklin Land Company
office for seven (7) days just to park the trailers while the site work was being done.
On July 10,2008, Rick Cordes, an agent for the Defendant owners, e-mailed Leffel. Cordes
confirmed that a lease had been entered into by the Defendant owners with Blue Dog. The e-mail
is produced in response to Request For Production No.2.
Leffel responded bye-mail dated July 14, 2008. Leffel advised Cordes of the restrictions
arising under Instrument No. 1200512, and the applicable CC&R provisions contained therein, and
Jacklin's position that the proposed Blue Dog was in breach of said encumbrances and/or covenants.
The e-mail is produced in response to Request For Production No.2.
Cordes responded on July 14,2008 bye-mail, apologizing "for not knowing this information
or being aware of the CC&R restrictions for this parcel." Cordes stated, "I will notifY Blue Dog RV
now and will make other arrangements." A copy ofthe e-mail is produced in response to Request
For Production No.2.
On July 15, 2008, Leffel advised Cordes that Jacklin wanted Blue Dog off the subject
property within ten (10) days. A copy of the e-mail is attached in response to Request For
Production No.2.
On July 15,2008, Cordes responded bye-mail (Request For Production No.2) stating that
his attorney would review the CC&Rs and respond at a later date.
On July 16, 2008, Cordes responded bye-mail (Request For Production No.2). Cordes
denied the existence of a breach, going back on his representation of July 10, to wit, that he would
tell Blue Dog to go to another location. The remainder of the referenced e-mail, produced in
response to Request For Production No.2, has been redacted on the basis of the attorney/client
privilege. In his July 16, 2008 e-mail, Cordes made no reference to the Agreement recorded as
Instrument No. 1200512, instead referring solely to the CC&Rs.
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On July 16,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes (Request For Production No.2), advising Cordes
of the limitations contained in Instrument No. 1200512. The e-mail is produced in response to
Request For Production No.2.
Cordes responded on July 16,2008 bye-mail (Request For Production No.2), stating that he
(the Defendant owners) were not aware of a written agreement between Jacklin Land Company and
Quality Centers Associates. Cordes asked for a copy of the Agreement.
On July 16,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes a copy of the Agreement. Cordes responded that
he would review the agreement (Instrument No. 1200512) and respond. Copies of all confirming
e-mails are produced in response to Request For Production No.2.
On July 22,2008, Leffel e-mailed Cordes. Leffel had previously received no response from
Cordes regarding Instrument No. 1200512 and Jacklin's claims that said Agreement had been
breached by the Blue Dog lease. A copy of the e-mail is produced in response to Request For
Production No.2.
On July 24, 2008, a representative for the Defendant owners advised that they would not
cause the removal of Blue Dog. A copy of the confirming e-mail, from Gary Patterson, is produced
in response to Request For Production No.2.
Contacts following that date, between Jacklin Land Company and Blue Dog and/or the
Defendant owners were between Jacklin Land Company's counsel (John F. Magnuson) and counsel
for the Defendant owners and Blue Dog RV. That correspondence began August 5, 2008 and has
continued to date. Defendants are in possession of copies of that correspondence, in letter form
and/or e-mail, as they were the recipients thereof.
Tom Stoeser
Tom Stoeser received one cell phone call in late June or early July of2008. The person who
phoned was in Oregon. The person was calling on behalf of Blue Dog, RV. Stoeser fielded the call
in Leffel's absence (Leffel was on vacation). Inquiry was made by the individual as to any CC&R
restrictions on the property at issue in this proceeding. Stoeser advised them of the restrictions
arising under Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and the CC&R provision incorporated
therein.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Copies of the documents responsive to Request For Production No.2 are
produced herewith and include the e-mails identified or discussed in the response to Interrogatory
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No.5 as weIl as a one-page typed sheet of Pat Leffel's notes of verbal communications with Blue
Dog and/or Rick Cordes.
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and any
ofthe defendants named in your Complaint regarding any aIleged violations of the Agreement and/or
any violations of any covenants, conditions, and restrictions you claim are applicable to the Subject
Property.
ANSWER:

Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Please see documents identified and produced in response to Request For
Production No.2.
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please identify all covenants, conditions, restrictions, or any
other agreements that you claim apply to Lots 1 through 4 of Block Two of Riverbend Commercial
Park Phase 1.
ANSWER:

The use restrictions that apply by consensual agreement to the property

identified in Interrogatory No.7 include the foIlowing:
(1)

The restrictions arising under the Agreement recorded as Kootenai County Instrument

No. 1200512; and
(2)

Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in Kootenai County Instrument Nos. 1135200,

1155659, and 1155779.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced herewith.
INTERROGA TORY NO.8: Please identify each Jacklin agent, em pI oyee, or representati ve
that communicated in any way with Blue Dog RV, and for each person identified, set forth the
specific topics of the communication.
ANSWER:

Pat Leffel, Tom Stoeser, and John F. Magnuson. Please see answer to

Interrogatory No.5 for subject matter of discussions.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT K.L.P. PROPERTIES, INC.'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS PAGE-8

717

INTERROGATOR Y NO.9: Please identify all communications between Jacklin and Blue
Dog RV, including any communications between either parties' representatives, agents, or
employees.
ANSWER:

Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request For Production Nos.
and 6.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce all documents that refer to or
involve Blue Dog RV, including without limitation, all documents regarding potentially leasing real
property to Blue Dog.
RESPONSE: Please see those documents produced in response to Request For Production
No.2 as well as those produced herewith in response to Request For Production No.6.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce all documents that relate to
Jacklin's claims in its Complaint.
RESPONSE: Objection. Request For Production No.7 is over broad, ambiguous, and
unduly burdensome. In addition, Request For Production No.7 calls for information protected by
the attorney-client privilege and the Attorney Work Product Doctrine. Without waiving said
objection, and subject to the same, please see all documents produced in response to these discovery
requests.

INTERROGATORY NO.1 0: Please identify by Phase, Block and Lot Number, the

property Jacklin offered to lease to Blue Dog RV.
ANSWER:

Discussions were had between Jacklin Land Company and Blue Dog RV as

to a built to suit for Blue Dog's entire operations, and the lease associated therewith, on the
following properties: Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park; and Lots 1
through 2, Block 1, Phase II, Riverbend Commerce Park.
Discussions regarding a potential lease for a service shop were also discussed with Blue Dog
as a portion of a building on Lot 3, Block 1, Phase II, Riverbend Commerce Park.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
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RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request For Production Nos.2
and 6.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please set forth each covenant, condition, and restriction, or
other agreement that applies to the property you identified in your answer to Interrogatory No.1 O.
ANSWER:

Exclusive of easements or plat conditions otherwise made a matter of public

record, please see Kootenai County Instrument No. 2066271000 and the provisions set forth therein.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Produced herewith.
INTERROGA TO R Y NO. 12: Please identify all communications relating to Jacklin's offer
to lease to Blue Dog RV the property identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 10.
ANSWER:

Please see answer to Interrogatory No.5 and the documents produced in

response to Request for Production Nos. 2 and 6.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce each document relating to
Jacklin's offer to lease to Blue Dog RV the property identified in your answer to Interrogatory No.
10.
RESPONSE: Please see documents produced in response to Request for Production Nos.
2 and 6.
INTERROGA TORY NO. 13: Please state whether any other lots in Riverbend Commercial
Park Phase I are subject to the to the same or substantially similar restrictions as the Subject
Property.
ANSWER:

Lots 1 through 17, Block 1, Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park, and Lots

1 through 14, Block 4, Phase I of Riverbend Commerce Park are subject to the terms of Kootenai
County Instrument No. 1200512 and Articles 2 through 6 Kootenai County Instrument Nos.
1135200,1155659, and 1155779. Every remaining lot in Phase I is subject to the same CC&Rs and
any subsequent amendment thereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

If your answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

affirmative, please identify:
(a)

The blocks and lots subject to the same or substantially similar restrictions;

(b)

Whether Jacklin sold or leased the identified blocks or lots; and

(c)

The person that owns or leases the blocks or lots.
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ANSWER:

Objection. Interrogatory No. 14 is unduly burdensome and not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Many of said lots have been sold and
resold by the parties purchasing the same. The current status of title is a matter of public record
equally accessible to these Defendants as it is to the Plaintiff. Moreover, said information is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said
objection, and subject to the same, Plaintiff states that the following lots have been sold: Block 1,
Lots 1 through 20; Block 3, Lots 1, 2, 7 and 8; Block 4, Lots 1 through 14, and Block 5, Lots 1
through 5. Jacklin Land Company still owns Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, and Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of
Block 3.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 14 is unduly burdensome and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Many of said lots have been sold and
resold by the parties purchasing the same. The current status of title is a matter of public record
equally accessible to these Defendants as it is to the Plaintiff. Moreover, said information is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said
objection, and subject to the same, Plaintiff states that the following lots have been sold: Block 1,
Lots 1 through 20; Block 3, Lots 1, 2, 7 and 8; Block 4, Lots 1 through 14, and Block 5, Lots 1
through 5. Jacklin Land Company still owns Lots 1 through 4, Block 2, and Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of
Block 3.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: In regard to paragraph 26 of your Complaint wherein you
claim that Blue Dog's use of the Subject Property is inconsistent with the requirement that the
Subject Property be utilized solely for a first class shopping center, please identifY:
(a)

Each person that has knowledge of this claim;

(b)

The specific covenants of the specific document(s) that define a "first class shopping

center;" and
(c)

Each document that supports this claim.

ANSWER:
(a) Please see those individuals identified in response to Interrogatory No.2.
(b)

The term "first class shopping center" is reasonably susceptible to common

understanding based upon the actions contemporaneously undertaken by Defendants' predecessor-intitle in developing such portions of the property encumbered by Instrument No. 1200512 as have
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been developed for shopping center purposes, with the consent of Plaintiff. Said phrase is commonly
understood not to include the unimproved use of the subject property for rental or sale purposes
associated with RVs.
(c)

Please see Kootenai County Instrument No. 1200512 and the documents produced

in response to Request for Production No. 12.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
ANSWER:

Please see documents produced herewith.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

Please state whether any other property in Riverbend

Commercial Park is subject to a requirement that it be utilized solely for a "first class shopping
center;" and if your answer is in the affirmative, please:
(a)

IdentifY each property subject to this requirement by block and lot number;

(b)

State whether the property subject to this requirement has been sold, or has been
or is now leased;

(c)

IdentifY each owner or lessee of the property since Jacklin first sold or leased the
property subject to this requirement.

ANSWER:
(a)

Lots 1 through 17, Block 1, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park and Lots 1 through

14, Block 4, Phase I, Riverbend Commerce Park.
(b)

All of said properties have been sold to third-parties.

(c)

Objection. Interrogatory No. 16 is over broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive.

In addition, Interrogatory No. 16 (c) calls for information not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence and seeks to place on Plaintiff a burden to obtain publicly-available
information which is equally available to Defendants as to this Plaintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: In regard to paragraph 26 of your Complaint wherein you
claim that Blue Dog's utilization ofthe Subject property "was done so without.,. 'working together
with Jacklin, '" please identifY:
(a)

Each person who has knowledge of this claim;

(b)

The specific document that defines "working together;" and

(c)

Each document that supports this claim.

ANSWER:
(a)

Please see those individuals identified in Response to Interrogatory No.2.
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(b)

The term "work together" is commonly understood and, by its own terms, requires

the mutual consent of both the burdened and benefitted property owners. Otherwise, see Instrument
No. 1200512.
(c)

See Instrument No. 1200512 and those documents produced in response to Request

for Production No. 12.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Please see Instrument No. 1200512 and those documents produced in response
to Request for Production No. 12.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please identify the specific individuals who drafted the
following documents:
(a)

The Agreement; and

(b)

The covenants, conditions, and restrictions you claim apply to the Subject

Property.
ANSWER:
(a)

Mike Nienstadt, attorney for Plaintiff, and Shaun Jackson, attorney for those parties

to said Agreement other than Jacklin Land Company.
(b)

Attorneys at Wetzel & Wetzel Law Office in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Please identify all lawsuits involving Jacklin and property in
Riverbend Commercial Park since 1988 by jurisdiction, caption, and file number; and for each
lawsuit identified, please set forth the disposition of the lawsuit.
ANSWER:

Objection.

Interrogatory No. 19 calls for information not reasonably

calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce all documents and/or tangible
things relating to or otherwise supporting your answer to the immediately proceeding interrogatory,
including, but not limited to, copies of all such written communication and notes relating to verbal
communications.
RESPONSE: Objection. Request for Production No. 14 calls for information not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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Dated this

~~

of December, 2008.

---
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Kootenai

) ss.
)

TOM STOESER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: I am the President of
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho limited liability limited partnership, the Plaintiff abovenamed, and make this verification for and on its behalf; that I have read the above and foregoing
answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, know the contents thereof,
and believe the same to be true.

.

_J~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this~ay of December, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of tht;, foregoing document was served upon the
following, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~ day of December, 2008:
Michael 1. Hines
Michael Schmidt
Lukins & Annis, P. S.
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201-0466

Fax: 509/747-2323

JACKLIN-BLUE DOG-RESPONSES TO KLPROGS.wpd
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STATE OF IDAHO
\ S5
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlt

FILED:

2009 JUL 27 PM 2: 57

MICHAEL J. HINES
ISB #6876
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT
ISB #6911
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S.
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W Sprague Ave
Spokane. WA 99201-0466
Telephone: (509) 455-9555
Facsimile: (509) 747-2323
Attomevs for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JACKLIN LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
limited partnership,
NO. CV-08-6752
Plaintiff,
v.

BLUE DOG RV, INC., an Idaho corporation;
THE PATTERSON FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED U/T/A DATED FEBRUARY 25,
2000; GAYLEN C. PATTERSON, TRUSTEE;
THE BRANAGH FAMILY 2000 TRUST
CREATED U/T/A DATED JANUARY 13,
2000; JOHN A. BRANAGH, TRUSTEE; KL
PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation;
RICHARD A. CORDES and SUZANNE M.
CORDES, husband and wife; DAVID
BARNES and MICHELLE BARNES, husband
and wife; GARY 1. PATTERSON and
ELIZABETH PATTERSON, husband and
wife; PHILLIP J. DION and KIMBERLY 1.
DION, husband and wife; and ANDREW J.
BRANAGH and ANNE C. BRANAGH,
husband and wife,

RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1)
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION: 1
K:\K\KLP024461 \BLUEDOG00002\PLDG\RESPONSE--SECOND SJM-072209-TRP-TRP.DOCX 7/27/09
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Defendants hereby respectfully submit this response to Plaintiff's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, which is alternatively noted as a Motion for Reconsideration.

I. INTRODUCTION
Jacklin's current motions seek a court order, whether by declaratory relief or a
permanent injunction, that Defendants "cease and desist from using the subject property for the
storage and/or parking ofRVs by a date certain, and that any future uses of the subject property
by either or both of the Defendants conform with the substance and procedures contained in the
QCAJJacklin Agreement and Articles 2-6 of the CC&Rs incorporated therein." See
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2)
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 15. Jacklin's current motions encompass only one issue:
Whether Jacklin must demonstrate an irreparable harm in order to receive the
injunctive/declaratory relief it requests.
The court has already decided this issue in its June 15,2009, Memorandum Decision
and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment ("Decision and Order"), finding that 1)
Jacklin must demonstrate irreparable damage in order for an injunction to issue, and 2) that
Jacklin cannot demonstrate any irreparable injury at the summary judgment stage. The Court
reserved for trial the issue of injury and damages. In its current motions, Jacklin still doesn't
allege any irreparable damage, it ignores the on-point Idaho authority requiring a plaintiff to
prove irreparable harm in order for an injunction to issue, it ignores the Court's discussion and
decision on this issue, and it doesn't provide the Court with any binding authority that requires
the Court to change its Decision and Order.

RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S (1) SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION: 2
K:\K\KLP02446I \BLUEDOG00002\PLDG\RESPONSE--SECOND SJM -072209-TRP-TRP .DOCX 7/27/09

If a trial court's conclusions are correct on the previous record, and it does not thereafter
receive any infonnation that would change its previous ruling, there is no basis for it to
overturn its initial decision. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001)
(Supreme Court affinned district court's denial of reconsideration motion, stating that "the
district court was provided with no new facts to create an issue for trial, and thus there was no
basis upon which to reconsider its summary judgment order).
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court to deny Jacklin's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment/Motion for Reconsideration.

II. FACTS
For purposes ofthe pending motions only, Defendants incorporate by reference the
undisputed facts as set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment filed on June 15,2009. Specifically, Defendants incorporate herein the
Court's findings that:
1.

The declaratory judgment Jacklin seeks would likely not provide Jacklin the

authority to evict Blue Dog. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment, p. 22.

2.

Jacklin failed to cite any authority for the proposition that injunctive relief of a

permanent nature can issue to ensure that the prevailing party obtains the benefit of its bargain.
Id. at 24.
3.

Jacklin has not provided the Court (at least not at summary judgment) with

evidence of waste or great injury, as required by I.R.C.P. 65(e). Id. at 25.
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4.

Jacklin provided testimony that it will be damaged, but did not provide

testimony or even argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated with a monetary
award. Jacklin's evidence regarding damage is speculative because Jacklin has not pointed to a
tenant that has left, that is thinking about leaving, or a identified a prospective tenant that has
decided not to rent land as a result of the presence of Blue Dog. Id. at 26.
5.

Granting Jacklin a permanent injunction at the summary judgment stage would

give Jacklin the principal relief it seeks without the case going to trial. Id.
6.

Jacklin has not alleged that defendants are removing or disposing of their own

property with the intent to defraud Jacklin. Id. at 27.
7.

Jacklin has not provided the Court with evidence entitling it to enjoin Blue

Dog's continued business on the subject property. Id.
8.

The Court denied Jacklin's motion for summary judgment as to its entitlement to

declaratory relief sought (eviction) and injunctive relief sought. Id.
III. ANAL YIS

A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when all ofthe facts contained

in all the applicable pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits have been construed
most favorably to the nonmoving party, and it is clear that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bailey v. Ness,
109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985); I.R.C.P. 56(c). The evidence must be construed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897,
899, 876 P.2d 595 (1994). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
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inferences must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851 (1991). If the evidence is conflicting on
material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is
not appropriate. Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120, 645 P .2d 350 (1982). A material fact is
one upon which the outcome ofthe case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849,
908 P.2d 143 (1995).

B.

JACKLIN MUST ESTABLISH GREAT OR IRREPARABLE HARM IN ORDER
FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION TO ISSUE.
As the Court set forth in its Decision and Order, LR.C.P. 65(e) requires a plaintiffto,

among other things, demonstrate that the complained-of act would produce waste or great or
irreparable injury. The Court determined that Jacklin did not provide evidence of waste or
great or irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, and reserved the issue of injury
and damages for trial.
Jacklin contends that I.R. C.P. 65( e) sets forth the requirements for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and therefore does not apply to its request for a permanent injunction.
However, Jacklin fails to cite any case law that sets separate standards for the issuance of
preliminary and permanent injunctions.! At a minimum, the irreparable harm element must be
proven in order for either type of injunction to issue. In fact, case law has made it very clear
that the "irreparable harm" element required by I.R.c.P. 65(e) is also required in order for a
permanent injunction to issue.

! It appears that Jacklin is actually seeking a preliminary injunction anyway because this matter
has not gone to trial, and granting a permanent injunction at this stage of the proceedings would
give Jacklin all the relief it seeks, which would be contrary to Idaho law. See Section E.,
below.
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The Idaho Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and United States Supreme Court have each
held that irreparable harm must be shown in order for a permanent injunction to issue. See Ada
County v. Fuhrman, 140 Idaho 230,91 P.3d 1134 (2004) (Idaho Supreme Court analyzed
whether the plaintiff made an adequate demonstration of irreparable harm to determine whether
the district court properly issued a permanent injunction); Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567
(D.Idaho 1999) (requirements for issuance of a permanent injunction is the likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law. Court
declined to address plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction because plaintiffs did not even
make an attempt to show the court that they meet the specific standards which permit the grant
of a permanent injunction); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1495
(9th Cir.1996) (permanent injunction may be granted to party that demonstrates the likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law);
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843 (9 th Cir. 2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.388, 391 (2006) (permanent injunctive relief only authorized
when the claimant demonstrates that it has suffered irreparable injury).
Despite the Court's decision and order specifically requiring Jacklin to establish
irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, Jacklin's present motions do not address or
even allege any irreparable injury that Jacklin may have suffered. Furthermore, Jacklin has not
provided any binding authority contrary to the Court's previous decision regarding the
requirement to prove irreparable injury in order for a permanent injunction to issue. As a
result, an injunction should not issue.
C.

JACKLIN MUST SHOW IRREPARABLE INJURY EVEN IF A RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT IS VIOLATED.
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Idaho clearly requires a plaintiff to show irreparable harm in order for an injunction to
issue. Jacklin has cited no Idaho authority, or other binding authority, that relieves a plaintiff
ofthis burden where a real property restrictive covenant is violated.
In Jacklin's present motions, it spends much of its memorandum citing non-binding
authority for the proposition that it doesn't have to show irreparable harm where a restrictive
covenant is breached. Jacklin has not shown that such a rule has been adopted by Idaho courts,
the Ninth Circuit, or the U.S. Supreme Court.
As set forth above, Idaho, the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court all require a
showing of irreparable harm in order for an injunction to issue. Jacklin has not cited any
authority binding on this Court that eliminates Jacklin's burden to demonstrate irreparable harm
in this case involving a restrictive covenant.
Moreover, contrary to Jacklin's assertion, per se irreparable harm is not the general rule
in the restrictive covenant context. Jacklin has not cited any Idaho, Ninth Circuit or Supreme
Court case law stating that forth as the general rule. To the contrary, Washington and Montana,
two neighboring states, both require a showing of irreparable harm in the restrictive covenant
context in order for an injunction to issue.
Washington courts require a showing of necessity and irreparable injury to be proven in
restrictive covenant cases. Holmes Harbor Water Co., Inc. v. Page, 8 Wn.App. 600, 508 P.2d
628 (1973). In the restrictive covenant context, Washington courts have also held that a
mandatory injunction should not issue where a plaintiff fails to establish that it would suffer
substantial damage if an obstruction is not removed. Id. at 603; citing Nielson v. King County,
72 Wn.2d 720, 435 P.2d 664 (1967); McInnes v. Kennell, 47 Wn.2d 29, 286 P.2d 713 (1955).
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Likewise, Montana requires an applicant seeking a preliminary injunction for a
violation of a restrictive covenant to "establish a prima facie case, or show that it is at least
doubtful whether or not he will suffer irreparable injury before his rights can be fully litigated."
Fox Farm Estates Landowners Ass'n v. Kreisch, 285 Mont. 264, 268, 947 P.2d 79 (1997).
The First Circuit has expressly refused to set aside the burden to establish irreparable
harm simply because real property is involved. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d
4 (1stCir.1991). In Narragansett, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the request for
a preliminary injunction. Id. at 6. The court held that "[i]n cases involving real property, we
have often found the irreparability of the injury to be of paramount concern." Id. The court
continued, "[r]eal estate has long been thought unique ... Be that as it may, irreparable harm is
not assumed; it must be demonstrated. And even where real property is involved, 'speculative
injury does not constitute a showing of irreparable harm. '" Id. at 6-7.
Similarly, in Pub. Servo Co. ofN.H.

V.

Town ofW. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380 (1st Cir.

1987), the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the city from removing several of its utility
poles. Id. at 381. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that "any restraint on any interest in
real property is per se irreparable injury," and explained that "[t]his argument confuses
permanent alienation or destruction of real property, which is incapable of being reconveyed or
restored, with a temporary action subject to reversal with compensation for loss suffered during
the period of deprivation." Id. The court determined that there was no irreparable injury
because the utility poles could be replaced on the same land, and the plaintiff could recover the
cost of the poles, equipment, and installation as damages. Id.
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Jacklin's present motions should be denied because Idaho law requires it to prove
irreparable injury in order for an injunction to issue, and Jacklin has failed to establish
irreparable injury.

D.

AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE EVEN IF JACKLIN CAN
PROVE SOME DAMAGES AT TRIAL, THOSE DAMAGES CAN BE
COMPENSATED BY A MONETARY AWARD.
Preliminarily, Jacklin should not be able to recover any damages in this matter because

it has not requested them and has never put the Defendants on notice that it seeks damages.
Defendants incorporate herein its Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion for
Reconsideration, and the authorities cited therein for this argument.
Notwithstanding the forgoing, in its decision and order the Court states:
There is testimony that Jacklin will be damaged, but no testimony
or even argument as to why that damage cannot be compensated
with a monetary award. The testimony of damage, while logical
and understandable, seems speculative at the present time in that
Jacklin has not pointed to a tenant that has left, is thinking about
leaving, or a prospective tenant that has decided not to rent land as
a result ofthe presence of Blue Dog.
See Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 26. This
is the first reference made in the matter regarding damages.
As noted in Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, the property at issue in
this case has not been developed. See Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8.
Defendants have not developed the property or erected any structures on the property. Id. As
a result, at the expiration of the lease between KLP and Blue Dog, the property can be returned
to the condition it was in prior to Blue Dog's leasehold.
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Should Jacklin be allowed to, and then establish damages at trial, because the property
can be returned to the condition it was in prior to Blue Dog's operation, any such damages can
be compensated by a monetary award. Jacklin has not shown that there is an inadequate
remedy at law. Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D. 567 (D.Idaho 1999) (requirements for issuance of a
permanent injunction is the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the
inadequacy of remedies at law). The Court recognized that Jacklin potentially could suffer
damages in the form of tenants leaving or potential tenants deciding not to lease property.
Although Jacklin has not established any such damages, even if it could, such damages would
be capable of calculation to provide an adequate remedy at law, so an injunction is not a
necessary remedy in this case.

E.

AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE ITS EFFECT WOULD
GIVE JACKLIN ALL THE RELIEF IT SEEKS WITHOUT BRINGING THE
CASE TO TRIAL.
As set forth above, and already determined by this Court, LR.C.P. 65(e) sets forth the

standards for issuance of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent. As noted by the
Court, it is longstanding law in Idaho that an injunction will not issue where its effect is to give
the plaintiffthe principal relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Rowland v.
Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869 (1925); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big
Creek Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282,55 P.2d 720 (1936); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, 144 P.2d
194 (1943).
The Court's decision and order specifically found that Jacklin failed to establish any
damages, let alone an irreparable injury, and reserved for trial the issue of damages. See
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, pp.26-27. If the
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Court were to determine that Jacklin does not have to establish an irreparable injury, and grants
Jacklin an injunction, then Jacklin will have received the relief it seeks without bringing the
case to trial. Such a result would be contrary to LR.C.P. 65(e) and Idaho law.

F.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF IN THE FORM
OF A "CEASE AND DESIST" ORDER.
Jacklin states that its request for declaratory relief in the form of a "cease and desist"

order seeks essentially the same form of relief as sought by the permanent injunction. See

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2)
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14.
Jacklin's argument regarding declaratory relief is based solely on the non-binding
authority it cites for the alleged right to injunctive relief. Id. Jacklin doesn't set forth any
separate case law or other authority to support an argument that declaratory relief in the form of
a "cease and desist" order can be issued. Id. Therefore, since Jacklin's argument regarding
irreparable hann fails as a matter oflaw, its request for declaratory relief in the form of a "cease
and desist" order also fails.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request this Court to deny
Plaintiff s (1) Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) Motion for Reconsideration.
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DATED this~ay of July, 2009.
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

By
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ISB #6876
MICHAELG.
ISB #6911
Attorneys for Defendants
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